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  ABSTRACT 
Encouraging Energy Efficiency: Pricing, Education, and Framing 
By 
Carrie A. Gill 
Doctor of Philosophy of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics 
University of Rhode Island 
 
The US residential sector consumed over 20 quadrillion Btu of energy in 2015, 
costing households billions of dollars in energy bills in addition to negative 
environmental and health externalities from conventional energy generation. Reducing 
energy consumption and promoting energy efficiency are critical for controlling costs, 
minimizing negative environmental impacts, and ensuring security of energy supply. 
Regulators and policy makers rely on a suite of strategies to promote energy efficiency 
and conservation. These strategies vary in degree of control over individual freedom of 
choice, effectiveness and impact, and political and practical feasibility. In this 
dissertation, I investigate the effects of three strategies to promote energy efficiency. 
In the first manuscript, I examine the effects of a time-varying residential 
electricity rate structure. One challenge of promoting energy efficiency is that the true 
marginal costs of electricity are not passed onto the majority of consumers who are 
charged a flat rate for electricity. I exploit quasi-random assignment of TOU rates and 
use a regression discontinuity framework to identify the causal effects of TOU pricing 
on four outcomes over the twelve months following treatment for high-use households. 
Though microeconomic theory predicts households shift consumption from peak to off-
	  peak hours, I find only suggestive evidence that this is the case. I find a decrease in 
level of peak consumption six to eight months following treatment along with a 
decrease in total consumption, suggesting energy conservation rather than load 
deferment and possibly indicating spillover effects of energy conservation into off-peak 
hours. I find evidence for decreases in electricity bill amounts, consistent with both 
more favorable marginal prices for households with already-low peak proportion and 
decreased consumption. 
In the second manuscript, I evaluate the effectiveness of in-school energy 
education lessons. Despite the prevalence of such education, there is little empirical 
evidence to support the efficacy of these programs on tangible outcomes outside of 
school. Using a differences-in-differences approach, I find evidence for short-term 
reductions on the order of eight percent in electricity use the day of a lesson regarding 
reducing phantom electric loads, with evidence of deferment in electricity use rather than 
reduction. I find no effect of lessons on energy pathways or wind energy on the days of 
the lessons. Findings show that energy education is potentially a valuable tool for 
encouraging energy efficiency and conservation, though the timing of lessons and 
curriculum content are critical to optimize treatment effects. 
In the third manuscript, I explore two facets of choice architecture that can 
encourage more energy-efficient behavior intentions. One challenge of promoting 
energy-efficient behavior change is status quo bias: limiting energy use often requires 
sacrificing convenience and comfort now and in the future. Using experimental data, I 
explore what temporal frame (e.g. daily, monthly, or yearly) minimizes status quo bias 
and encourages energy-efficient choices. Results suggest individuals are most willing to 
	  adopt energy-efficient behaviors when the cost savings are framed on a monthly basis, 
relative to daily and yearly frames. I investigate whether cognitive fluency – the 
perceived ease of processing information – could be an underlying mechanism. I find 
suggestive evidence that individuals are indeed most fluent with energy costs framed on a 
monthly basis, possibly because most individuals receive monthly energy bills. When 
individuals are faced with energy costs in relatively disfluent frames (daily and yearly), I 
find that energy efficiency intentions are greatest when given a context for total energy 
spending in a matching frame.   
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PREFACE 
This dissertation is written in three-manuscript form. The first manuscript is co-
authored with Corey Lang. It is being prepared for submission to the Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management. The second manuscript is also co-authored 
with Corey Lang. It is being prepared for submission to the Journal of the Association of 
Environmental and Resource Economists. The third manuscript is co-authored with 
Stephen Atlas and David Hardisty. It is being prepared for submission to the Journal of 
Public Policy and Marketing. 
 
Manuscript 1: The effects of mandatory time-of-use pricing on high-consuming 
households using a regression discontinuity framework 
 
Manuscript 2: Learn to conserve? The effects of in-school energy education on at-home 
electricity consumption 
 
Manuscript 3: Matching costs to context: Status quo bias, temporal framing, and 
household energy decisions 
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The effects of mandatory time-of-use electricity pricing on high-consuming households 
using a regression discontinuity framework 
 
Carrie Gill and Corey Lang 
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Abstract 
Time-varying electricity rates are one way to encourage the optimal level of electricity 
consumption by passing along the marginal cost of electricity generation to consumers. 
Time of use (TOU) pricing is a coarse variant of real-time pricing, charging consumers 
a higher rate during hours of peak demand and a lower rate during off-peak hours. 
Because of marginal costs set to appease regulatory concerns about increasing 
electricity bills, such a rate structure gives rise not only to substitution between on- and 
off-peak consumption, but also produces income effects through decreased electricity 
bills. We exploit quasi-random assignment of TOU rates and use a regression 
discontinuity framework to identify the causal effects of TOU pricing on four outcomes 
over the twelve months following treatment for high-use households. Though 
microeconomic theory predicts households shift consumption from peak to off-peak 
hours, we find only suggestive evidence that this is the case. We find a decrease in level 
of peak consumption six to eight months following treatment along with a decrease in 
total consumption, suggesting energy conservation rather than load deferment and 
possibly indicating spillover effects of energy conservation into off-peak hours. We 
find evidence for decreases in electricity bill amounts, consistent with both more 
favorable marginal prices for households with already-low peak proportion and 
decreased consumption. 
 
Keywords: Time-of-Use Pricing; Electricity; Energy Conservation; Regression 
Discontinuity 
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1. Introduction 
One challenge of promoting residential energy efficiency is that the true costs of 
electricity are not passed onto the consumer. Most consumers face either a flat rate or 
inclining block rate pricing schedule, where rates are independent of total demand for 
electricity (FERC 2012). However, since electricity cannot be stored and must be 
generated in real time to meet demand, times of peak demand cause additional electricity 
generation facilities to come on board (Borenstein 2013). These additional facilities 
generate electricity that is often purchased at a higher wholesale cost either because the 
facilities are less efficient or because the producers have market power to increase 
marginal prices (Borenstein 2013, EIA 2014). Growing peak demand exacerbates the 
challenge of producing adequate supplies of electricity to meet varying demand 
throughout the year (NERC 2013). In regions where peak demand is met through the use 
of fossil fuel-based generation, reducing peak demand and variability can decrease 
emissions of greenhouse gases and pollutants (Holland and Mansur 2004). Because these 
costs are hidden to consumers, consumers have no incentive to reduce their electricity 
consumption (Borenstein 2002, 2005; Joskow and Wolfram 2012).  
Dynamic, real-time pricing, which translates the actual cost of electricity 
generation at any given time to the consumer, represents the opposite end of the spectrum 
from flat rate pricing. However, real-time pricing comes with regulatory and political 
concerns, including difficulty for the consumer to understand and adjust to time-varying 
prices (see Alexander 2010 for a review). Time-of-use (TOU) pricing is a coarse form of 
real-time pricing. Under a time-of-use pricing scheme, consumers pay a higher rate 
during pre-determined hours of peak demand and a lower rate during off-peak hours.  
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While over two million residents are enrolled in some form of TOU pricing (FERC 
2012), nearly all time-varying pricing schemes are optional for residential consumers, 
and may have either opt-in or opt-out defaults (e.g. Cappers et al. 2016, Hydro One 2008, 
Idaho Power Company 2006, Charles River Associates 2005, Strapp et al. 2007, 
Hammerstrom et al 2007, Navigant 2008, Hartway 1999). As utility regulators move 
toward time-varying pricing, it is critical to understand the effects on consumption and 
cost to the consumer across a variety of settings.  
One strategy to enact TOU pricing is to mandate certain households into the rate 
structure based on some criteria. We exploit a unique empirical setting in Connecticut, 
where households who exceed a threshold of 2,000 kWh in a single billing period are 
mandated into TOU pricing and may not switch back to flat rate pricing. Because 
households cannot precisely control their electricity consumption, exceeding this 
threshold may be considered as-good-as-random assignment of TOU pricing to high-use 
households. Therefore, this particular empirical setting lends itself very well to a 
regression discontinuity framework, allowing for identification of the causal effect of 
TOU pricing on several outcomes specifically for high-use households.  
We employ this framework to estimate local average treatment effects of 
exceeding this threshold – and being treated with TOU pricing – on proportion of 
consumption during peak hours, level of peak consumption, level of total consumption, 
and total electricity bill cost from one to twelve months following the exceedance. 
Though microeconomic theory predicts households would shift consumption from peak 
to off-peak hours, we only find suggestive evidence that this is the case. We find a 
decrease in level of peak consumption six to eight months following treatment along with 
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a decrease in total consumption, possibly indicating spillover effects of energy 
conservation into off-peak hours. Lastly, we find evidence for decreases in electricity bill 
amounts, consistent with both more favorable marginal prices for households with 
already-low peak proportion and decreased consumption.  
We make several important contributes to the literature. Generally, this research 
provides another point in the important conversation of how to appropriately encourage 
energy conservation through price incentives. Specifically, we investigate the causal 
effect of TOU pricing for the segment of high-consuming households, which has been 
overlooked in the literature. Furthermore, this research addresses a critical gap regarding 
the effectiveness of mandatory enrollment based on some criteria. There are several ways 
in which utility providers may enact TOU pricing, all with potential benefits and 
concerns. One option is to allow consumers to opt into TOU pricing. This option has 
traditionally had a low rate of uptake, with only certain consumers opting in (see for 
example Matsukawa 2001 or Aigner and Ghali 1989). For example, consumers who have 
flexibility to shift their usage throughout the day and could save money or who are 
environmentally concerned and view TOU pricing as a commitment device to reduce 
energy may be more inclined to opt into a time-varying rate structure. Utility providers 
could instead default consumers into TOU pricing and allow them to opt-out. This would 
capture another subset of consumers that are rather indifferent to the rate change 
(Cappers et al. 2016). If these consumers are engaged enough to be aware of the rate 
change, they may have some flexibility to shift load and either maintain the same energy 
expenditure or reduce their costs. However, if these indifferent consumers are also 
disengaged or fail to opt-out for other reasons, they may face higher electricity costs. A 
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third method of deploying TOU pricing is mandatory enrollment (Jessoe et al. 2014). 
Concerns over consumer welfare prevent across-the-board mandatory enrollment in TOU 
pricing (Alexander 2010). However, the compromise is to enroll only the highest-use 
customers into TOU pricing, allowing others to opt in as they prefer, may present 
relatively low regulatory risk.  
The paper is structured as follows. We review the literature on energy efficiency 
generally and TOU pricing specifically in Section 2 and describe the empirical setting in 
Section 3. We lay out our conceptual framework and corresponding hypotheses in 
Section 4. We describe the data in Section 5 and regression discontinuity method in 
Section 6. We present results and discussion in Section 7 and conclude with directions for 
future research and policy implications in Section 8. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 Utility providers face the challenge of providing just enough electricity to meet 
demand at any given time (Borenstein 2013). Each electricity generation plant can only 
generate electricity up to some capacity, before additional facilities must be brought on 
board to meet increased in demand. To prevent the occurrence of blackouts and 
brownouts, when utility providers triage who receives electricity, excess facilities are 
built that can generate additional electricity only during times of peak demand. However, 
the most efficient electricity generation facilities that can supply electricity at the lowest 
marginal cost are utilized first. Then during times of peak demand, additional, less-
efficient facilities are brought online. Higher marginal costs from the less-efficient 
facilities and relatively inelastic demand for electricity result in a large wholesale price. 
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Under a time-invariant pricing scheme, these higher costs are seen only by the utility 
provider and not by the consumer. This lack of information about marginal costs results 
in over-consumption by consumers, who face a rate lower than the true marginal cost of 
generation during hours of peak demand in their flat rate tariffs (Borenstein 2005, Joskow 
and Wolfram 2012).1 
 To address the problem of high demand from households during times of high 
peak total demand, utility providers and others have pushed for behavior change and 
demand response programs. There has been a growing movement for using concepts 
from psychology and behavioral economics to encourage energy efficiency (Allcott 2014, 
Gillingham and Palmer 2014, Allcott and Mullainathan 2010). One well-known example 
is the peer comparison on energy bills, which leverage social norms to encourage 
conservation (Allcott 2011). Demand response programs can include programmable 
thermostats, direct load control, and other technologies that can limit the amount of 
energy usage either by schedule or directly from the utility during hours of peak demand. 
These programs have been found to be relatively effective in reducing electricity 
consumption and shifting load demand, especially when paired with time-varying pricing 
schemes (see Newsham and Bowker 2010 and Faruqui and Sergici 2009 for reviews), 
though there is some evidence of strategic behavior to counteract direct load control 
technology (e.g. Lang and Okwelum 2014).  
Time-varying electricity prices offer another way to encourage efficiency, where 
consumers face costs that more closely reflect actual marginal costs. On the opposite side 
of the spectrum from flat rate pricing is dynamic real-time pricing, which changes with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 There could also be under-consumption when consumers face marginal prices that are higher 
than the true marginal costs of electricity. 
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the fluctuations of marginal rates on the wholesale electricity market. One study of real-
time pricing finds consumers respond to real-time pricing by reducing demand during 
peak hours (Allcott 2011). In between flat rate and real-time pricing lie several course 
variants. Time-of-use (TOU) pricing, peak time rebates (PTR), and critical peak pricing 
(CPP) are three such schemes that either charge consumers a pre-determined premium to 
use electricity during pre-set hours of peak demand (TOU and CPP) or rebate consumers 
for reducing usage during hours of peak demand (PTR). If consumers are aware of the 
rates and can modify their energy consumption behavior, then they can better control 
their electricity usage and bills. However, if consumers are either unaware, do not 
understand, or are unwilling or unmotivated to change their behavior, time-varying rates 
may result in increased bills for consumers. Indeed, the literature has generally found that 
coupling time-varying pricing programs with salient information about marginal costs 
and electricity consumption (e.g. in-home displays (Jessoe and Rapson 2014) or glowing 
orbs (Allcott 2011)) or technology that enables increased control over consumption is 
more effective (Newsham and Bowker 2010).  
Prior research has explored the effects of coarse time-varying pricing schemes on 
residential electricity consumption, generally finding small reductions in electricity 
consumption due to TOU pricing, varying in both magnitude and significance (see 
Faruqui and Sergici (2009) and Newsham and Bowker (2010) for reviews). In a meta-
analysis of TOU pricing programs, Faruqui and Sergici (2010) find a three percent 
reduction in peak electricity load. Programs that couple TOU pricing with an enabling 
technology, such as a programmable thermostat that allows residents to set back the 
temperature when they are out of the home or during peak hours, tend to result in the 
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largest reductions (Newsham and Bowker 2010). Similarly, TOU pricing schedules 
coupled with critical peak pricing, days when there is an additional premium for 
electricity, result in larger electricity load reductions (Faruqui and Sergici 2010). Much of 
the recent literature studies programs in which participation is voluntary and open to all 
households (e.g. Cappers et al. 2016, Hydro One 2008, Idaho Power Company 2006, 
Charles River Associates 2005, Strapp et al. 2007, Hammerstrom et al 2007, Navigant 
2008, Hartway 1999). 
 A recent randomized control trial in California compared voluntary (opt-in) TOU 
enrollment to default (opt-out) TOU enrollment (Cappers et al 2016). Given the option to 
opt-in, 19.5 percent of households chose TOU pricing over their default inclining block 
rate schedule. However, only two percent of households actively opted-out of TOU 
pricing when it was the default pricing schedule. The households in each group also had 
differential energy savings, with households who actively opted into TOU pricing having 
roughly three times larger energy reductions than those who were defaulted in. This is 
evidence of a subset of consumers who are relatively disengaged from their energy 
pricing and/or unwilling or unable to change their demand. But while the average per-
customer energy savings were lower in the default TOU enrollment scenario, estimated 
benefits dwarfed those of an opt-in enrollment scenario due to increased participation. 
While studies of voluntary and default TOU pricing are critical to understanding the 
efficacy of time-varying pricing on demand, self-selection may bias the magnitudes of 
estimated effects (Aigner and Ghali 1989). The effects of mandatory enrollment in time-
varying pricing for high-use consumers have been largely overlooked. Moreover, the 
specific effects of mandatory enrollment for high-use consumers is important, as these 
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consumers are responsible for a significant amount of total electricity consumption and 
demand during peak hours. 
 Jessoe, Rapson, and Smith (2014) investigated the effects of a preliminary 
iteration of the TOU pricing program in this paper, finding reductions in total electricity 
usage. Our analysis extends their study in several ways. First, we use higher resolution 
data and are able to observe preferences for peak and off-peak electricity consumption 
under flat rate prices. Second, the threshold for being mandated onto TOU pricing is 
2,000 kWh for all households in our sample, while the threshold starts quite a bit higher 
at 4,000 kWh and then drops to 3,000 kWh for the households in Jessoe, Rapson, and 
Smith’s analysis. Third, there are a couple nuances due to the newness of the TOU 
pricing program that we do not face in our analysis, including a long time lag between 
exceeding the threshold and switching rates (households that exceeded as early as 
November 2006 were not switched to TOU rates until February 2008) and 
implementation glitches that failed to switch some households that actually exceeded the 
threshold. 
Jessoe and Rapson (2015) explore a mandatory TOU pricing program for high-
use consumers, but in the Commercial and Industrial (C&I) sector. In this program, C&I 
consumers who exceeded a certain consumption threshold within one billing period were 
mandated to TOU pricing and not allowed the option to switch to a different pricing 
schedule. For these consumers, the threshold started at 300 kW on June 1, 2008 and 
decreased by 100 kW each of the subsequent two years. Each time the threshold 
decreased, a number of C&I consumers exceeded the threshold and were mandated into 
TOU pricing. The authors use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effects of 
 
 
11 
TOU pricing on future consumption for the set of firms that exceeded the June 1, 2010 
threshold, and find no significant change in electricity consumption due to TOU pricing. 
This empirical setting is very similar to the setting that residential consumers face in this 
study. 
 
3. Empirical Setting 
The United Illuminating Company (UI) services consumers in the greater New 
Haven area, Connecticut. On January 1, 2009, under the direction of the Public Utility 
Regulatory Authority, UI imposed a mandatory TOU pricing schedule for residential 
consumers who exceed 2000 kWh in a single monthly billing period.  Once a household 
exceeds this threshold, the household is notified and switched from a flat rate to TOU 
pricing within six months. It is important to note that households do not see an immediate 
rate change. For the households in our dataset, it typically took two monthly bills before 
they were switched to TOU rates (mean = 2.1 bills, standard deviation = 0.5 bills). 
Households are prohibited from switching back to flat rate pricing, with exceptions made 
for households containing a person with a serious medical condition who have a letter 
from a physician, houses undergoing repairs related to a storm, exceedances due to 
malfunction appliances with evidence of repair or replacement, and households that may 
have received an incorrect utility bill. However, all of these exceptions require that 
electricity rates were consistently below 20 percent of the threshold for the prior 24 
months, and any reversals that are approved are a one-time only exception (UI 2016). 
Table 1 presents rates for flat rate and TOU standard generation pricing schedules 
January 2013-2016 for standard service generation. Due to factors like demand and losses 
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in transmission and distribution, utility providers distinguish between summer and winter 
rates, with summer rates typically being higher. Charges under flat rate pricing are 
independent of the time of day, in contrast to TOU pricing, which charges a higher rate 
during hours of peak demand. On-peak hours are defined as noon – 8pm Monday through 
Friday. All other times, including Saturday and Sunday and holidays, constitute off-peak 
hours.  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Flat rate tariffs range from $0.18 - $0.25 per kilowatt-hour (kWh). Under TOU 
pricing, off-peak rates ranged from $0.14 - $0.20 per kWh while on-peak rates ranged 
from $0.27 - $0.37 per kWh. TOU rates during on-peak hours were 1.7-2.4 times higher 
than off-peak rates over this time period. The proportion of consumption occurring 
during peak hours required for the total cost to be identical under both rate structures is 
given for both summer and winter months. This proportion varies between 0.29-0.31. A 
household that consumes more during peak hours than this proportion would face higher 
total costs under TOU pricing than under flat rate pricing, while households with a lower 
peak proportion would face lower electricity bills. We discuss distribution of peak 
proportion along with data in Section 5. 
 
4. Conceptual Framework 
Let 𝑝!! < 𝑝!! = 𝑝!! < 𝑝!! be prices for peak 𝑝! and off-peak 𝑝!  usage under flat 
rate 𝑝! and TOU 𝑝! price structures and 𝑄! = 𝑄! + 𝑄! be total consumption of energy 
 
 
13 
during peak and off-peak hours. The consumer’s problem is to maximize utility over 𝑄!, 𝑄! subject to a budget constraint: 
 max!!,!! 𝑈(𝑄!,𝑄!)         𝑠. 𝑡.        𝑝!𝑄! + 𝑝!𝑄! ≤ 𝐵  
 
where 𝐵 is the amount budgeted for electricity. Assume, for illustrative purposes, that 
utility is described by a Cobb Douglas utility function: 
 𝑈 𝑄!,𝑄! = 𝑄!!𝑄!!!! 
 
where 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1). When the household is billed under flat rate pricing, they do not have 
to discriminate when to consumer energy due to a price differential. Therefore, we can 
think of the household as revealing information about their true preferences for 
consumption during peak and off-peak hours. Define 𝜃 ≡   𝑄! 𝑄! as the proportion of 
peak consumption and let 𝜃! represent a consumer’s initial preferences for peak and off-
peak consumption under flat rate pricing.  We can solve the utility maximization problem 
to gain insight into this preference parameter: 
 ℒ = 𝑄!!𝑄!!!! + 𝜆(𝐵 − 𝑝!𝑄! + 𝑝!𝑄!) 
 
The first order conditions are 
 𝜕ℒ𝜕𝑄! = 𝛼𝑄!!!!𝑄!!!! − 𝜆𝑝! = 0 
 𝜕ℒ𝜕𝑄! = (1 − 𝛼)𝑄!!𝑄!!! − 𝜆𝑝! = 0 
 
 
 
14 
𝜕ℒ𝜕𝜆 = 𝐵 − 𝑝!𝑄! + 𝑝!𝑄! = 0 
 
Using the first two conditions, we can solve each for 𝜆 and set them equal to each other to 
solve for 𝛼: 
 𝛼𝑄!!!!𝑄!!!!𝑝! = (1 − 𝛼)𝑄!!𝑄!!!𝑝!  
 𝛼(1 − 𝛼) = 𝑄!𝑄! ∙ 𝑝!𝑝! 
 𝛼 = 𝜌𝑄!𝑄! + 𝜌𝑄! 
 
where we define 𝜌 as the ratio of peak to off-peak prices, 𝜌 ≡ 𝑝! 𝑝!. In the case of flat 
rate pricing, 𝑝! = 𝑝! ⇒ 𝜌 = 1 and 𝛼 =   𝑄! 𝑄! =   𝜃!. In other words, 𝛼 is the 
proportion of usage during peak hours relative to total consumption. A household reveals 
their preferences under flat rate pricing, which gives us critical information about the 
shape of the household’s utility function. By knowing a single parameter 𝛼, we can make 
inferences about a household’s preferences for consumption under changing prices.  
We want to understand how consumption patterns change following a switch to 
TOU pricing along four dimensions: peak proportion, peak usage, total usage, and bill 
amount. To do so, it is necessary to solve the utility maximization problem for demand. 
Again using the first order conditions, we solve: 
 𝑄! = 1 − 𝛼𝛼 𝜌𝑄! 
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𝑄! = 𝐵𝑝! − 𝜌𝑄! 
 𝑄!∗ = 𝛼𝐵𝑝!  
 𝑄!∗ = (1 − 𝛼)𝐵𝑝!  
 
We now have all the necessary calculations to formulate hypotheses of expected 
behavior under utility maximization. First consider change in peak proportion when a 
household is treated with TOU pricing. Recall that 𝜃! = 𝛼 is the household’s initial peak 
proportion and let 𝜃! be peak proportion under TOU rates. The change in peak proportion 
is given by: 
 ∆𝜃 ≡ 𝜃! − 𝜃! 
 ∆𝜃 = 𝑄!!𝑄!! + 𝑄!! − 𝛼 
 
∆𝜃 = 𝛼𝐵𝑝!(1 − 𝛼)𝐵𝑝! + 𝛼𝐵𝑝! − 𝛼 
 ∆𝜃 = 𝛼 𝑝!1 − 𝛼 𝑝! + 𝛼𝑝! − 1  
 
Under a TOU pricing scheme where 𝑝!   < 𝑝!   , we know that ∆𝜃 < 0, indicating a 
decrease in the proportion of electricity used during peak hours. Using 𝑝!   = 0.15,𝑝!   =
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0.30), there is a maximum change at 𝛼 = 0.59, but for typical preferences peak 
proportion decreases linearly as 𝛼 increases. 
 We can also infer how peak usage will change. It is convenient to normalize Δ𝑄! 
by peak consumption under flat rate prices. Using optimized demand derivations, 
 Δ𝑄!𝑄!! = 𝑄!! − 𝑄!!𝑄!!  
 Δ𝑄!𝑄!! =
𝛼𝐵𝑝! − 𝛼𝐵𝑝!𝛼𝐵𝑝!  
 Δ𝑄!𝑄!! = 𝑝! − 𝑝!𝑝!  
 
So the percentage change in peak usage is a function of flat rate prices and peak prices 
under TOU, and is independent of preferences for peak proportion. For 𝑝!   = 0.15,𝑝!   =0.30, households would reduce peak usage by 33 percent. We can conduct a similar 
inference for total consumption.  Δ𝑄!𝑄!! = 𝑄!! − 𝑄!!𝑄!!  
 
Δ𝑄!𝑄!! =
𝛼𝐵𝑝! + (1 − 𝛼)𝐵𝑝! − 𝛼𝐵𝑝! − (1 − 𝛼)𝐵𝑝!𝛼𝐵𝑝! + (1 − 𝛼)𝐵𝑝!  
 Δ𝑄!𝑄!! = 𝑝! − 𝑝!𝑝! − 1𝑝! − 1𝑝! 𝑝!𝛼 
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In other words, the percentage change in total load increases for small values of 𝛼 and 
decreases linearly with 𝛼. To illustrate this result using 𝑝!   = 0.15,𝑝!   = 0.30,𝑝!   = 0.20, 
households who use less than half their total electricity consumption during peak hours 
(representing typical real-world preferences) are expected to increase total load. This 
result is largely due to income effects. For customers who consume a peak proportion 
less than some value of 𝛼, the TOU price structure is designed such that most households 
will not see an increase in bills even in the absence of change in consumption patterns. 
Therefore, many households who change nothing would actually see bills decrease. 
However, Walras’s law states that households will adjust consumption to spend exactly 
their electricity budgets. Therefore, deriving changes to bill amounts using this micro 
theory framework lead to no change to bill amount for households with any value of 𝛼.  
 We can further explore how total consumption changes due to substitution and 
income effects. We use a Slutsky decomposition to find interim demand for peak and off-
peak consumption holding buying power constant. In other words, the household can still 
afford the original consumption bundle preferred under flat rates using TOU prices: 
 𝐵! = 𝑝!𝑄!! + 𝑝!𝑄!! 
 
Consistent with prior findings, micro theory predicts households shift away from peak 
consumption, and the substitution effects dominate income effects for households using 
less than two-thirds of their electricity during peak hours. On the other hand, income and 
substitution effects both work to increase off-peak consumption for households with peak 
proportion preferences less than 𝛼 = 0.33. For households with preferences for more 
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peak consumption relative to total, a negative income effect attenuates a positive 
substitution effect for off-peak usage.  
This level of 𝛼 represents the break-even peak proportion; a household with 
preferences for this peak proportion would see identical bills under both flat rate and 
TOU pricing. More generally, we can solve for 𝛼 in terms of prices by setting total costs 
under each rate structure equal to each other: 
 𝑇𝐶! = 𝑇𝐶! 
 𝑝!𝑄! = 𝑝!𝛼𝑄! + 𝑝! 1 − 𝛼 𝑄! 
 𝛼!" = 𝑝! − 𝑝!𝑝! − 𝑝! 
 
As the difference between peak and off-peak prices increases, the break-even level of 𝛼 
decreases. As mentioned previously, one regulatory concern is that households would be 
worse off from a change in rate structure. Therefore, prices are set such that most 
households have preferences for peak proportion that fall below this break-even point. It 
is important to note, however, that households with preferences toward peak proportion 
greater than 𝛼!" are still predicted to increase total consumption, as the substitution effect 
toward off-peak consumption dominates all other effects. More specifically, households 
with preferences for peak proportion less than 𝛼!"(𝑝!/𝑝!) are predicted to increase total 
consumption. 
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Using average winter rates for 2013-2016,2 the break-even proportion is equal to 
one-third. In other words, households that consume one third of total electricity during 
peak hours see no change in their electricity bill when they are switched from flat rate 
pricing to TOU pricing. We illustrate this in Figure 1, which plots a consumer’s budget 
constraint under flat rate pricing and indifference curve between peak consumption on the 
horizontal axis and off-peak consumption on the vertical axis. We use the break-even 
peak proportion to determine the shape of the utility function and corresponding 
indifference curves. The resulting optimal consumption bundle under flat rate pricing is 
represented at point 0. After rates change according to the TOU rate schedule, the 
consumer’s budget constraint shifts, allowing the consumer to increase utility by shifting 
load from peak hours to off-peak hours, as seen by the higher indifference curve. Lower 
total costs also result in a wealth increase, allowing for an increase in total consumption 
given the assumption that the household’s budget for electricity remains fixed. The 
optimal consumption bundle under TOU pricing is represented at point 1.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Note that any consumption bundle that lies along the same ray from the origin 
contains the same proportion of peak to off-peak consumption. Since bundle 1 lies to the 
left of the ray from the origin to bundle 0, peak proportion will decrease when the 
household switches from flat rate pricing to TOU pricing. This intuitive result holds for 
all levels of peak proportion and is the basis for our first hypothesis. We test for changes 
in peak proportion in each of the first twelve months after exceeding the threshold and 
being switched to TOU pricing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  𝑝!"#$ = $0.20/𝑘𝑊ℎ; 𝑝!"#$ = $0.30/𝑘𝑊ℎ; 𝑝!"" = $0.15/𝑘𝑊ℎ	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Figure 2 illustrates two additional scenarios for peak proportions below and above 𝛼!". Note that all households with true preference for peak proportion less than 𝛼!" (i.e. 
with optimal consumption bundles laying on the budget constraint to the left of point 0) 
are structural “winners” in terms of decreased total costs under TOU pricing. Panel A of 
Figure 2 shows optimized consumption bundles for a households with a revealed 
preference for peak proportion 𝛼 = 0.1. In the absence of any change in usage patterns, 
such a household could maintain flat-rate electricity consumption patterns a see a 
decrease in their bill amounts. However, micro theory predicts that these households 
would strategize by substituting consumption from peak to off-peak hours. The difference 
in slopes of the rays from the origin to each optimized bundle shows only a small 
decrease in peak proportion. There is also an income effect, which allows the household 
to move to a higher utility and increase total consumption. While utility providers and 
regulators motivate TOU pricing as a way to decrease peak consumption and shift load to 
off-peak hours, increases in total consumption would attenuate predicted benefits of 
electricity conservation. In addition to testing for changes in peak proportion, we also 
investigate effects of TOU pricing on level of peak consumption and total consumption.  
Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates changes to optimal consumption for a household 
with a preference for higher peak proportion than 𝛼!". All households with preferences 
greater than 𝛼!" are structural “losers”. In other words, these households would face 
increased electricity bills if they make no changes to their peak and off-peak consumption 
patterns. In order to stay within the budget constraint, these households must shift to a 
lower utility. In this lower utility, peak proportion and total consumption both must 
decrease. 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
Several assumptions must hold for predictions of this conceptual framework to be 
realized. First, the rate changes must be salient to the household and the household must 
understand the consequences of the TOU marginal prices. In our empirical setting, 
households who exceed 1,750 kWh in a single billing cycle are sent a letter alerting them 
to the mandatory rate change policy if they exceed the threshold. Households who exceed 
the threshold are sent another letter notifying them that their rates will change within the 
next billing cycle.3 However the timing between high consumption and receiving a letter 
may not be immediate and, while we can assume households receive the letters, we 
cannot observe whether decision makers within the household pay attention to the letter 
or understand the consequences. Second, households must be able to shift load to off-
peak hours, engage in energy conservation behaviors, or invest in energy efficient capital 
improvements. It is possible, though, that some households may not be able to make 
these changes despite understanding the consequences of the rate change. Third, 
households must be motivated to make these changes. Finally, we make the assumption 
that households have a fixed budget for electricity and strive to maintain that budget 
rather than reallocating savings achieved under TOU pricing to other goods or increasing 
budget to maintain the same levels of peak and total consumption as under flat rate 
prices.  
One regulatory concern with mandating TOU rate structures is placing a burden 
on households that are limited in their ability to adjust consumption patterns, a burden 
that could disproportionately impact some socioeconomic populations. Therefore, TOU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Both letters are included in Appendix B. 
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marginal prices are set in such a way that a majority of households would face lower 
electricity bills without changes to consumption. As we alluded to previously, these 
income effects may have the unintended consequence of increasing total consumption. 
We test for changes in electricity bill amount for the twelve bills following treatment to 
address this question. 
 
5. Data 
We obtained 15-minute interval electricity load data from April 30, 2013 to October 1, 
2016 for all households who were mandated into TOU pricing due to exceeding the 2000 
kWh threshold from November 2013 to September 2015,4 as well as for all households 
that consume at least 1500 kWh during the timeframes we use in the analysis (we 
describe these timeframes in the methods section). We exclude households that exceed 
the threshold but are not switched into TOU rates within six months, as this may be an 
indicator of households that qualify for an exemption from the mandatory rate change, 
and therefore arguably fundamentally different in their energy usage patterns. This leaves 
us with a final dataset of 7358 households, 1974 of which were mandatorily and 
irreversibly enrolled in TOU pricing.  
 Figure 3 gives a sense for seasonal variation in total electricity consumption. We 
plot daily consumption over the sample period, smoothed using a 7-day moving average. 
Electricity consumption spikes in both the cold winter months and hot summer months, 
ostensibly due to heating and cooling loads. These peaks in average electricity use also 
correspond to the occurrence of households exceeding the threshold. Figure 4 illustrates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 i.e. We have data for households that switch rates during this timeframe that also have six months of data 
on flat rate pricing and twelve months of data following the rate change. 
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the number of households that exceed 2,000 kWh and that switch from flat rate to TOU 
pricing each month. The frequency of rate changes intuitively lags the seasonal peaks in 
electricity consumption, as households are more likely to exceed in the cold winter 
months and hot summer months. On average, rate changes occur 2.1 billing cycles 
following exceedance, with the majority of households being switch within the first 
couple billings cycles.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 Under TOU pricing, marginal electricity prices are higher during noon-8pm on 
weekdays. Figure 5 shows an average load profile. Consumption is lowest overnight 
when most individuals are sleeping, peaks slightly in the morning hours when most 
individuals are getting up and getting ready for a traditionally scheduled work day, 
increases during afternoon hours, and peaks in the late afternoon and early evening when 
many individuals are getting home from work. The shaded gray area indicates peak 
hours. Since preferences for peak proportion of consumption affect predictions for effects 
on total consumption and electricity bill amounts, it is important to understand the trends 
and variation in peak proportion as well. Panel A of Figure 6 shows average peak 
proportion each month. Average peak proportion is relatively stable throughout the year, 
with only a slight shift to peak consumption during summer months (likely due to 
electricity-run air conditioning).   
[Figure 5 about here] 
[Figure 6 about here] 
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Panel B illustrates variation in peak proportion across households. Peak 
proportion is normally distributed with mean and median equal to 0.26 (sd = 0.037), 
indicating that 26 percent of electricity is consumed during peak hours. Within our data, 
monthly trends account for 24 percent of variation in peak proportion while household 
habits account for another 35 percent of variation. Together, 58 percent of variation in 
peak proportion is explained by month of sample and household. It is also important to 
note that 96 percent of the sample consume less than 𝛼!"#$%!!"!#. This leads to two 
important observations. First, regulators seem to have set the TOU marginal prices 
appropriately to ensure the majority of households do not face increases in electricity 
bills. Second, that the majority of houses stand to benefit from a rate change provides 
further motivation for our investigation of whether income effects lead to unintended 
increases in total consumption.  
We unfortunately do not have data on what kind of enabling technology (e.g. 
programmable thermostats) or feedback displays (e.g. in-home energy displays) the 
households have. Prior research has shown that these technologies are somewhat critical 
to achieving energy reductions with TOU pricing (e.g. Newsham and Bowker 2010, 
Baatz 2017).  
We aggregate consumption data to the bill-level for our analysis. Specifically, we 
calculate total consumption in each billing period, peak consumption, peak proportion, 
and bill amount. We additionally match household electricity data to assessor data to 
understand balance in observable characteristics between treatment and control groups. 
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6. Regression Discontinuity Method 
In our empirical setting, households that exceed the (arbitrary) threshold of 2000 
kWh in a single billing period are then treated with TOU pricing, while those failing to 
exceed the threshold are not treated (they remain on flat rate pricing). A household 
becomes treated when they exceed the threshold for the first time. We make the 
necessary and plausible assumption that households are unable to precisely control their 
exact level of electricity consumption. For even just one decision-maker, precise control 
of cumulative consumption over a billing cycle would be nearly impossible without 
instant feedback from an in home display or smart meter (and awareness of and desire to 
receive and act on this feedback). Furthermore, many households are likely to have more 
than one agent responsible for making energy-related decisions in the household.5 
Therefore, there is stochasticity in whether a household exceeds the threshold and, in a 
neighborhood around the threshold, treatment status can be assumed to be as good as 
random. The regression discontinuity (RD) design improves inference by effectively 
comparing observations in this neighborhood, exploiting this quasi-random treatment 
assignment to identify a causal effect of TOU pricing among plausibly similar households 
(Imbens and Lemieux 2007). In our case, we estimate the local average treatment effect 
of exceeding the threshold on (i) proportion of consumption during peak hours, (ii) level 
of peak consumption, (iii) total consumption, and (iv) total cost on electricity bills in one 
to twelve billing periods.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Another source of exogenous variation is assignment to one of 17 billing cycles. Each billing cycle covers 
roughly 31 days of electricity use, but billing file dates are spread throughout the month (e.g. the December 
2013 bill for households on billing cycle 1 covers 11/4/2013 – 12/4/2013 while billing cycle 17 covers 
11/27/2013 – 12/27/2013). Since there are differences in the days covered (including associated weather, 
proportion of weekend and week days, holidays, etc.), some households would exceed the threshold under 
some billing cycles but fall short of the threshold under others. We discuss potential ways to exploit this 
variation to identify causal effects and related directions for future research in the conclusion. 
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 Each household is exogenously assigned to one of 17 billing cycles that determine 
start and end dates of each bill throughout the sample period. We group all households 
that receive a bill during each calendar month-year to form a cohort, and we apply the 
RD approach to each cohort. To illustrate, consider the cohort of households who receive 
a bill in December 2013. 1,510 households used between 1500 and 1999 kWh during 
their bills, while 141 households exceeded the 2000 kWh threshold for the first time. RD 
effectively compares households arbitrarily close to the threshold in terms of our three 
outcomes of interest. Figure 7 illustrates the RD approach. Total consumption in the 
cohort month is our running variable (horizontal axis), and we plot households with 
respect to total consumption and some outcome measure in some future month. We 
control for correlations between total consumption in the cohort month and the outcome 
variable, allowing for different relationships on either side of the threshold. We then 
estimate the magnitude of the discontinuity at the threshold, the local average treatment 
effect. In this particular illustration, suppose the outcome measure is peak consumption. 
Intuitively, we posit a positive correlation between total consumption and peak 
consumption, shown by the positive linear fits on either side of the threshold. The 
magnitude and direction of the discontinuity indicates that exceeding the threshold and 
being switched to TOU pricing causes a decrease in peak consumption. Such a finding 
would be consistent with hypotheses derived from our conceptual framework. 
Empirically, we model these outcomes as: 
𝑦!"!! = 𝛽𝐷!"#$% + 𝑓 𝐷!"#$% ,𝑦!";𝜸 + 𝜀!"     (7) 
where y is the outcome variable in billing period 𝑡 + 𝜏 for household 𝑖, where 𝜏 ranges 
from one to twelve months and 𝑡 is equal to the cohort month. The treatment variable is 
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𝐷!"#$%, an indicator equal to 1 if customer 𝑖 exceeds the threshold for the first time in 
their cohort billing cycle and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of interest is 𝛽, which is 
interpreted at the causal effect of being mandatorily enrolled in TOU pricing from flat 
rate pricing for households close to the threshold. We use several variations in functional 
form to control for the running variable on either side of the threshold, including linear, 
quadratic, cubic, and local-linear6, as well as present the average treatment effect 
estimated from a differences-in-difference model (i.e. comparing mean levels of the 
outcome measure for treatment and control groups without controlling for total 
consumption).  
We aggregate our RD approach by choosing the six cohort months that have the 
largest numbers of households that exceed the threshold for the first time: December 
2013, January 2014, February 2014, January 2015, February 2015, and August 2015. 
Households can be assigned to both treatment and control groups for different cohort 
months. For example, a household may consume 1600 kWh in December 2013, 1900 
kWh in January 2014, and 2100 kWh in February 2014. The household would be in the 
control group for December and January, and in the treatment group in February, and not 
have any observations in 2015. Since the dependent variable is an outcome in a future 
month 𝑡 + 𝜏, we are careful to remove households that eventually are treated from the 
control group for an analysis of treatment on an outcome in month 𝑡 + 𝜏 or after. We 
control for unobservable characteristics of each cohort month with fixed effects. We also 
acknowledge that the levels of outcome variables may differ systematically by bill cycle. 
For example, one bill cycle ending in month 𝑡 + 𝜏 may be several days shorter than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Specifically, we use the local linear estimation command by Calonico et al. (2014a, 2014b).  
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another, or the days in one bill cycle may include a holiday or different distribution of 
weekend and weekdays. We control for these unobserved differences by including bill 
cycle fixed effects. Furthermore, we cluster the error term at the household level to allow 
for correlation within household. Our aggregated model becomes: 
𝑦!"!! = 𝛽𝐷!"#$% + 𝑓 𝐷!"#$% ,𝑦!";𝜸  +  𝑐𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡!" + 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒! + 𝜀!" (8) 
6.1  Balance of Observables 
To appropriately apply the RD framework, we must be reasonably convinced that 
potential outcomes of observations in the neighborhood of the threshold are continuous. 
In other words, we assume that future peak proportion, level of peak consumption, total 
consumption and bill amount for households in the neighborhood of the threshold would 
be continuous in the absence of a change in rate structure. This critical assumption allows 
us to attribute any discontinuity in future electricity consumption for households who just 
barely exceeded the threshold (i.e. were treated) relative to households who failed to 
exceed the threshold (i.e. were not treated) to the rate change rather than to other 
confounding factors.  
Because we cannot observe potential outcomes to test this assumption, we instead 
test for differences in observable house characteristics and electricity consumption trends. 
We use the model given in Equation 8 with each characteristic as the dependent variable. 
We restrict the sample to households that consume within 500 kWh of the threshold 
throughout the analysis and control flexibly for the running variable using a cubic 
polynomial fitted to each side of the threshold. Table 2 presents our results. Columns 1-5 
test for differences in house characteristics at the threshold. Treated households tend to 
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have lower assessed values ($38,000 difference), but treated and control households are 
statistically indistinguishable in terms of lot size, building area, year built, and number of 
bedrooms. Columns 6-8 test for differences in baseline consumption characteristics at the 
threshold. Baseline values use the four billing cycles prior to the cohort month. 
Differences in these characteristics for households at the threshold are statistically 
insignificant. These results lend confidence to the strength and appropriateness of the RD 
empirical framework. 
[Table 2 about here] 
6.2 McCrary Density Test 
We also want to ensure that households are not able to strategize their total 
consumption so as to avoid the mandatory rate change for exceeding the threshold. If 
households were able to avoid the rate change, it would compromise the as-good-as-
random experimental nature of the RD framework. Such a phenomenon would appear as 
bunching below the threshold in the density plot of consumption in the cohort months. 
We conduct a McCrary density test, which estimates a discontinuity in density at the 
threshold (McCrary 2008). Figure 8 illustrates this. We find no significant discontinuity 
at the threshold (log difference in density height at the threshold = 0.12, standard error = 
0.15). These results provide further confidence in applying the RD method to our 
empirical setting. 
[Figure 8 about here] 
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7. Results and Discussion 
We first present results for the outcome measure peak proportion six billing 
cycles following the cohort month in Table 3. By this time, all households that exceeded 
the threshold in their cohort month are guaranteed to be switched to TOU pricing. We 
estimate the average treatment effect on either side of the threshold without controlling 
for the running variable in Column 1. We control for total consumption in the cohort 
month on either side of the threshold using different functional forms in Columns 2-6, 
estimating the local average treatment effect. We present the coefficient estimate on an 
indicator for treatment status (i.e. exceeding 2000 kWh in the cohort month) and omit all 
other coefficients from the table. The estimated average treatment effect is negative and 
significant in Column 1, indicating that mean peak proportion is 0.006 less for the 
treatment group than for the control group six billing periods following initially 
exceeding the threshold. However, this estimate captures differences between households 
that may be relatively far from the threshold and plausibly not ideal counterfactuals. 
Applying the RD framework and controlling more flexibly for total consumption on 
either side of the threshold, the estimated local average treatment effect decreases in 
magnitude and statistical difference. This result indicates that there is no statistically 
distinguishable discontinuity in peak proportion at the threshold. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 We expect the treatment effect to change over time as households adjust to new 
rates, so we extend our analysis to twelve months after initial exceedance in the cohort 
month. Table 4 presents our main results across months and outcome measures. Each cell 
is the coefficient estimate for the treatment indicator for a separate regression of outcome 
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𝑡 + 𝜏 months later on treatment status (results from twelve regressions are reported in 
each column). All models control for total consumption on either side of the threshold in 
the cohort month using a cubic polynomial, include cohort and bill cycle fixed effects, 
and cluster errors at the household level.7 
[Table 4 about here] 
Column 1 presents the causal effect of treatment on peak proportion. Recall that 
our microeconomic conceptual framework predicted decreases in peak proportion 
following the rate change. While coefficient estimates are mostly negative, they are also 
largely statistically indistinguishable from zero with the exception of peak proportion 
seven months later. This coefficient is interpreted as a 0.0125 reduction in peak 
proportion seven months following initially exceeding the threshold and being switched 
to TOU pricing. Recall that mean peak proportion in our sample is 0.26, so this reduction 
indicates a shift of 4 percent of peak consumption to off-peak hours. In sum, the 
statistical insignificance indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of TOU 
pricing causing a change in proportion of consumption during peak hours relative to total, 
and is inconsistent with microeconomic predictions. 
 One potential explanation for why peak proportion does not change in response to 
higher peak rates is that households may decrease peak consumption in tandem with off-
peak consumption, maintaining the same proportion. Such a case could indicate that 
either the household is not utility maximizing, or that household preference for peak 
proportion change, possibly due to spillover effects. For example, if the household 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Full tables with all model specifications for each outcome measure are available in Appendix A: Tables 
1A-4A. 
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develops energy efficient habits to decrease rather than defer peak electricity 
consumption, these habits may also apply to behaviors in off-peak hours. Another 
possibility is that a household invests in energy-efficiency improvements (e.g. an energy 
efficient dishwasher, washing machine, or other electronics) in order to decrease peak 
consumption. Such investments would necessarily also decrease off-peak consumption 
without changing peak proportion. We can glean inference into whether spillover effects 
exist in our analysis of peak and total consumption. 
 Column 2 presents estimated treatment effects on peak consumption while 
Column 3 presents effects on total consumption.  The effects of TOU on these two 
outcomes follow generally similar patterns. First, results suggest an increase in both peak 
and total consumption the first month after exceeding the threshold. This increase is a bit 
counterintuitive. Most households receive a letter during the first month after exceeding 
the threshold that alerts them to the rate change. With this letter being the only difference 
between treatment and control households during this month, it is possible that 
households are responding to the letter. Then the question becomes why consumption 
increases rather than decreases. We can speculate that households somehow 
misunderstand the consequences and parameters of TOU pricing as explained in the 
letter, though this intuitively seems like an unlikely scenario. We estimate small positive 
effects on consumption turning to negative effects for two to five months after 
exceedance, though these estimates are statistically insignificant. 
 We estimate significant reductions in peak and total consumption six to eight 
months following exceeding the threshold. For six months after exceedance, households 
enrolled in TOU pricing use 30 kWh less electricity during peak hours and 88 kWh less 
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electricity in total. For households in our sample, these reductions represent an eleven 
percent decrease in peak proportion and nine percent reduction in total consumption.8 At 
six months after exceedance, all treated households have been formally notified and 
enrolled in TOU pricing. The timing of these reductions align with intuition about when 
households may respond to their first electricity bills under the new rate structure. 
However, the effect magnitudes decrease after eight months and become statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Interestingly, we estimate a positive, significant increase in 
both peak and total consumption twelve months following initial exceedance of the 
threshold, which is admittedly puzzling.  
Overall, these results suggest that TOU pricing may cause households to reduce 
electricity consumption, but these effects may be temporary as households adjust. The 
effect sizes for reductions in total consumption are larger than the magnitudes of 
reductions for peak consumption. This indicates two things. First, these results show that 
households respond to TOU pricing by changing consumption during both peak and off-
peak hours, which may partially explain why we fail to find a significant change in peak 
proportion. Second, the relatively larger magnitudes of reductions in total consumption 
more than encompass the changes in peak consumption. This finding provides some 
suggestive evidence of positive spillover effects. Households may respond to TOU 
pricing by making adjustments that affect their consumption throughout the day, rather 
than specifically during peak hours. Furthermore, that the effect seems to be temporary 
and then attenuate suggests that household responses are along the lines of energy 
efficient behavior modifications, rather than investments in energy efficiency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Mean peak load per billing period = 264 kWh. Mean total load per billing period = 989 kWh. 
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improvements to appliances, electronics, or infrastructure. These effects can also provide 
insight into the question of whether income effects cause increases in consumption for 
the 95 percent of households who face lower electricity bills under TOU pricing without 
having to adjust usage patterns. Generally negative or insignificant treatment effects point 
to households reallocating electricity bill savings to other goods rather than to increasing 
electricity consumption. However, the significant increase in peak and total consumption 
twelve months following treatment is cause for concern, and motivates the need for 
additional research to investigate the long-term impacts of TOU rate structures and 
marginal cost levels. 
Finally, we test whether electricity bills change due TOU pricing enrollment. 
Estimated treatment effects given in Column 4 generally echo the effects on consumption 
in sign and statistical significance. We find an increase in total cost for the first bill 
following treatment and then see fairly consistent reductions. Treatment effects are 
statistically nonzero for six to nine months following treatment, with estimated savings of 
$15-22. This reduction represents an 8-11 percent decrease in monthly electricity bill 
amounts for these months. These reductions conform to the idea that marginal prices are 
set such that most households would see either a reduction or no change in bill amount, 
and provide evidence for the effectiveness of regulatory choices. 
7.1 Falsification Test 
We conduct a falsification test using a false threshold at 1900 kWh in each cohort 
month. We control for the running variable below the false threshold, between the false 
and true thresholds, and above the true threshold. Table 5 presents the estimated 
coefficients on both the false and true treatment indicators, with each panel 
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corresponding to one of our four outcome measures and each column corresponding to 
the number of months following treatment (i.e. each panel-column is its own regression). 
We expect the coefficients on the false treatment indicators to be consistently statistically 
insignificant, with the coefficients on the true treatment indicators to generally follow the 
same pattern in sign, magnitude, and statistical significance as in the main results. Results 
show only two statistically significant coefficients on the false treatment indicator, and 
there does not appear to be an obvious pattern that would be cause for concern about 
application of the RD framework to this particular empirical setting. Furthermore, 
coefficients on the true treatment indicators generally echo the main results, though 
statistical significance is slightly diminished. Overall, these results provide support for 
our empirical method and lend confidence to the robustness of our results. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
8. Conclusion 
Our research address the question of how TOU electricity rate structures impact 
the segment of high-consuming households. We exploit a unique empirical setting where 
households that exceed a consumption threshold within one billing period are 
mandatorily and irreversibly switched from flat rate pricing to TOU pricing. Imprecise 
control over consumption and the assumption of potential outcomes across this threshold 
allow us to estimate the causal local average treatment effect of TOU pricing on four 
outcome measures in the twelve months following treatment. Microeconomic theory 
predicts unequal marginal prices would lead to substitution effects that would decrease 
the proportion of consumption occurring during peak hours, and the way the marginal 
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prices are chosen would lead to income effects that could increase total consumption. In 
contrast, we find only suggestive evidence that peak proportion decreases as a result of 
TOU pricing. Instead, we find evidence of a short-term decrease in peak and total 
consumption on the order of ten percent beginning six months after treatment. This level 
of conservation is consistent with reductions found in prior literature (Newsham and 
Bowker 2010; Baatz 2017; Jessoe, Rapson, and Smith 2014). The combination of 
decreased consumption and differential marginal prices leads to expected reductions in 
electricity bill amounts of $15-22. While negative point estimates for effects on 
consumption and bill amount are generally negative for all months, the statistically 
significant effects do not persist throughout the study period. 
 Our findings lead to several interesting observations and directions for future 
research. First, the combination of results regarding peak proportion and consumption 
variables suggest that households may be engaging in energy efficient behavior change, 
at least in the short term. Instead of deferring electricity use to off-peak hours, thereby 
decreasing peak proportion, households seem to be engaging in energy conservation with 
spillovers from peak to off-peak hours. This overall decrease, instead of only a decrease 
during peak hours, may point to the costs of load deferment being higher than the costs of 
small one-time changes (e.g. replacing incandescent light bulbs with LED bulbs) or habit 
formation (e.g. turning off lights when leaving a room regardless of the time of day). 
Decreased consumption also suggests that households may reallocate savings to other 
goods rather than to additional electricity use.  
However, the short-term nature of energy conservation and savings on energy 
bills, with effects that indicate an increase in consumption twelve months after treatment 
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motivate the need for more study to understand how these effects change over time. It is 
possible that households take longer than twelve months to adjust to the new rate 
structure, possibly engaging in energy conservation in the short-term but increasing 
consumption in the long-term due to wealth effects. Since we do not have information on 
prevalence of enabling technology or feedback displays, we cannot know how salient the 
change in prices or household usage is to the household. Prior research shows that higher 
energy reductions may be possible when TOU is coupled with such technology 
(Newsham and Bowker 2010, Baatz 2017), so evidence of small and insignificant 
reductions may point to lack of technology or low salience of prices.  
 We also suspect that the insignificant effects on peak proportion may be masking 
heterogeneity in response to TOU pricing. Marginal rates are chosen such that the 
majority of households would see reduced electricity bills under TOU pricing relative to 
flat rate pricing given no changes to electricity consumption patterns. Preliminary 
evidence points to significant differences in response between households with below-
average peak proportion and households with above-average peak proportion, and 
particularly households near or above the break-even peak proportion. Future research 
should explore heterogeneity response further. 
 Finally, our findings generally point to decreases in electricity bill amounts due to 
switching to TOU pricing. This indicates that regulators are setting rates effectively to 
avoid distributional concerns about changes to consumer welfare. Future research should 
seek to understand characteristics of households with high peak proportion under flat 
rates resulting in bill increases under TOU pricing. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1. Optimized Consumption Bundles for Break-Even Peak Proportion 
 
Notes: Figure illustrates budget constraints, indifference curves, and utility-optimized 
consumption bundles under flat rate pricing (solid) and TOU pricing (dashed). Parameters include 
flat rate price = $0.20/kWh, on-peak price = $0.30/kWh, and off-peak price = $0.15, which reflect 
average prices 2013-2016. We assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function with alpha = 0.333, which 
is the break-even peak proportion. 
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Figure 2. Optimized Consumption Bundles for Low and High Peak Proportion 
Panel A. Low peak proportion 
 
Panel B. High peak proportion 
 
Notes: Figure illustrates budget constraints, indifference curves, and utility-optimized 
consumption bundles under flat rate pricing (solid) and TOU pricing (dashed). Parameters include 
flat rate price = $0.20/kWh, on-peak price = $0.30/kWh, and off-peak price = $0.15, which reflect 
average prices 2013-2016. We assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function with alpha below (Panel 
A) and above (Panel B) the break-even peak proportion. 
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Figure 3. Daily Load over Sample Period 
 
Notes: Figure illustrates daily load over the sample period, smoothed using a 7-day moving 
average.  
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Figure 4. Patterns of Exceedances and Rate Changes 
Panel A. Number of Households that Incur Rate Changes each Month 
 
Panel B. Number of Households that Incur Rate Changes each Month 
 
Notes: Figure shows the number of households who exceed 2,000 kWh in a billing period (Panel 
A) and change rates (Panel B) in each month. Bars are stacked in Panel B, with the gray area 
representing households who were mandatorily enrolled in TOU pricing and the black area 
representing households who voluntarily opted into TOU pricing (households who opt-in are 
removed from the main analysis due to concerns about selection bias). An average of 93 
households switch rates per month during Nov 2013 – Sept 2015.  
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Figure 5. Average Load Profile 
 
Notes: Figure illustrates daily load over the sample period, smoothed using a 7-day moving 
average. Gray shaded area indicates peak hours of noon-8pm (weekdays only).  
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Figure 6. Variation in Monthly Peak Proportion 
Panel A. Peak proportion throughout the year 
 
Panel B. Distribution of peak proportion 
 
Notes: Figure illustrates trends and variation in monthly peak proportion, defined as the ratio of 
peak consumption to total consumption over each calendar month. Panel A shows average peak 
proportion per month. Panel B shows the distribution of peak proportion using a kernel density 
estimator (mean = 0.26). 
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Figure 7. Regression Discontinuity Framework 
 
Notes: In our empirical setting, households that have total consumption greater than 2000 kWh in 
a single billing cycle are treated. This picture illustrates this threshold for a cohort month (i.e. for 
all households who receive a bill during the month). The outcome measure (peak proportion, peak 
consumption, total consumption, total cost) is plotted along the vertical axis. We estimate the size 
of the discontinuity at the threshold. This illustration shows the causal effect of exceeding the 
threshold would be a decrease in the outcome measure. 
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Figure 8. McCrary Density Plot 
 
Notes: Figure shows density of observations around the threshold. The log difference in height of 
density at the threshold = 0.121 (standard error = 0.150). 
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Table 1. Flat Rate and TOU Pricing Schedules
Effective Date Summer Rate Winter Rate
Summer On-
Peak Rate
Summer Off-
Peak Rate
Summer Break 
Even Peak 
Proportion
Winter On-
Peak Rate
Winter Off-
Peak Rate
Winter Break 
Even Peak 
Proportion
1/1/13 $0.187 $0.179 $0.294 $0.139 0.31 $0.270 $0.139 0.30
7/1/13 $0.192 $0.183 $0.321 $0.139 0.29 $0.291 $0.139 0.29
9/5/13 $0.199 $0.190 $0.324 $0.143 0.31 $0.295 $0.143 0.31
10/1/13 $0.201 $0.192 $0.326 $0.145 0.31 $0.297 $0.145 0.31
1/1/14 $0.196 $0.189 $0.317 $0.147 0.29 $0.290 $0.147 0.29
2/1/14 $0.197 $0.189 $0.317 $0.147 0.29 $0.290 $0.147 0.29
7/1/14 $0.201 $0.192 $0.345 $0.144 0.28 $0.312 $0.144 0.29
8/14/14 $0.208 $0.199 $0.351 $0.150 0.29 $0.318 $0.150 0.29
1/1/15 $0.249 $0.241 $0.370 $0.195 0.31 $0.342 $0.195 0.31
7/1/15 $0.201 $0.194 $0.310 $0.153 0.30 $0.285 $0.153 0.31
1/1/16 $0.211 $0.205 $0.308 $0.168 0.31 $0.287 $0.168 0.31
7/1/16 $0.195 $0.187 $0.319 $0.141 0.30 $0.291 $0.141 0.31
Average $0.203 $0.195 $0.325 $0.151 0.30 $0.297 $0.151 0.30
Flat Rate Time-of-Use Rates
Notes: All rates are given in $/kWh. Rates include charges for generation, distribution, transmission, bypassable FMCC, combined transmission 
assessment, competitive transition assessment, and non-bypassable FMCC. Summer includes June - September. Winter includes October - May. 
On-peak hours are noon - 8pm Monday - Friday. Off-peak hours include all other hours, weekends, and holidays. Break even peak proportion is 
the proportion of consumption during peak hours relative to total consumption such that a household would see an identical bill under either rate 
schedule.
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Table 2. Balance of Observable Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Characteristic:
Lot Size 
(0.001 acres)
Assessed 
Total House 
Value ($)
Building Area 
(sqft) Year Built Bedrooms
Baseline 
Consumption
Baseline Peak 
Proportion
Baseline 
Total Cost
Treatment -123.2 -37,859* -92.89 -4.138 -0.00330 -8.426 -0.00214 -1.576
(137.7) (21,747) (146.6) (4.130) (0.116) (30.70) (0.00636) (6.385)
Observations 812 1,540 956 1,254 1,197 1,335 834 1,127
Notes: Table shows balance of observable characteristics across treatment and control groups. Each column reports the coefficient on an indicator 
for treatment, controlling for total consumption in the cohort month using a local-polynomial (robust RD). The dependent variable differs across 
columns and corresponds to a house characteristic using assessor data or a baseline characteristic, calculated by averaging the four bills prior to the 
cohort month. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
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Table 3. Average Treatment Effect across Models
DV = Peak Proportion (t+6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model: Diff-in-Diff
RD: 
Linear
RD: 
Quadratic
RD: 
Cubic
RD: Local 
Linear
Treatment Indicator -0.00670*** -0.00560* -0.00469 -0.00405 0.00101
(0.00169) (0.00319) (0.00446) (0.00538) (0.00739)
Experimental Month FE Y Y Y Y N
Bill Cycle FE Y Y Y Y N
Observations 8,496 8,496 8,496 8,496 989
R-squared 0.0570 0.0570 0.0575 0.0575 .
Adj. R-squared 0.055 0.054 0.055 0.054 .
Notes: Table presents estimates of treatment effect from several specifications on peak proportion 
six months following treatment. Columns 1 presents results from a differences in differences 
model. Columns 2-4 present the local average treatment effect by controlling for the running 
variable (consumption during the cohort month) using a linear, quadratic, or cubic functional 
form on either side of the threshold. Column 5 presents a local average treatment effect using 
robust local-linear RD. Columns 1-4 additionally include fixed effects for cohort month and bill 
cycle. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Treatment Effect on Outcome Measures in Future Months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV: Peak Proportion
Peak 
Consumption
Total 
Consumption Bill Amount
Treatment t+1 -0.000339 23.88* 95.14** 17.60**
(0.00455) (13.35) (43.47) (8.224)
Treatment t+2 -0.00183 9.821 49.51 -0.823
(0.00481) (12.95) (46.99) (8.701)
Treatment t+3 0.00118 6.698 24.54 -4.258
(0.00489) (11.55) (42.46) (7.756)
Treatment t+4 -0.00350 -1.344 11.83 -4.962
(0.00509) (10.39) (40.25) (7.719)
Treatment t+5 -0.00473 -13.24 -32.19 -13.17
(0.00518) (13.59) (47.59) (9.711)
Treatment t+6 -0.00405 -30.43** -87.52* -22.49**
(0.00538) (14.49) (49.14) (9.889)
Treatment t+7 -0.0125** -37.65*** -79.63* -21.78**
(0.00545) (13.79) (46.97) (9.334)
Treatment t+8 -0.00469 -24.00** -63.53 -19.50**
(0.00540) (11.32) (41.98) (8.175)
Treatment t+9 0.00454 -5.889 -43.48 -15.37**
(0.00520) (10.56) (37.96) (7.361)
Treatment t+10 -0.00561 2.125 21.34 -4.571
(0.00628) (12.49) (43.26) (8.414)
Treatment t+11 -0.00205 18.09 62.31 5.027
(0.00538) (15.68) (51.56) (10.07)
Treatment t+12 -0.00170 29.55* 100.3* 9.562
(0.00494) (16.73) (57.79) (10.88)
Notes: Table presents local average treatment effects on four outcome measures. Each cell is the 
treatment effect from one regression, controlling for total consumption during the cohort month using a 
cubic polynomial on either side of the threshold. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Falsification Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Treatment Effect: 1 month later 2 months 3 months 4 months 5 months 6 months 7 months 8 months 9 months 10 months 11 months 12 months
Panel A: DV = Peak Proportion
False Treatment Indicator 0.00519 0.00843 0.0103 -0.00197 -0.00382 -0.0226 -0.00344 -0.00461 0.000414 0.0198 0.0210 0.00543
(0.0117) (0.0114) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0140) (0.0136) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0151) (0.0142)
True Treatment Indicator 5.76e-05 -0.00477 0.00220 -0.00285 -0.00356 9.00e-06 -0.0129** -0.00385 0.00598 -0.00600 -0.000763 0.00139
(0.00511) (0.00533) (0.00571) (0.00581) (0.00594) (0.00610) (0.00629) (0.00627) (0.00585) (0.00692) (0.00636) (0.00595)
Panel B: DV = Peak Consumption
False Treatment Indicator 11.40 -33.15 -4.581 -17.56 -7.349 21.26 40.14 9.133 2.566 30.58 11.79 27.32
(27.18) (27.35) (24.84) (28.03) (35.13) (36.68) (33.88) (26.80) (23.97) (27.40) (32.70) (37.11)
True Treatment Indicator 24.76* 6.926 6.086 1.392 -3.721 -25.77 -38.01** -18.78 0.958 11.16 26.14 32.51*
(14.61) (14.14) (12.63) (11.51) (13.74) (15.86) (15.76) (12.56) (11.41) (13.63) (16.75) (17.99)
Panel C: DV = Total Consumption
False Treatment Indicator -19.74 -189.8** -41.54 -53.98 14.83 168.2 149.2 39.95 0.915 41.16 -24.49 69.55
(85.46) (96.30) (85.96) (94.61) (109.6) (114.7) (105.9) (90.08) (83.00) (91.88) (102.4) (116.2)
True Treatment Indicator 106.0** 52.86 19.05 21.30 -2.550 -85.61 -71.68 -42.25 -16.91 59.15 80.73 91.75
(44.93) (50.26) (45.49) (43.06) (46.56) (52.47) (49.93) (43.85) (40.98) (46.32) (54.50) (61.51)
Panel D: DV = Bill Amount
False Treatment Indicator -2.468 -35.45* -7.862 -14.41 5.911 32.20 30.26 10.04 0.529 8.548 -3.274 12.60
(16.20) (18.18) (16.24) (18.91) (22.24) (23.00) (21.09) (17.92) (16.26) (18.24) (20.09) (22.20)
True Treatment Indicator 19.52** -0.353 -5.311 -3.039 -7.704 -22.17** -20.17** -15.27* -10.04 3.164 8.383 8.048
(8.507) (9.323) (8.346) (8.289) (9.657) (10.59) (9.875) (8.534) (7.950) (9.026) (10.66) (11.61)
Notes: Table presents results of a falsification test. Each panel-column presents results from one regression that includes a false threshold at 1900 kWh in the cohort month, with cubic 
control of the running variable interacted with both true treatment indicator and false treatment indicator. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1A. Treatment Effect in Future Months Across Specifications
DV = Peak Proportion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model: Diff-in-Diff
RD: 
Linear RD: Quadratic
RD: 
Cubic
RD: Local 
Linear
Treatment t+1 -0.00256* -0.00224 0.00113 -0.000339 0.00270
(0.00131) (0.00247) (0.00362) (0.00455) (0.00762)
Treatment t+2 -0.00358** -0.00244 0.00322 -0.00183 -0.00472
(0.00140) (0.00267) (0.00389) (0.00481) (0.00562)
Treatment t+3 -0.00485*** -0.00359 0.00447 0.00118 -0.00137
(0.00151) (0.00283) (0.00408) (0.00489) (0.00501)
Treatment t+4 -0.00443*** -0.00712** -0.00212 -0.00350 -0.00481
(0.00152) (0.00290) (0.00417) (0.00509) (0.00623)
Treatment t+5 -0.00339** -0.00405 -0.00173 -0.00473 -0.0101*
(0.00155) (0.00295) (0.00422) (0.00518) (0.00564)
Treatment t+6 -0.00670*** -0.00560* -0.00469 -0.00405 0.00101
(0.00169) (0.00319) (0.00446) (0.00538) (0.00739)
Treatment t+7 -0.00715*** -0.00792** -0.0112** -0.0125** -0.00752
(0.00173) (0.00324) (0.00459) (0.00545) (0.00599)
Treatment t+8 -0.00398** -0.00106 -0.00203 -0.00469 -3.48e-05
(0.00170) (0.00319) (0.00448) (0.00540) (0.00614)
Treatment t+9 -0.00321* 0.00260 0.00668 0.00454 0.00515
(0.00165) (0.00313) (0.00438) (0.00520) (0.00577)
Treatment t+10 -0.00372** -0.00584* -0.00344 -0.00561 -0.00668
(0.00174) (0.00339) (0.00500) (0.00628) (0.00620)
Treatment t+11 -0.00440** -0.00217 0.00184 -0.00205 -0.00239
(0.00175) (0.00324) (0.00453) (0.00538) (0.00817)
Treatment t+12 -0.00371** -0.000965 0.00215 -0.00170 -0.00544
(0.00160) (0.00298) (0.00421) (0.00494) (0.00640)
Notes: Table presents estimated treatment effect on peak proportion, with each row estimating the effect of 
treatment on peak proportion in future months. Column 1 presents results from a differences in differences 
model. Columns 2-4 present the local average treatment effect by controlling for the running variable 
(consumption during the cohort month) using a linear, quadratic, or cubic functional form on either side of 
the threshold. Column 5 presents a local average treatment effect using robust local-linear RD. Columns 1-
4 additionally include fixed effects for cohort month and bill cycle. Each cell is the treatment effect from 
one regression, with the treatment effects shown from 72 regressions in total. R-squared values range from 
0.037-0.368. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2A. Treatment Effect in Future Months Across Specifications
DV = Peak Consumption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model: Diff-in-Diff
RD: 
Linear RD: Quadratic
RD: 
Cubic
RD: Local 
Linear
Treatment t+1 107.8*** 23.80*** 38.71*** 23.88* 0.208
(4.231) (7.591) (10.61) (13.35) (15.82)
Treatment t+2 53.72*** 22.43*** 28.44*** 9.821 -32.88*
(4.241) (7.559) (10.47) (12.95) (17.66)
Treatment t+3 23.95*** 12.97* 22.63** 6.698 -8.329
(3.759) (6.786) (9.556) (11.55) (15.38)
Treatment t+4 7.134** 0.201 3.128 -1.344 -1.234
(3.520) (6.325) (8.740) (10.39) (11.17)
Treatment t+5 -7.538** -4.693 -10.99 -13.24 -21.24
(3.786) (7.190) (11.05) (13.59) (13.69)
Treatment t+6 -22.20*** -16.85** -31.74*** -30.43** -40.14**
(4.263) (8.034) (11.93) (14.49) (17.35)
Treatment t+7 -23.13*** -19.04** -36.33*** -37.65*** -29.91**
(4.387) (8.112) (11.61) (13.79) (15.12)
Treatment t+8 -14.41*** -11.95* -23.85** -24.00** -14.99
(3.775) (6.794) (9.452) (11.32) (12.15)
Treatment t+9 -3.978 -8.966 -7.120 -5.889 1.480
(3.295) (6.071) (8.632) (10.56) (10.81)
Treatment t+10 18.70*** 4.438 6.127 2.125 5.898
(4.075) (7.161) (10.17) (12.49) (16.27)
Treatment t+11 45.89*** 24.47*** 27.36** 18.09 1.251
(5.129) (9.098) (12.79) (15.68) (20.05)
Treatment t+12 67.92*** 39.29*** 43.98*** 29.55* 1.534
(5.591) (9.908) (13.67) (16.73) (22.97)
Notes: Table presents estimated treatment effect on peak consumption with each row estimating the effect 
of treatment on peak consumption in future months. Column 1 presents results from a differences in 
differences model. Columns 2-4 present the local average treatment effect by controlling for the running 
variable (consumption during the cohort month) using a linear, quadratic, or cubic functional form on 
either side of the threshold. Column 5 presents a local average treatment effect using robust local-linear 
RD. Columns 1-4 additionally include fixed effects for cohort month and bill cycle. Each cell is the 
treatment effect from one regression, with the treatment effects shown from 72 regressions in total. R-
squared values range from 0.085-0.382. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3A. Treatment Effect in Future Months Across Specifications
DV = Total Consumption (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model: Diff-in-Diff
RD: 
Linear RD: Quadratic
RD: 
Cubic
RD: Local 
Linear
Treatment t+1 432.5*** 109.6*** 146.0*** 95.14** -25.66
(14.68) (25.52) (35.04) (43.47) (51.86)
Treatment t+2 239.1*** 110.7*** 104.9*** 49.51 -103.3
(16.18) (28.27) (38.10) (46.99) (64.41)
Treatment t+3 118.9*** 70.71*** 74.60** 24.54 -32.61
(14.01) (24.99) (34.93) (42.46) (56.56)
Treatment t+4 46.25*** 30.99 26.24 11.83 21.42
(12.92) (23.30) (33.26) (40.25) (41.68)
Treatment t+5 -17.01 -6.018 -38.14 -32.19 -39.58
(12.87) (24.24) (38.13) (47.59) (46.81)
Treatment t+6 -55.95*** -41.18 -95.75** -87.52* -120.0**
(14.02) (26.36) (39.72) (49.14) (48.40)
Treatment t+7 -56.70*** -37.67 -83.55** -79.63* -61.44
(14.09) (26.08) (38.26) (46.97) (45.44)
Treatment t+8 -41.75*** -38.43* -76.46** -63.53 -45.52
(12.52) (23.01) (33.85) (41.98) (39.76)
Treatment t+9 -8.462 -48.62** -55.69* -43.48 -9.113
(11.65) (21.11) (31.02) (37.96) (41.50)
Treatment t+10 80.90*** 31.91 23.94 21.34 40.80
(14.31) (24.65) (35.04) (43.26) (54.91)
Treatment t+11 177.2*** 88.52*** 82.86* 62.31 -14.29
(17.12) (30.25) (42.42) (51.56) (55.80)
Treatment t+12 270.6*** 142.4*** 135.9*** 100.3* -0.923
(19.85) (34.68) (47.84) (57.79) (66.81)
Notes: Table presents estimated treatment effect on total consumption with each row estimating the effect 
of treatment on total consumption in future months. Column 1 presents results from a differences in 
differences model. Columns 2-4 present the local average treatment effect by controlling for the running 
variable (consumption during the cohort month) using a linear, quadratic, or cubic functional form on 
either side of the threshold. Column 5 presents a local average treatment effect using robust local-linear 
RD. Columns 1-4 additionally include fixed effects for cohort month and bill cycle. Each cell is the 
treatment effect from one regression, with the treatment effects shown from 72 regressions in total. R-
squared values range from 0.077-0.463. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4A. Treatment Effect in Future Months Across Specifications
DV = Bill Amount (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model: Diff-in-Diff
RD: 
Linear RD: Quadratic
RD: 
Cubic
RD: Local 
Linear
Treatment t+1 82.49*** 20.81*** 27.49*** 17.60** -1.693
(2.775) (4.821) (6.624) (8.224) (9.522)
Treatment t+2 33.26*** 10.32** 10.52 -0.823 -28.73**
(2.950) (5.220) (7.070) (8.701) (11.93)
Treatment t+3 11.83*** 3.261 4.987 -4.258 -13.87
(2.519) (4.526) (6.370) (7.756) (10.30)
Treatment t+4 0.788 -1.750 -2.727 -4.962 -0.599
(2.440) (4.418) (6.334) (7.719) (8.059)
Treatment t+5 -9.973*** -7.328 -13.96* -13.17 -10.39
(2.586) (4.930) (7.777) (9.711) (9.379)
Treatment t+6 -17.27*** -13.61*** -25.07*** -22.49** -28.25***
(2.794) (5.272) (7.988) (9.889) (9.486)
Treatment t+7 -17.01*** -12.81** -22.34*** -21.78** -17.18*
(2.792) (5.175) (7.623) (9.334) (9.033)
Treatment t+8 -14.59*** -13.50*** -21.28*** -19.50** -15.18*
(2.475) (4.535) (6.640) (8.175) (8.014)
Treatment t+9 -8.943*** -16.27*** -17.14*** -15.37** -9.678
(2.251) (4.106) (6.034) (7.361) (7.453)
Treatment t+10 8.204*** -2.011 -3.314 -4.571 -0.619
(2.776) (4.786) (6.820) (8.414) (10.82)
Treatment t+11 28.58*** 11.34* 9.845 5.027 -9.758
(3.347) (5.897) (8.280) (10.07) (11.29)
Treatment t+12 42.34*** 18.85*** 17.58* 9.562 -9.395
(3.725) (6.515) (9.005) (10.88) (12.97)
Notes: Table presents estimated treatment effect on bill amount with each row estimating the effect of 
treatment on bill amount in future months. Column 1 presents results from a differences in differences 
model. Columns 2-4 present the local average treatment effect by controlling for the running variable 
(consumption during the cohort month) using a linear, quadratic, or cubic functional form on either side of 
the threshold. Column 5 presents a local average treatment effect using robust local-linear RD. Columns 1-
4 additionally include fixed effects for cohort month and bill cycle. Each cell is the treatment effect from 
one regression, with the treatment effects shown from 72 regressions in total. R-squared values range from 
0.080-0.428. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5A. Treatment Effect on Outcome Measures in Future Months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV: Peak Proportion
Peak 
Consumption
Total 
Consumption Bill Amount
Treatment t+1 0.00544 -45.11 -213.5 -40.30
(0.0162) (61.30) (197.1) (37.37)
Treatment t+2 0.0120 -97.81 -446.6* -89.05*
(0.0207) (68.81) (265.0) (49.55)
Treatment t+3 -0.0348 -157.1 -316.2 -76.88
(0.0268) (108.3) (446.2) (82.55)
Treatment t+4 -0.0283 30.69 330.4 44.60
(0.0316) (69.33) (311.4) (57.12)
Treatment t+5 -0.0186 99.00 464.9* 72.22
(0.0412) (61.76) (244.4) (44.38)
Treatment t+6 -0.0638 58.14 374.5 58.11
(0.0430) (70.62) (253.7) (48.28)
Treatment t+7 -0.0452 95.26 400.8 67.79
(0.0396) (112.1) (332.2) (66.37)
Treatment t+8 -0.0302 81.51 390.0 67.67
(0.0382) (97.65) (302.0) (61.45)
Treatment t+9 -0.0161 40.21 188.3 25.56
(0.0401) (89.19) (276.0) (57.08)
Treatment t+10 -0.0194 11.60 91.67 6.475
(0.0527) (69.45) (235.2) (47.03)
Treatment t+11 0.0203 1.303 -84.44 -30.90
(0.0411) (79.77) (303.1) (59.02)
Treatment t+12 0.00251 -10.91 -56.05 -26.86
(0.0354) (150.8) (599.1) (118.4)
Notes: Table presents local average treatment effects on four outcome measures. Each cell is the 
treatment effect from one regression, controlling for total consumption during the cohort month 
(December 2013 only) using a cubic polynomial on either side of the threshold. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.
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Appendix B: Rate Change Alert and Notification of Rate Change Letters 
 
 UNITED ILLUMINATING  
PROCEDURE NAME: 
EXCEPTIONS TO MANDATORY TIME OF DAY (TOD) 
PROCEDURE NUMBER: 
CF-004 
 
EXHIBIT C—Rate Change Alert Letter:  R to RT (English version) 
UI Account No.: {AccNo} 
 
Dear {SoldTo}, 
As part of Connecticut’s regulatory policies to control peak energy use and lower cost, the United Illuminating 
Company (UI) is working with the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA) to help customers manage rising 
electric costs and provide tools that will help control energy use and cost.   
Our records show that you are currently on our standard residential rate, Rate R, and that your monthly electric 
use exceeded 1,750 kilowatt-hours (kWh) in at least one billing period during the past 12 months. 
If your consumption should exceed 2,000 kWh during any future billing cycle, you will be placed on UI’s time-of-
day rate, known as Rate RT.  Rate RT gives you the opportunity to control your energy bill, and helps reduce 
peak demand on the regional electric grid by shifting some of your consumption to off-peak hours. 
When compared to your present rate, Rate RT charges less for electricity used during off-peak hours, 8 p.m. 
until noon Monday through Friday, plus all hours Saturday and Sunday.  Electricity used during on-peak hours, 
noon to 8 p.m. weekdays, costs more than your current rate. The off-peak period consists of many more hours 
than the on-peak period.  
You can take advantage of the lower off-peak rate by using large appliances/equipment such as dishwashers, 
washers, clothes dryers, dehumidifiers, and, air conditioners, during off-peak hours. You can also control your 
peak use by using energy efficient equipment such as CFL and LED lighting, energy star appliances, set-back 
thermostats and pool pump timers. 
 If you do not want to switch to Rate RT, you should monitor your electricity use to make sure you do not 
consume over 2,000 kWh during any billing cycle.  Once you have been switched to Rate RT, you cannot be 
switched back — even if you reduce your consumption. Depending on their particular usage pattern, UI has 
found that many customers pay about the same under Rate R and Rate RT; however, UI’s time-of-day rate 
offers you the opportunity to lower your bill.  If you believe you would benefit from Rate RT, you may switch by 
calling UI at 800-722-5584. 
To learn more about the energy efficiency and conservation programs UI offers to help you reduce your energy 
consumption and cost, visit UI’s website, uinet.com, or call UI at 800-722-5584 (800-7-CALL UI).  A full 
explanation of Rate RT can also be found on UI’s web site, www.uinet.com, located under the Rate/Tariffs 
option.  
In addition, to learn how you may be able to further lower your electric bill by choosing an alternate electric 
supplier, please visit Connecticut’s Energy Information Website, EnergizeCT.com.  From the home page, click 
“Choose Your Electric Supplier.” Your generation rate appears on your electric bill under the “Generation 
Services Charge” line item. You may also call 877-WISE USE (877-947-3873) or call UI at the number shown 
above.     
    
Sincerely, 
The United Illuminating Company 
Customer Care Center 
Origin Date: 08/04/2011 Revision Date: 09/15/2016 Page 13  
Owner Name & Title: Jill Thomas, Manager, Business Management 
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 UNITED ILLUMINATING  
PROCEDURE NAME: 
EXCEPTIONS TO MANDATORY TIME OF DAY (TOD) 
PROCEDURE NUMBER: 
CF-004 
 
EXHIBIT D—Mandatory Switch Letter:  R to RT (English version) 
UI Account No.: {AccNo} 
 
Dear {SoldTo}, 
UI is required to switch any customer whose electric usage exceeds 2,000 kilowatt-hours (kWh) in a single 
month, to its time-of-day rate, Rate RT, to comply with state regulatory policy designed to reduce peak energy 
use and help customers control their costs. 
Our records show your account exceeded the 2,000 kWh threshold during at least one billing period in the last 
12 months.  Accordingly, we are required to switch you from our standard residential rate, Rate R, to the time-of-
day rate, Rate RT. 
Your rate will be permanently changed to Rate RT within your next billing cycle. Please note that this is required 
by the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority.   
Under Rate RT, you can control your electric bill and reduce costs by shifting more of your consumption to off-
peak periods. Rate RT charges less for electricity used during off-peak hours, 8 p.m. until noon Monday through 
Friday, plus all hours Saturday and Sunday. Electricity used during on-peak hours, noon to 8 p.m. weekdays, 
costs more than what you are presently paying. 
You can take advantage of the lower off-peak rate by using large appliances/equipment such as dishwashers, 
washers, clothes dryers, dehumidifiers, and, air conditioners, during off-peak hours. 
To learn about the energy efficiency and conservation programs UI offers to help you reduce your energy 
consumption and cost, visit UI’s website, uinet.com, or call UI at 800-722-5584 (800-7-CALL UI) to speak with a 
Customer Care associate.  A full explanation of Rate RT can also be found on uinet.com, located under the 
Rate/Tariffs option.  
In addition, to learn how you can further lower your electric bill by choosing an alternate electric supplier, please 
visit Connecticut’s Energy Information Website, EnergizeCT.com.  From the home page, click “Choose Your 
Electric Supplier”, then click on “Compare your electric supplier and save.” Your rate appears on your electric bill 
under the “Generation Services Charge” line item. You may also call 877-WISE USE (877-947-3873) or call UI 
at the number shown above.   
Sincerely, 
The United Illuminating Company 
Customer Care Center 
  
Origin Date: 08/04/2011 Revision Date: 09/15/2016 Page 15  
Owner Name & Title: Jill Thomas, Manager, Business Management 
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Appendix C: Empirical Challenges of Difference-in-Differences 
One may argue that a good robustness check would use a difference-in-
differences (DID) empirical framework. With such a rich dataset, the DID framework 
could be interpreted at resulting in a causal effect because we could control for so much 
variation using a large set of household and time fixed effects. However, there is an 
interesting empirical challenge using DID with this dataset. I describe the data in full 
below, along with the method and results. I do not interpret these results causally, but 
instead see the results as upper and lower bounds on the true causal treatment effect 
estimated using a regression discontinuity design. 
C.1 Spike in Consumption Prior to Rate Change 
It is informative to narrow down our sample to only customers who are mandated 
into TOU pricing due to exceeding the 2,000 kWh threshold in a single billing cycle. In 
Figure 1C, we aggregate consumption over each monthly bill and present the number of 
households that exceed the threshold during each billing cycle. In this figure, billing 
cycle 0 represents the first bill that a household receives under TOU pricing. In other 
words, the household is being charged TOU rates for the entire month and sees their first 
bill with the new charges at the end of the month. There are a couple notable points in 
this plot. First, most households are switched to TOU pricing within four months of 
initially exceeding the threshold. This could indicate several months when the household 
is using a large amount of electricity but does not have information about how continuing 
this level of electricity use will affect their bills. Seeing a change in rates, corresponding 
to larger bills, may be a financial shock to households and induce a significant reduction 
in electricity. In another scenario, these few months of high electricity consumption may 
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occur over the winter holidays or cold winter months, when electricity use is high due to 
heaters running, family or friends visiting, or children being home from school. Rate 
changes would not occur until the milder (and less eventful) early spring, in agreement 
with the spikes in rate changes occurring in February through April each year. By the 
time households see a change in rates, the changes in their electricity bills may be offset 
due to decreased electricity consumption, possibly attenuating the impact felt by the rate 
change and associated changes in electricity consumption.  
The second notable point about Figure 1C is that for about five percent of 
households who are mandated into TOU pricing, they again exceed the 2,000 kWh 
threshold per bill about a year after their initial exceedance. An even smaller proportion 
exceed two years afterwards. We can infer two things from this pattern. For the 
households who continue to exceed the threshold around the same time each year, this 
level of electricity consumption appears to represent a structural change in usage patterns. 
For example, a household may add an additional family member to the household or 
grow their energy-intensive capital stock, which would increase electricity consumption 
across all months of the year and push the household over the threshold for those months 
that are most energy intensive (i.e. due to heating in winter). Or a household may build an 
addition, which requires more electricity to heat in the winter and would cause a 
recurring exceedance of the threshold each year.  
 
Figure 1C. Rate of Exceedance in Event Time 
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On the other hand, a large proportion of households who exceed the threshold 
prior to their rate change do not exceed the threshold after the rate change. We can 
interpret this in two ways. If this level of electricity use is not random, then we would 
have to infer that the household is on a trajectory towards higher consumption. Following 
the switch to TOU pricing, the customer adjusts energy-related behaviors at home or 
invests in energy efficient capital stock, thereby reducing consumption in the months 
following the rate change. In this instance, we would be able to compare mean 
consumption before and after the rate change to understand the effects of TOU pricing. 
However, the initial exceedance of some household may represent a random draw from 
the high-use tail of their energy consumption distribution. In this case, their consumption 
during the month of exceedance is abnormal relative to their typical consumption habits. 
Consumption would then likely decrease in the following months matching typical usage 
patterns. Simply comparing mean consumption before to after the rate change would then 
be misleading, as the abnormal exceedance would inflate mean consumption prior to the 
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rate change. In this case the difference in means could not be interpreted as the causal 
effect of TOU pricing.  
 
Figure 2C. Mean Load in Event Time 
 
 
Figure 2C further illustrates this point. The plot shows mean daily load leading up to and 
following the rate change from flat rate to TOU pricing (which occurs at bill zero). The 
spike in consumption just prior to the rate change is clear, and seemingly abnormal 
relative to typical rates of consumption at other times. This is potentially suggestive that 
this high level of consumption is more along the lines of a fluke, in which case we should 
take care in designing our empirical approach and interpreting our results. 
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C.2 Panel Data Framework 
 
We exploit the richness and high resolution of our data by using panel data 
methods to control for time-invariant customer characteristics and daily average 
electricity consumption across all customers.  We estimate the model 
𝑦!" = 𝛽𝐷!"#$% + 𝛼! + 𝜏! + 𝜀!       (1C) 
where 𝑦!" is electric load for customer 𝑖 at time 𝑡. We aggregate 15-minute interval data 
to hourly usage.9 𝐷!"#$% is an indicator equal to 1 if customer 𝑖 is being billed under TOU 
pricing at time 𝑡 and 0 otherwise. We include household fixed effects, 𝛼!, to control for 
each household’s typical energy usage. In our preferred model, we interact customer 
fixed effects with hour-of-the-day dummy variables, to flexibly control for each 
customer’s usage at each hour of the day. We also include a time fixed effect, which 
controls for events that affect consumption across all households (e.g. weather, holidays). 
In our preferred model, this time fixed effect controls for average usage across all 
households in every hour of our sample period. We cluster errors at the household level 
to allow for correlation in usage for each household. In this model, 𝛽 is our coefficient of 
interest and is interpreted as the difference in mean hourly load under TOU pricing from 
under flat rate pricing, ceteris paribus. A significant, negative 𝛽 would indicate reduced 
electricity consumption under TOU pricing, while an insignificant 𝛽 would indicate that 
electricity consumption under TOU pricing is statistically indistinguishable from 
consumption under flat rate pricing. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The primary driver of doing so was limitations with computer memory in running such a large 
data set, cutting an original dataset of around 200 million customer-interval observations to nearly 
50 million customer-hour observations. We are not concerned with any loss of information 
because our dataset is so rich.  
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 In the above model, other households who have not yet switched to TOU pricing 
serve as the counterfactual to those who have switched in identifying the coefficient of 
interest. These households are plausibly a reasonable counterfactual because they are all 
high-use households and all eventually are switched into TOU pricing. However, towards 
the end of our sample period, the number of households in the counterfactual declines as 
more and more are switched into TOU pricing. Therefore, we also run the above model 
with data aggregated at the daily level including a control group of 3,000 high-use 
households who remain on flat rate pricing throughout the sample period. The inclusion 
of these households informs the time fixed effect only, since there is no variation in the 
indicator for TOU pricing and hence household fixed effects absorb that information.  
We also estimate the change in consumption during peak hours following the 
change to TOU pricing from flat rate pricing. We calculate the proportion of total daily 
load that is consumed during peak hours of noon – 8pm Monday through Friday. We 
estimate the following model 
𝑝!" = 𝛽𝐷!"#$% + 𝛼! + 𝜏! + 𝜀!       (2C) 
where 𝑝!" is the proportion of load consumed during peak hours and the remaining 
variables are defined as above. In this model, we omit weekend days, which are 
considered off-peak. 
 Finally, we address the empirical challenge of interpreting the seemingly 
abnormal spike in consumption just prior to being switched onto TOU pricing. Our 
concern is that this spike represents unintentional or short-term increased consumption, 
inconsistent with typically load patterns. Therefore, including data from this period in our 
model would inflate the treatment effect as households would revert to mean 
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consumption after the spike regardless of being treated. We attempt to control for this in 
two ways. First, we omit the first month a household exceeds the threshold. Second, we 
omit from the first month a household exceeds the threshold through the first month they 
are on TOU pricing (i.e. before the household gets their first bill under the new pricing 
schedule). Our thinking is that households have yet to receive feedback about their 
abnormal consumption until they receive their first bill with the new rates. We should 
consider the range of treatment effects to represent upper and lower bounds of how 
consumption changes following the switch to TOU pricing. 
C.3 Results 
Table 1C builds up to our preferred model using Equation 1. Column 1 is essentially a t-
test of the difference in mean electricity consumption on flat rate pricing to TOU pricing. 
Column 2 additionally controls for customer-specific levels of consumption, Column 3 
interacts the customer fixed effect with hour of the day, and Column 4 adds an hour-of-
sample fixed effect. Columns 1 – 4 only include households that change rates during the 
sample period. Column 5 repeats Column 4 but using data aggregated at a daily level. 
Column 6 extends Column 5 by also including a set of high-use households that remain 
on flat rate pricing throughout the sample period. In our preferred model (Column 4), we 
see a significant difference in mean hourly electricity load of 0.300 kWh, roughly 20 
percent of hourly load.10 Inclusion of the control group in Column 6 (using daily 
aggregated data) leaves the results largely unchanged.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Mean hourly load is 1.50 kWh and mean daily load for households who change rates is 36.1 
kWh. 
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Table 1C. Main Results of Panel Data Method 
 
 
 We use the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell method to evaluate individual coefficients for 
each household using hourly data, and plot the distribution of these coefficients in Figure 
3C. The mean of these coefficients agrees with the coefficient estimate in Column 4, but 
there is a surprising amount of variation. For some households, electricity consumption 
following their rate change increases, but the majority of households sees a decrease in 
electricity consumption. Some households even see much lower consumption. One 
empirical concern we have is that the magnitude of reduction is driven by an accidental 
or abnormal, short-term increase in consumption on flat rate pricing. If this is the case, 
our estimate would be biased upwards and our interpretation of the effect would be 
misleading.  
 
Table 2: Main Results of Panel Data Method
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DV Hourly Load Hourly Load Hourly Load Hourly Load Daily Load Daily Load
DTOU -0.112*** -0.150*** -0.151*** -0.300*** -7.295*** -7.936***
(0.0128) (0.00876) (0.00876) (0.0115) (0.277) (0.228)
Customer FE N Y N N Y Y
Customer-Hour of Day FE N N Y Y N N
Hour of Sample FE N N N Y N N
Day of Sample FE N N N N Y Y
Observations 46,031,006 46,031,006 46,030,958 46,030,958 1,904,122 4,143,150
R-squared 0.00177 0.129 0.213 0.319 0.413 0.398
Adjusted R-squared 0.002 0.129 0.212 0.318 0.412 0.397
Notes: Each column estimates the effect of TOU pricing on electricity load. The dependent variable is hourly electricity load for 
N=2,156 households (Columns 1-4) or daily load for N=2,156 households (Column 5) or N=5,212 households The coefficient of 
interest is on the indicator variable DTOU equal to 1 if the customer is under TOU pricing and 0 otherwise. Column 1 represents 
simple differences in average hourly loads when facing flat rate and TOU pricing. Subsequent models build on Column 1 by 
including various fixed effects (FE) to account for time-invariant customer characteristics and unobservable time trends. 
Column 6 additionally includes a control group of high-use households who remain on flat rate pricing throughout the sample 
period. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the customer level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3C. Distribution of Treatment Effects 
 
 
To account for this, we systematically exclude data from the month that the 
household first exceeds the 2,000 kWh threshold. Table 2C presents these results. 
Column 1 repeats the results from Column 6 of Table 2 for reference. Column 2 excludes 
the bill during which the household first exceeds the threshold. Column 3 excludes from 
the first month of exceedance up to the time the household receives a bill on TOU 
pricing. Intuitively, as we exclude these months, the magnitude of change in electricity 
consumption decreases. Our most conservative interpretation is Column 3, where there is 
no statistically distinguishable difference in consumption under either pricing schedule. 
While there is no way to understand the underlying causes of the spike in consumption 
that puts households into TOU pricing from our dataset alone, we can at minimum view 
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these results as upper (Column 1) and lower (Column 3) bounds for a treatment effect 
(roughly no effect to 20 percent daily load reduction). Column 4 presents the results 
estimating Equation 2. We find a small but statistically significant decrease in the 
proportion of electricity consumed during peak hours. 
 
Table 2C. Excluding the pre-rate change spike in electricity, peak proportion 
 
  
Table 3: Excluding the pre-rate change spike in electricity, peak proportion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DV = Daily Load Peak Proportion
DTOU -7.280*** -2.586*** 0.123 -0.00614***
(0.327) (0.327) (0.350) (0.000857)
Customer FE Y Y Y Y
Day of Sample FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,431,905 1,383,879 1,286,774 1,369,925
R-squared 0.385 0.384 0.396 0.242
Adjusted R-squared 0.384 0.383 0.395 0.241
Notes: Each column estimates the effect of TOU pricing on electricity load. The dependent 
variable is daily electricity load for N=1,592 households. The coefficient of interest is on the 
indicator variable DTOU equal to 1 if the customer is under TOU pricing and 0 otherwise. All 
columns include customer and day of sample fixed effects. Column 1 uses all data. Column 2 
excludes the first month that a household exceeds the threshold. Column 3 excludes from the first 
month of exceeding the threshold through the first bill on TOU pricing. Column 4 estimates the 
difference in mean proportion of electricity consumed during peak hours for weekdays only, 
including all data. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the 
customer level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Abstract 
Environmental education for school students, including lessons on recycling, water 
conservation, and energy reduction, is a popular measure aimed at increasing 
environmental knowledge, promoting environmental attitudes, and increasing pro-
environmental behaviors. Despite the prevalence of such education, there is little 
empirical evidence to support the efficacy of these programs on tangible outcomes 
outside of school. This paper contributes a robust empirical analysis of a series of energy 
lessons in the United States. Using a differences-in-differences approach, we find 
evidence for short-term reductions on the order of eight percent in electricity use the day 
of a lesson regarding reducing phantom electric loads, with evidence of deferment in 
electricity use rather than reduction. We find no effect of lessons on energy pathways or 
wind energy on the days of the lessons. Findings show that energy education is 
potentially a valuable tool for encouraging energy efficiency and conservation, though 
the timing of lessons and curriculum content are critical to optimize treatment effects. 
 
Keywords: Energy Education; Electricity; Energy Conservation; Interfamily learning  
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1. Introduction 
 
Among the suite of strategies to promote sustainable environmental behaviors, 
environmental education for school children is a popular non-price measure to nudge pro-
environmental behavior. Environmental education for school students, including lessons 
on recycling, water conservation, and energy reduction, aims to increase environmental 
knowledge, promote environmental attitudes, and increase pro-environmental behaviors. 
Despite the prevalence of such education, there is little empirical evidence to support the 
efficacy of these programs on tangible outcomes outside of school. 
The link between in-school education and knowledge, attitude, and behavior at 
the household level is indirect. Education programs target students, including elementary-
aged children who have little explicit agency in household management decisions. 
However, evaluations of environmental education programs show that, while modest, 
there is potential for intergenerational influence between child and family (see Duvall and 
Zint (2007) for a review). For example, children treated with environmental education in 
school encourage their families to engage in pro-environmental behaviors including 
energy-saving behaviors (Hiramatsu et al., 2014), recycling (Evans and Gill, 1996), and 
decreasing household waste (Grodzinska-Jurczak et al., 2003). While the literature on 
energy behavior, and conservation specifically, is extensive (see Abrahamse et al. (2005) 
for a review), there have been few evaluations of in-school energy education as a non-
price mechanism to nudge residential energy efficiency. 
This research seeks to understand the effects of an in-school energy education 
program on household electricity consumption. We conduct a case study examining the 
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effects of such lessons using household daily electricity load panel data for households of 
all students who received a lesson within one school, as well as for a set of randomly 
chosen control households from which we construct an appropriate counterfactual. We 
employ a differences-in-differences framework to estimate changes in electricity use on 
the days of energy lessons. Our results are consistent with intuition about how curriculum 
content might affect energy use at home. We find reductions in electricity consumption 
on the order of eight percent on the day of an energy lesson about reducing phantom 
electric loads. However, we find an increase in load two days following the lesson of the 
same magnitude, suggesting deferment of electricity use rather than true conservation. 
We fail to find effects of lessons on energy pathways and wind energy. Though we 
cannot say with certainty why we only see an effect of the lesson on phantom electric 
loads and not energy pathways or wind energy, our intuition points to lesson content. The 
lesson on phantom loads has direct action items for reducing electricity use at home, 
while the other lessons offer a more indirect link from content to conservation. We 
additionally explore heterogeneity in treatment effect for the lesson on phantom loads 
along dimensions of baseline consumption and house characteristics using assessor data.  
While small sample size limits our statistical precision, our results suggest that higher-
consuming households may reduce more on the day of the lesson, and that reductions 
may be smaller for newer houses with higher assessed values and enhanced for larger 
houses. 
Through this analysis, we make two primary contributions to the literature. First, 
we provide critical empirical evidence of how energy education for school students 
affects electricity use at home, adding a much-needed data point in the sparse literature 
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on energy education. Most studies of energy education rely on self-reports, with mixed 
findings on energy-related behavior change (DiMatteo et al. 2014, Zografakis et al. 
2008). Of the two empirical analysis of energy education on consumption, one fails to 
find any effect while the other finds small reductions in aggregate geographic locations 
near schools (Osbaldiston and Schmitz 2011, Agarwal et al 2017). However, neither 
program is directly comparable to the energy lessons in this analysis because of the 
components and timing of the education treatment. 
Second, our findings add to the body of literature on intergenerational learning by 
showing that in-school energy lessons have an affect on energy-related behaviors at 
home, especially when lesson content includes direct action items for energy reduction. 
Our findings have important implications for environmental education policy, suggesting 
that energy education may be an effective way to encourage energy conservation. 
However, we find that this effect is temporary and results in deferment rather than 
reduction. Future research is needed to understand how to optimize timing of energy 
lessons and curriculum content to achieve deeper and persistent energy reductions at 
home. 
 
2. Literature Review 
According to the most recent Residential Energy Consumption Survey, US 
households consumed over 10 quadrillion Btu of energy in 2009, resulting in over 1,100 
million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions (EIA 2017). Three-quarters of this 
energy was used for space heating, appliances, electronics, and lighting (EIA 2013). 
However, with concerns over climate change mitigation, pollution from electricity 
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generation, and consumer welfare, both policy makers and environmentalists have been 
working to encourage energy efficiency and conservation. Broadly speaking, 
interventions aimed to reduce energy use can be categorized as either a price incentive or 
non-price mechanism.  
Price incentives are the typical recommendation of classical economists, and 
include strategies to adjust the cost of energy that is passed onto the consumer. In the 
electricity market, most consumers face either a flat rate or inclining block rate pricing 
schedule, where rates are independent of total demand for electricity (FERC 2012). 
However, since electricity cannot be stored and must be generated in real time to meet 
demand, times of peak demand cause additional electricity generation facilities to come 
on board, which generate electricity that is often purchased at a higher wholesale cost 
(Borenstein 2013, EIA 2014). Growing peak demand exacerbates the challenge of 
producing adequate supplies of electricity to meet varying demand throughout the year 
(NERC 2013). In regions where peak demand is met through the use of fossil fuel-based 
generation, reducing peak demand and variability can decrease emissions of greenhouse 
gases and pollutants (Holland and Mansur 2004). Because these costs are hidden to 
consumers, consumers have no incentive to reduce their electricity consumption 
(Borenstein 2002, 2005; Joskow and Wolfram 2012). Newsham and Bowker 2010 and 
Faruqui and Sergici 2009 provide reviews of various pricing schemes. 
One alternative price incentive is dynamic real-time pricing, which translates the 
actual cost of electricity generation at any given time to the consumer. However, real-
time pricing comes with regulatory and political concerns, including difficulty for the 
consumer to understand and adjust to time-varying prices (see Alexander 2010 for a 
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review). Time-of-use pricing is a coarse form of real-time pricing. Under a time-of-use 
pricing scheme, consumers pay a higher rate during pre-determined hours of peak 
demand and a lower rate during off-peak hours (Cappers et al 2016, Hydro One 2008, 
Idaho Power Company 2006, Charles River Associates 2005, Strapp et al. 2007, 
Hammerstrom et al 2007, Navigant 2008, Hartway 1999, Gill and Lang in prep). In a 
similar structure, critical peak pricing charges consumers a premium for electricity use 
only during hours of peak demand on specific high-demand days (Wolak 2006, Charles 
River Associates 2005, Violette et al 2007). These pricing schemes can be seen as sticks 
rather than carrots, punishing consumers for high use rather than rewarding them for 
reduced use. On the other hand, peak time rebates actually pay consumers for not using 
electricity during critical peak periods (Strapp et al 2007, Wolak 2006, Navigant 2008, 
Herter et al 2007). Finally, increasing block rate pricing charges consumers increasing 
marginal prices per kilowatt-hour depending on total consumption (Reiss and White 
2005). Price incentives are generally shown to decrease energy consumption, though with 
varying effectiveness (Newsham and Bowker 2010). For example, Ito (2014) shows that 
consumers respond to average prices rather than marginal prices when facing an 
increasing block rate price structure, affecting desired effects of nonlinear pricing on 
electricity consumption and consumer welfare. The effectiveness of price incentives 
increases when coupled with non-price strategies (Newsham and Bowker 2010). 
Non-price strategies include mandatory energy efficient standards for buildings 
and appliances (Costa and Kahn 2011, Jacobsen and Kotchen 2013), demand response 
programs including direct load control (Summit Blue 2004, KEMA 2006), commitment 
devices and goal setting (Becker 1978, Harding and Hsiaw 2014), social comparisons 
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(Allcott 2011), feedback (Jessoe and Rapson 2014, Carrico and Riemer 2011), and 
education (Agarwal et al 2017). For example, direct load control programs allow the 
utility provider to automatically curtail sources of electricity use, like air conditioners, in 
response to total demand during critical peak periods. One reason why direct load control 
programs are effective is because they obviate the need for behavior change by the 
consumer. While programs such as this have been shown to be effective, consumer 
behavior during off peak hours can attenuate predicted energy conservation benefits 
(Newsham and Bowker 2010, Wolak 2011, Lang and Okwelum 2015). There has been a 
growing movement for using concepts from psychology and behavioral economics to 
encourage energy efficiency (Allcott 2014, Gillingham and Palmer 2014, Allcott and 
Mullainathan 2010). One well-known example is the peer comparison on the OPower 
home energy reports. Allcott (2011) finds this comparison leads to a persistent two 
percent reduction in electricity use. 
Energy feedback and in-home energy displays can be considered as one type of 
education geared toward educating energy-related decision-makers about energy use and 
cost in real-time. These methods have been shown to be effective, especially when 
coupled with price incentives like critical peak pricing (Jessoe and Rapson 2014, 
Newsham and Bowker 2010). However, these measures rely on some base knowledge of 
how to reduce energy use in the home, and motivation to do so. Towards the first point, 
suggestions for electricity reduction and energy efficiency improvements popular on 
energy bills (notably also on OPower home energy reports) provide some additional 
education about how to reduce energy use at home. In-school energy education for 
students can also provide critical information about actions to reduce energy 
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consumption, as well as some key motivation in the form of persistent nudging from 
eager children. 
Utilities expend significant effort and resources on energy education, funded in 
part by consumers and mandated by state and federal legislation. The goal of energy 
education programs is to reduce energy consumption in order to even out daily and 
seasonal energy demand, save consumers money on utility bills, and curb greenhouse 
gases emissions. These programs promote behaviors that reduce energy consumption in 
the short-term (i.e., unplugging appliances when not in use) and in the long-term by 
increasing propensity to acquire energy efficient capital stock (i.e., purchasing Energy 
Star certified appliances) (Allcott and Rogers, 2014). However, the tangible effect of 
energy education in schools on energy consumption at home is not well understood.  
While the literature on energy behavior and conservation is extensive (see 
Abrahamse et al. (2005) for a review), there have been few evaluations of in-school 
energy education. Although the NEED Project (www.need.org) conducts knowledge 
assessments of their energy education curricula, they do not address the behavioral 
impacts of energy education. Two studies that rely on before and after surveys find 
contradicting effects of energy education for in elementary and junior high school. 
DiMatteo et al. (2014) finds increases in energy knowledge but not self-reported changes 
in behavior, while Zografakis et al. (2008) do find an increase in self-reported energy-
saving behaviors and a decrease in ‘energy-squandering’ behaviors. 
The majority of literature on environmental education in general, and energy 
education in particular, are problematic for several reasons. First, they rely on self-
reported behavior change, which is likely to be overstated (Geller, 1981). Second, they 
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used methods that fail to construct a counterfactual, compare treatment to control, or used 
a randomized framework, thereby potentially biasing the estimated treatment effect. 
Third, they do not quantify a treatment effect in terms of actual energy consumption, 
falling short of what is needed to properly evaluate the impacts that energy education will 
have on electricity use and its consequences. While some studies find evidence of 
increased self-reported pro-environmental behavior and intergenerational learning 
following energy education, there are no robust research studies that empirically estimate 
the effects of in-school education on observable, quantifiable outcomes at the household 
level. This research seeks to estimate the effects of in-school energy education on student 
household energy consumption. 
A recent empirical study of an energy education program in Singapore provides 
some evidence for the effects of energy lessons on household electricity consumption. 
Argawal et al. (2017) use a quasi-experimental approach to estimate changes in total 
monthly electricity consumption aggregated for households within 2 km from a school 
that participated in an energy savings campaign. The campaign included frequent energy 
lessons and an energy savings challenge with a 10% home electricity reduction goal and 
prizes for households that reduce the most. As such, the campaign is not directly 
comparable to the energy education program in our research. However, the findings 
suggest decreases in electricity consumption for households near treated schools relative 
to households farther from treated schools on the order of 1-2%. The authors of the study 
claim this is evidence of both effective nudging and spillover effects to neighbors without 
school children. However, there are several limitations of this study, including potential 
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selection bias, possible contamination between the treatment and control groups, and 
confoundedness of the energy education with competition and challenge aspects. 
Osbaldiston and Schmitz (2011) attempted to conduct an empirical analysis of 
two one-hour interventions in ninth grade science classes in a Midwestern US city. 
Researchers collected household electricity consumption data of participating students 
and gathered additional data through a pre- and post-survey administered to students and 
mailed to parents four weeks after the intervention. However, the authors find no 
significant difference in household electricity consumption across years before and after 
the energy program and estimates are not included in the published article. 
A related vein of literature seeks to understand the impact of water conservation 
education. Of these, only one study empirically examines change in water usage at the 
household level. Geller et al (1983) find that educational pamphlets elicit no discernable 
effect on household water usage and posit that only one household member fully receives 
educational treatment by actively engaging with the pamphlet when it is delivered.  
 
3. Background on eesmarts energy lessons 
The United Illuminating Company (UI) is a public electrical utility that serves the 
Greater New Haven area in Connecticut. Mandated by legislation in 1998, UI and four 
other Connecticut utilities administer the Energy Efficiency Board (EEB), now part of the 
brand Energize Connecticut SM. The EEB represents public and private interests by 
assisting utilities in developing and implementing energy efficiency programs (CEEF, 
2014). Funding for energy efficiency programs is provided through the Connecticut 
Energy Efficiency Fund (CEEF), government initiatives, and grants. The CEEF uses the 
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Combined Public Benefits Charge, a surcharge on consumer utility bills. Funding for 
EEB energy efficiency programs in Connecticut totaled $142M in 2013, 41% of which 
was spent on the residential sector (CEEF, 2014). 
 Among other services, Energize Connecticut programming includes community 
and childhood education. eesmarts is one of Energize Connecticut’s energy education 
programs and has delivered curricula to K-12 students since 2001. In 2013, eesmarts 
conducted professional development regarding renewable energy and energy efficiency 
to 466 educators through the Capitol Region Education Council (CREC) (CEEF, 2014). 
eesmarts lessons cover energy basics, including energy systems, conventional energy 
generation, and renewable energy sources, and highlight energy conservation behaviors at 
home. In 2013, Energize Connecticut programs, administered by the Utilities, cost $1M 
for K-12 education, with $1M budgeted for 2014. Despite legislation, costs to consumers, 
and effort on the part of UI, returns to in-school energy education programs are poorly 
understood.  
 In the 2015-2016 academic year, educators delivered eesmarts programming to 
over 500 students in the Greater New Haven area. We study the effects of three eesmarts 
lessons delivered to all fourth and fifth graders at one school. The first lesson taught 
students about ‘phantom’ electric loads – the electricity used by appliances even when 
they are turned off. This lesson introduced students to basic concepts of electricity, 
including types of energy, types of fuel and electricity sources, and compared electricity 
use of common household appliances. Students participated in two exercises that are 
particularly relevant to reducing electricity at home. First, they recorded which 
appliances or equipment they used the previous day (e.g. iPad, TV, lights) and estimated 
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how much energy they used in total. Second, students used a wattmeter to measure and 
record how much electricity various appliances use, both when the appliances are on and 
off.11 Students then came up with recommendations for how they could reduce their 
electricity use at home. Because of the direct ties linkages between this lesson and 
electricity conservation, we focus on the effects of this lesson in our main analysis. The 
second lesson described energy pathways. During this lesson, students built circuits to 
understand how electricity flows and manifests itself, including as light, heat, and sound. 
The third lesson discussed wind energy systems and included an activity to understand 
the impacts of different turbine blade shapes. The same educator taught all lessons, and 
all students were encouraged to discuss the lessons with their families at home. 
 
4. Methods 
We employ a differences-in-differences empirical framework to identify the 
effects of three energy lessons on household electricity consumption. Intuitively, we may 
expect a school student to talk about something novel or exciting that happened at school 
at home after school hours. For engaged families, it is not unreasonable to think that such 
a conversation would include takeaways from an energy lesson. Such communication 
would provide one mechanism for interfamily learning about energy conservation. 
Furthermore, some families may even act on specific conservation behaviors or 
experiment with energy use throughout the house. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
electricity use decreases on days of energy lessons. However, the energy lessons are only 
a small part of a student’s busy schedule. As much of the literature shows, permanent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Activity instructions included in the Appendix. 
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behavior change is extremely difficult to achieve. In the absence of persistent reminders 
and feedback about energy conservation, there is limited incentive to continue to reduce 
energy use. Therefore, we are primarily interested in changes to household electricity use 
on the day of a lesson. 
To test this hypothesis, we rely on a differences-in-differences model that 
compares the treatment group (households with a student who received an energy lesson) 
to the control group (households who do not contain a student who received an energy 
lesson) and examines whether there is differential energy use on the day of the lesson. 
The basic empirical model is as follows: 
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑!" = 𝛽!𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦! + 𝛽!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻! 
+𝛽!𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻! + 𝜀!"    (1) 
where 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦! is a binary variable equal to one if an energy lesson occurred on day 𝑡,  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻! is a binary variable equal to one if household 𝑖 contains a student who 
received an energy lesson, and 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻! is the interaction of the 
two. The dependent variable is electricity load for each household 𝑖 on each day 𝑡. The 
coefficient of interest is on the interaction term, 𝛽!, and is interpreted as an average 
change in kilowatt-hour (kWh) usage for treated households on the day of the lesson 
relative to control households. A negative, significant coefficient indicates a reduction in 
electricity consumption. The error term 𝜀!" is clustered at the household level to allow for 
correlations in electricity use within each household unit.  
 The rich nature of our dataset allows us to additionally control for unobservable 
characteristics that may affect electricity consumption. We extend the model in Equation 
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1 to control for unobservable household-level average electricity use with a household-
specific fixed effect, 𝛼!. Household fixed effects flexibly control for time-invariant 
factors including family size, house characteristics, preferences for AC use or heating, 
household appliances, etc. We also control for average electricity use each day of the 
sample using a time fixed effect, 𝜃!. These fixed effects flexibly account for determinants 
of electricity use on each day, including weather, time of day, and day of week norms, 
without imposing an assumption about the functional form of these relationships. With 
these fixed effects, our model becomes: 12 
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑!" = 𝛽!𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻! +   𝛼! + 𝜃! + 𝜀!"   (2) 
We make two more modifications to the basic model. First, we include the 
summation of coefficients on the three days prior to each lesson, the third term in 
Equation 2, to test the assumption of parallel trends between the treatment and control 
groups within the differences-in-differences framework. Doing so bolsters our confidence 
that we have an appropriate counterfactual for the treatment group. Second, we 
hypothesize the effect of the lessons attenuates quickly, within a few days. We make the 
assumption that the effect will attenuate completely within one week following the 
lesson, and estimate changes in electricity use for each of the seven days following the 
lessons. Doing so provides insight into how the effect of energy lessons changes over 
time. Our full specification is: 
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑!" = 𝛽!𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻! 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Note that the fixed effects take the place of the other terms from Equation 1. In other words, 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦!" is accounted for through the day fixed effect and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻!" is accounted for through 
the household fixed effect. 
 
 
87 
+ 𝛽!!𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻!!!!!!  
+ 𝛽!!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻!!!!!!  
+  𝛼! + 𝜃! + 𝜀!"        (3) 
Our coefficient of interest is again on 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻!, a binary 
variable equal to one if a lesson occurred on day 𝑡 for household 𝑖 and zero otherwise. 
The second term in Equation 3 tests for continued changes in electricity consumption 
over the seven days following each energy lesson. 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻!! is a 
binary variable equal to one if household 𝑖 received a lesson 𝜏 days before day 𝑡, and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient estimate for 𝛽!! indicates a change in electricity load on 𝜏 days 
following the lesson. Coefficients that are significantly distinguishable from zero would 
indicate possible persistence of the treatment effect. 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻!! is a 
binary variable equal to one if household 𝑖 received a lesson 𝜏 days after day 𝑡, and zero 
otherwise. If our assumption of parallel trends holds, then the coefficient estimates for 𝛽!! 
would be insignificant, indicating the electricity use prior to treatment is statistically 
indistinguishable between the treatment and control groups. These coefficients provide 
evidence for quality of the control group as an appropriate counterfactual for the 
treatment group.  
4.1 Exploration of Heterogeneity in Treatment Effect 
Our main analysis focuses solely on the effects of the lesson on phantom power 
due to the direct linkages with electricity conservation. In a classic scenario using 
differences-in-differences, there is measurement of the dependent variable prior to some 
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treatment and then after the treatment. In our empirical setting, we have not just one, but 
three treatment dates. Running the model given by Equation 3 would results in an 
estimated treatment effect that is averaged over the three lessons. However, two potential 
issues arise with doing so. First, the estimated treatment effect will be smaller in 
magnitude (and potentially lower in statistical significance) if one or two of the lessons 
do not affect electricity consumption at home. Second, since the lessons are spread 
throughout the academic year, if the treatment group responds differently to changes in 
season, then the same control group may not be an appropriate counterfactual. For 
example, we can imagine a scenario where a treatment group household increases use of 
heat or air conditioning in response to colder or hotter weather more so than households 
without children or with lower income families in the control group. With the use of 
household fixed effect, which essentially subtract mean daily load for each household, 
differences in extreme electricity use between treatment and control could bias the 
estimated treatment effect. To account for these complications, we estimate the treatment 
effect of each lesson instead of all lessons on average. We use a sample period that 
includes 30 days prior to the lesson, the day of the lesson, and seven days following the 
lesson.  
 We investigate whether the lessons have different effects on electricity use at 
home. It is plausible that the content of the lesson matters, and curriculum that includes 
action items for reducing electricity at home may result in deeper energy reductions at 
home. On the other hand, perhaps any lesson on energy prompts discussion of energy use 
at home and provides a reminder or cue to engage in energy efficient behaviors. In other 
words, the mechanism linking energy lessons to energy conservation may be that the 
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lessons are reminders, rather than instructions. Therefore, understanding how curriculum 
relates to electricity conservation has critical implications for curriculum development 
and timing of lessons depending on programmatic goals. One limitation of our empirical 
setting is that all students received the same lessons on the same days (i.e. Phantom 
Power was the first lesson for all students and all students received this lesson on October 
27, 2015). Therefore, we must interpret results with caution because the order of the 
lessons is confounded with the content of the lesson.  
Finally, we investigate heterogeneity in treatment effect by several characteristics. 
We first explore differences in treatment effect by level of electricity consumption. While 
higher-consuming households potentially have more opportunities to reduce electricity 
use, lower-consuming households may be more motivated to conserve either because 
they already have energy efficient capital stock, but may not be engaging in energy-
efficient household habits, or because they are more financially constrained. Then, we 
explore heterogeneity based on house characteristics. We focus on four characteristics: 
assessed value, gross area, number of bedrooms, and year built. While assessed value is 
highly correlated with square footage and neighborhood, it may also be an indication of 
improvements due to remodeling. Remodeled houses may have more efficient features, 
such as insulation. Above median assessed value may also be an indicator of wealth of 
the household. Wealthier households may be more likely to have many energy-
consuming appliances and electronics, which family members could turn off or unplug to 
conserve electricity. Gross area and number of bedrooms are both indicators of house 
size. It is possible that larger houses have more opportunity for energy reductions. Newer 
homes may include more electronics that can either be unplugged or turned off, or that 
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allow for easy and precise control of energy use, such as for heating or cooling. These 
features of newer homes may provide more energy savings opportunities. To test for 
heterogeneity, we interact the variable of interest with a binary variable equal to one for 
households who are above median13 in each characteristic, based on the treatment group: 
𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑!" = 𝛽!𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻! 
+  𝛽!𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻!   𝑥  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐! 
+  𝛼! +   𝜃! + 𝜃!  𝑥  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐! + 𝜀!"    (3) 
We additionally interact day fixed effects with the indicator for high consumption to 
control differentially for high-consuming control households.  
 
5. Data 
In the 2015-2016 academic year, 586 students received energy lessons in UI’s 
territory. We made a substantial attempt to obtain data for all students, but most schools 
declined to share the necessary information we needed to match student households with 
electricity data. We obtained data for 65 fourth and fifth grade students at a Catholic 
school in the Greater New Haven area that received three energy lessons. An educator 
delivered programming on phantom power sources on October 27, 2015, energy 
pathways on January 12, 2016, and wind energy on May 10, 2016. We obtained 
electricity consumption data from July 1, 2014 – October 5, 2016 for N=50 households14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Splitting by treatment group median maximizes the sample size in each bin (e.g. there are an equal 
number of treated households above and below median). 
14 Data for ten households were not obtained due to students living outside the utility’s territory, two 
households contain two students who are siblings, and three households could not be matched due to issues 
with addresses.   
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that contain a student. We additionally obtained electricity consumption data for N=1,485 
households selected at random by United Illuminating.15 Depending on meter type 
installed at each house, data were provided at 15-minute intervals, peak and off-peak 
hours, or at the daily level. We aggregated all data to consumption per day for each 
household, resulting in a dataset of N=756,804 household-day observations. 
 Figure 1 plots a 7-day smoothed moving average of daily electricity consumption 
treated and untreated households. Mean daily load for the treatment group is significantly 
higher than for untreated households (means = 31.1 kWh/day for treated households and 
18.6 kWh/day for control households, t(1535) = -5.37). This difference is likely due to 
several socioeconomic and demographic factors. All households in the treatment group 
contain at least one child, whereas only 34% of households in New Haven contain a child 
under 18 years old (US Census 200016). According to 2015 American Community Survey 
estimates for New Haven, family households earn nearly $17,000 more in annual income 
than non-family households.17 Furthermore, all households in the treatment group 
presumably have sufficient disposable income to enroll their child(ren) in a non-public 
school.18  
[Figure 1 about here] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 One possible concern is that the randomly selected control households may contain a student who 
received an energy lesson at a different school. However, we are not concerned about this possibility 
because the chances of contamination are roughly 0.16% (468 treated student households not included in 
our treatment group divided by a residential customer base of roughly 290,000 households). 
16 https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk 
17 Median family household income = $45,540. Median non-family household income = $27,724. (ACS 
2015) https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk 
18 To illustrate: tuition for one student is $4,500 per year, with ancillary costs including a $25 application 
fee, uniform purchases, and annual fundraising requirements. 
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One empirical concern is that the untreated group, which is comprised of 
randomly chosen households, may not be an adequate counterfactual for the treatment 
group. We construct a counterfactual for the treatment group by choosing control 
households with a mean daily load for the thirty days before each lesson that is 
sufficiently close to the mean daily load of each treatment household in that time period. 
We match each treatment household to the k=2 nearest neighbors, with replacement, 
within a caliper of 1 kWh mean daily load. In order to capture the most appropriate 
counterfactual, we construct a control group for each lesson specifically, using the thirty 
days prior to that lesson to calculate mean daily load. Figure 2 illustrates the agreement 
between treatment and control groups for each lesson. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
We additionally obtain assessor data for N=41 single family homes in the 
treatment group and N=55 homes in the control group for houses transacted since 1995.19 
We use this data to test for heterogeneity in treatment effect by house characteristics. 
 
6. Results and Discussion 
We present main results in Table 1. The dependent variable is daily load for each 
household, with the coefficient of interest on 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻! interpreted 
as a kWh reduction in electricity use on the day of lesson 1 relative to the control group. 
Column 1 interacts binary variables for days prior to, day of, and after the lesson with a 
binary variable indicating treatment status. Column 2 instead uses household and day 
fixed effects. The preferred model is Column 2 and Figure 3 illustrates the results of this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Of course a larger sample would be ideal, and this analysis should be viewed as strictly exploratory. 
 
 
93 
model. The coefficients on the prior day indicators are all insignificant, which show no 
statistically discernible difference in electricity load the three days leading up to the 
lesson and provide evidence for the appropriateness of the constructed control group. 20 
[Table 1 about here] 
The coefficient of interest is on the interaction 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻!, 
which estimates the reduction in load on the lesson day for the treatment group relative to 
control. The coefficient estimate is negative and significant at the 10 percent level, 
indicating a 2.5 kWh reduction in electricity use on the day of the lesson for households 
that contain a student who received the lesson, an eight percent decrease in electricity 
load relative to baseline. While the majority of coefficients on the next day indicators are 
statistically insignificant, the coefficient estimate for two days following the lesson is 
positive and similar in magnitude to our coefficient of interest. This could be an 
indication that households defer electricity use the day of the lesson to two days 
following the lesson. For example, households may defer doing a load of laundry, 
watching television, or using a computer. Importantly, evidence of deferment indicates a 
net zero reduction in electricity load due to the energy lesson.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Table 2 compares results of the preferred model from Table 1 using various 
control groups. This table is meant as a robustness check to ensure the consistency of our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Table 1A and Figure 1A in the Appendix present results from the same models using a control group 
comprised of randomly chosen households. Note that the coefficient on the indicator for treatment status, 
7.894, in Column 1 is further evidence of the difference between treatment and control groups, and 
incentive for constructing a more appropriate counterfactual through nearest neighbor matching. In 
contrast, this coefficient in Column 1 of Table 1 of the main paper (using matching methods) is both 
smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
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main finding that electricity consumption is reduced on day of the energy lesson. 
Columns 1-4 use a constructed counterfactual with k=1 through 4 neighbors, 
respectively. Column 5 uses all neighbors within the 1 kWh/day caliper.  
[Table 2 about here] 
The coefficient of interest is negative and significant Columns 2-5, indicating a 
reduction in electricity use on the order of six to eight percent on the day of the lesson. 
The coefficient of interest in Column 1 is similarly negative, though larger in magnitude 
with larger standard errors. Consistency of the coefficient of interest lends confidence to 
our main finding of a short-term reduction in electricity consumption on the days of 
energy lessons. Across all columns, the coefficient estimate on the two days later 
indicator is positive, though significance is lost in Column 5. Again, this suggests an 
increase in electricity load two days following the lesson, and provides evidence of the 
treatment effect being caused by deferral of load rather than reduction in load. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Next, we explore differences in treatment effect by lesson. Table 3 presents the 
results of this analysis, where each column represents each lesson.21 Column 1 repeats 
results of the preferred model in Table 1. Column 2 (3) uses the same model but for the 
sample period of 30 days before the second (third) lesson, the day of, and seven days 
following. For each column, the control group is constructed by matching each treated 
unit to two nearest neighbors based on mean daily baseline load for the thirty days prior 
to the lesson, subject to a caliper of 1 kWh/day. Coefficients on the three prior day 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Tables 2A and 3A in the Appendix present results from models with one through four nearest neighbors 
and all neighbors, subject to the caliper of 1 kWh/day, for each of lessons 2 and 3 respectively. 
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indicators are statistically insignificant for all columns, indicating good agreement 
between treatment and control groups. Results fail to show a significance difference in 
load on the days of lessons 2 and 3. Interestingly, we see a significant increase in load for 
two to four days following the third lesson, roughly equal to a ten percent increase in 
daily use for each day relative to baseline. While we cannot rule out this finding being an 
odd effect of the lesson on wind energy, our intuition suggests this effect may be more 
likely due to some other event or occurrence common to all houses of fourth and fifth 
graders in this particular school. Lesson content, timing, and dates are confounded in our 
empirical setting, so we cannot disentangle whether the absence of treatment effects of 
the second and third lesson is due to lesson content (specifically a lack of energy saving 
action items) or due to other factors. However, that we find a treatment effect for the 
lesson most directly applicable to energy conservation is suggestive that lesson content 
matters.  
Lastly, we explore heterogeneity in treatment effect by several characteristics. 
Table 4 presents results from this analysis for the lesson on Phantom Power, which was 
the only lesson to have a statistically significant treatment effect.22 Column 1 investigates 
heterogeneity in treatment effect by baseline electricity consumption. We fail to find a 
statically distinguishable difference in electricity use the day of the lesson between 
above- and below-median consuming households, though the signs on the coefficients 
suggest higher-consuming households may reduce more on the day of the lesson. 
Columns 2-5 explore differences based on house characteristics. All coefficients on 𝐿𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑎𝑦!  𝑥  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐻𝐻!are negative, indicating reductions in electricity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Analogous results for the other lessons are included in the Appendix: Tables 4A and 5A. 
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consumption for households below median in each characteristic. Signs of coefficients on 
the interactions with the characteristics suggest that these reductions may be smaller for 
newer households with higher assessed values and enhanced for larger households. While 
the magnitudes and signs of the coefficients of interest are interesting – and could align 
with intuition – the standard errors are unfortunately large due to our limited sample size. 
This is an area ripe for future research. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we conduct an empirical analysis of the effects of in-school energy 
lessons for fourth and fifth grade students on household electricity consumption. Using a 
differences-in-differences empirical framework, we compare electricity load on the day 
of the energy lesson and on seven days after between households with students who 
received the energy lesson and control households that closely match treated households 
in mean daily baseline load. We estimate energy reductions on the order of 2.5 kWh on 
the day of a lesson regarding phantom loads, roughly equivalent to eight percent of mean 
daily load. However, we see an increase in load of roughly the same magnitude two days 
following the lesson, suggesting deferment of electricity use rather than conservation. 
We fail to find an effect of lessons about energy pathways and wind energy on 
electricity consumption the days of those lessons. Our empirical setting cannot allow us 
to causally attribute this difference in treatment effects to the content of the lessons due to 
confoundedness with timing and ordering of the lessons. For example, we cannot rule out 
that students become desensitized to the novelty of the energy lessons by the second 
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lesson. However, intuition points to the curriculum content as a driver of the effect. The 
curriculum for the lesson on phantom loads includes direct action items for the students 
to take home. We also investigate whether there is a difference in treatment effect for 
high-consuming households or households with certain house characteristics.  The 
magnitudes of the coefficient estimates suggest that the treatment effect may be larger for 
high consuming households and families in larger homes, but smaller for households in 
higher valued or more recently constructed homes. However, our small sample of treated 
households limits our ability to identify heterogeneity in treatment effect with statistical 
precision. 
This study contributes an empirical case study to the literature on energy 
education. While there are benefits to a case study-style analysis using all students from 
one school, there are also critical limitations that influence our interpretation of the 
treatment effect. Most importantly, this case study is of a private, Catholic school, which 
arguably differs from other schools both in socio-economic demographic characteristics 
and other unobservable characteristics. For example, one could argue that the households 
who went through the effort to enroll their children in a private school are also more 
motivated than households whose children attend public school. More motivated 
households may also be more receptive to behavior change or more likely to discuss 
energy lessons with their children after school. Therefore, the effects we find may 
represent an upper bound on changes in energy use due to in-school lessons. 
 Future research should address this limitation by including a more diverse set of 
schools in the analysis. With a larger sample size and experimental design, empirical 
analysis would also be able to tease out effects lesson content and timing, as well as 
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investigate heterogeneity in effect by student grade, household socioeconomic or 
demographic characteristics, household characteristics, and consumption levels. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1. Electricity consumption 
	  
	  
Notes: Figure illustrates smoothed daily load using a 7-day moving average. The treatment group 
is composed of N=50 households who contain a student who received all three energy lessons 
(mean daily load = 31.1 kWh/day). Vertical reference lines denote the energy lesson: Phantom 
Power occurred on 10/27/2015, Energy Pathways occurred on 1/12/2016, and Wind Energy 
occurred on 5/10/2016. The untreated group is composed of N=1485 randomly chosen 
households (mean daily load = 18.6 kWh/day). 
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Figure 2. Electricity consumption 
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Notes: Figure illustrates mean daily load for the treatment and control groups smoothed using a 7-
day moving average. The control group (N=85 households) is constructed by matching on mean 
daily load for 9/26/2015-10/26/2015, using the two nearest neighbors with replacement and a 
caliper of 1 kWh/day). Treated households without a match within the caliper are dropped. N=48 
households remain in the treatment group.  
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Figure 3. Treatment effect over time for lesson 1 on phantom power 
 
 
Notes: Figure plots coefficient estimates for three days prior to the date of lesson 1, the day of the 
lesson, and the seven days following the lesson. This figure illustrates results in Column 2 of 
Table 1. Error bars indicate the 90% confidence interval around the point estimate. 
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DV = Daily Load [kWh] (1) (2)
Treatment HH 0.486
(2.013)
Lesson Day 0.375
(1.295)
Lesson Day x Treatment HH -1.771 -2.463*
(1.609) (1.479)
1 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.202 -0.334
(1.243) (1.121)
2 Next Day x Treatment HH 1.496 2.495**
(1.303) (1.175)
3 Next Day x Treatment HH -1.165 -1.469
(1.257) (1.057)
4 Next Day x Treatment HH 1.151 0.175
(1.500) (1.242)
5 Next Day x Treatment HH 3.697** 2.207
(1.694) (1.538)
6 Next Day x Treatment HH 1.524 1.145
(1.375) (1.154)
7 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.904 -0.557
(1.316) (1.136)
1 Prior Day x Treatment HH -1.648 -1.713
(1.346) (1.248)
2 Prior Day x Treatment HH 1.429 1.951
(1.409) (1.326)
3 Prior Day x Treatment HH -2.778* -1.906
(1.649) (1.544)
Household Fixed Effects N Y
Day Fixed Effects N Y
Observations 5,103 5,103
R-squared 0.00551 0.689
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.678
Table 1. Treatment Effect of Lesson 1
Notes: Dependent variable is mean daily load for N=48 treatment 
households and N=85 control households 9/26/2015-11/3/2015. 
Column 1 uses a differences-in-differences model while Column 2 
adds household and day fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the 
household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels. 
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DV = Daily Load [kWh] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lesson Day x Treatment HH -3.299 -2.463* -2.306* -2.015* -2.058**
(2.022) (1.479) (1.282) (1.176) (0.967)
1 Next Day x Treatment HH 0.275 -0.334 -0.878 -1.009 -1.221
(1.402) (1.121) (1.033) (0.989) (0.839)
2 Next Day x Treatment HH 2.721** 2.495** 2.172* 2.023* 1.254
(1.292) (1.175) (1.108) (1.056) (0.964)
3 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.167 -1.469 -1.414 -1.222 -1.487*
(1.014) (1.057) (0.968) (0.919) (0.813)
4 Next Day x Treatment HH 0.718 0.175 0.266 -0.359 -0.504
(1.324) (1.242) (1.130) (1.117) (0.965)
5 Next Day x Treatment HH 2.313 2.207 1.843 1.384 2.201
(1.583) (1.538) (1.474) (1.443) (1.346)
6 Next Day x Treatment HH 1.879 1.145 0.711 0.719 0.872
(1.249) (1.154) (1.136) (1.091) (1.000)
7 Next Day x Treatment HH 0.815 -0.557 -0.405 -0.281 0.367
(1.161) (1.136) (1.037) (0.979) (0.856)
1 Prior Day x Treatment HH -0.957 -1.713 -1.451 -0.935 -0.517
(1.360) (1.248) (1.106) (1.040) (0.874)
2 Prior Day x Treatment HH 0.852 1.951 1.332 1.018 1.772
(1.486) (1.326) (1.322) (1.319) (1.224)
3 Prior Day x Treatment HH -1.451 -1.906 -2.077 -1.656 -1.469
(1.900) (1.544) (1.440) (1.377) (1.236)
Household Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Day Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,532 5,103 6,716 7,988 29,842
R-squared 0.696 0.689 0.698 0.700 0.708
Adjusted R-squared 0.683 0.678 0.688 0.690 0.699
Caliper 1 1 1 1 1
Neighbors 1 2 3 4 all
Table 2. Treatment Effect of Lesson 1
Notes: Dependent variable is mean daily load 9/26/2015-11/3/2015. The treatment group contains N=48 households. 
The control group is constructed by matching on mean daily load for 9/26/15-10/26/2015. Each column uses a 
different number of nearest neighbors, all subject to a caliper of 1 kWh/day. Errors are clustered at the household 
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
 
 
110 
 
  
DV = Daily Load [kWh] (1) (2) (3)
Lesson Day x Treatment HH -2.463* -0.0134 -0.404
(1.479) (1.326) (1.062)
1 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.334 -0.456 0.102
(1.121) (1.392) (0.927)
2 Next Day x Treatment HH 2.495** -0.232 -0.538
(1.175) (1.229) (1.080)
3 Next Day x Treatment HH -1.469 -0.512 2.481**
(1.057) (1.191) (1.176)
4 Next Day x Treatment HH 0.175 1.309 3.452***
(1.242) (1.381) (1.272)
5 Next Day x Treatment HH 2.207 -0.443 2.762**
(1.538) (1.374) (1.110)
6 Next Day x Treatment HH 1.145 -1.771 -0.454
(1.154) (1.584) (0.887)
7 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.557 -1.543 0.364
(1.136) (1.525) (0.834)
1 Prior Day x Treatment HH -1.713 -0.288 -1.456
(1.248) (1.205) (1.263)
2 Prior Day x Treatment HH 1.951 1.677 1.509
(1.326) (1.341) (1.138)
3 Prior Day x Treatment HH -1.906 0.257 -0.263
(1.544) (1.280) (1.234)
Household Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Day Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Observations 5,103 5,403 5,219
R-squared 0.689 0.739 0.767
Adjusted R-squared 0.678 0.730 0.758
Table 3. Treatment Effect of Lessons 1, 2, and 3
Notes: Dependent variable is mean daily load for thirty days prior to each lesson, the 
day of the lesson, and seven days following the lesson. Each column corresponds to a 
lesson. Lesson 1 (column 1) occurred on 10/27/2015. Lesson 2 (column 2) occurred 
on 1/12/2016. Lesson 3 (column 3) occurred on 5/10/2016. The control group is 
constructed by matching on mean daily load for thiry days prior to the lesson using 
two nearest neighbors subject to a caliper of 1 kWh/day. Errors are clustered at the 
household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 4. Heterogeneity in Treatment Effect of Lesson 1
DV = Daily Load [kWh] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Characteristic = 
Above 
Median 
Consumption
Above 
Median 
Value
Above 
Median 
Gross Area
Construction 
Newer than 
1955
More than 
3 Bedrooms
Lesson Day x Treatment HH -0.760 -2.468 -0.341 -2.763 -1.769
(1.247) (2.108) (1.244) (2.585) (2.044)
-4.825 0.454 -4.087 1.296 -1.634
(3.325) (3.701) (3.653) (3.510) (4.711)
Household Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Day Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Day x Characteristic FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 5,103 3,681 3,681 3,681 3,681
R-squared 0.694 0.657 0.656 0.656 0.656
Adjusted R-squared 0.681 0.640 0.639 0.639 0.639
Lesson Day x Treatment HH 
x Characteristic
Notes: Dependent variable is mean daily load for thirty days prior to the lesson, the day of the lesson, and seven days 
following the lesson. Each column explores heterogenetiy in the treatment effect by some characteristic, a binary 
variable equal to one if the household is above (treatment group) median for that characteristic. Median consumption = 
24.5 kWh/day averaged over all days prior to the first lesson. Median assessed house value = $186,690. Median gross 
area = 3,274 square feet. Median year of construction = 1955. Median number of bedrooms = 3 bedrooms. The control 
group is constructed by matching on mean daily load for thiry days prior to the lesson using two nearest neighbors 
subject to a caliper of 1 kWh/day. Errors are clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Appendix 
 
Phantom Power: Kill-a-Watt Activity Instructions for Students 
 
  
Name:  ___________________________________________ 
 
KILL-A-WATT ACTIVITY 
 
Part 1:   
 
OBJECTIVE 
By the end of this lesson, students will be able to: 
• Determine the number of watts an electrical device uses. 
 
 
MATERIALS / EQUIPMENT 
x Variety of household electric devices including devices that have a “stand by” power feature and others 
that have on/off switches. Use electrical devices such as computers, printers, speakers, pencil 
sharpeners, desk lamps, vacuum cleaners, power chair charger, camera charger, cordless drill 
charger, fan, coffee maker, digital clock, cell phone charger,  
x Power strips 
x Extension cords 
x Kill-A-Watt meters (* two versions now available: regular and EZ) 
x Optional: electric bill  
 
TIME: 30 minutes 
 
 
PROCEDURE 
1.  Look at the appliances and predict which device you think needs the most power and why. 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Watts: The amount of energy a device uses in performing its function; the SI derived unit used to 
measure power, equal to one joule per second. In electricity, a watt is equal to current (in amperes) 
multiplied by voltage (in volts). 
 
NOTE:  Pay attention to the instructions for using the Kill-A-Watt meter and the safety warning 
about using electricity. 
 
2. Follow your teacher’s directions as to which appliance to begin your testing. 
3. Attach the Kill-A-Watt meter as instructed. 
4. Turn the appliance on and allow it to run for one minute.  
5. Record the number of watts drawn by the appliance. 
6. Which device recorded the most number of watts?  _________________________________ 
7. Which device used the lowest wattage?  __________________________________________ 
8. Why do you think the results were as recorded?  ____________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
9. Was your prediction correct?  _______________ 
10. Share your findings in the class discussion. 
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DV = Daily Load [kWh] (1) (2)
Treatment HH 7.894***
(1.993)
Lesson Day 0.797***
(0.275)
Lesson Day x Treatment HH -3.324** -2.147**
(1.492) (0.966)
1 Next Day x Treatment HH -1.513* -1.161
(0.818) (0.817)
2 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.329 1.079
(1.016) (0.957)
3 Next Day x Treatment HH -1.964** -1.900**
(0.950) (0.841)
4 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.572 -0.806
(1.186) (1.037)
5 Next Day x Treatment HH 2.525* 2.078
(1.401) (1.333)
6 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.0175 0.136
(1.301) (1.159)
7 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.476 0.0258
(0.965) (0.874)
1 Prior Day x Treatment HH -1.061 -0.791
(0.960) (0.909)
2 Prior Day x Treatment HH 1.163 1.718
(1.258) (1.241)
3 Prior Day x Treatment HH -2.517* -1.974
(1.451) (1.417)
Household Fixed Effects N Y
Day Fixed Effects N Y
Observations 36,819 36,819
R-squared 0.0132 0.850
Adjusted R-squared 0.013 0.845
Table 1A. Treatment Effect of Lesson 1
Notes: Dependent variable is mean daily load for N=49 treatment 
households and N=932 control households 9/26/2015-11/3/2015. 
Column 1 uses a differences-in-differences model while Column 2 
adds household and day fixed effects. Errors are clustered at the 
household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels. 
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Figure 1A. Treatment effect over time 
 
 
Notes: Figure plots coefficient estimates for three days prior to the date of lesson 1, the day of the 
lesson, and the seven days following the lesson. This figure illustrates results in Column 2 of 
Table 1A. Error bars indicate the 90% confidence interval around the point estimate. 
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DV = Daily Load [kWh] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lesson Day x Treatment HH -0.105 -0.0134 -0.939 -1.441 -1.045
(1.795) (1.326) (1.181) (1.138) (0.948)
1 Next Day x Treatment HH 0.117 -0.456 -0.990 -0.964 -1.011
(1.795) (1.392) (1.306) (1.236) (1.083)
2 Next Day x Treatment HH 0.0501 -0.232 -0.433 -0.560 -0.414
(1.641) (1.229) (1.136) (1.079) (0.904)
3 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.192 -0.512 -1.025 -1.978* -1.786**
(1.608) (1.191) (1.095) (1.083) (0.886)
4 Next Day x Treatment HH 0.959 1.309 1.316 0.527 -0.136
(1.954) (1.381) (1.208) (1.208) (0.958)
5 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.156 -0.443 -0.772 -1.503 -1.576
(1.757) (1.374) (1.269) (1.228) (1.058)
6 Next Day x Treatment HH -2.216 -1.771 -2.515* -2.746** -1.705
(1.939) (1.584) (1.467) (1.378) (1.194)
7 Next Day x Treatment HH -1.218 -1.543 -2.258 -2.577* -2.188*
(1.935) (1.525) (1.396) (1.366) (1.217)
1 Prior Day x Treatment HH -0.195 -0.288 -0.307 -0.544 -0.610
(1.486) (1.205) (1.097) (1.051) (0.927)
2 Prior Day x Treatment HH 1.588 1.677 1.680 1.050 1.415
(1.587) (1.341) (1.273) (1.247) (1.112)
3 Prior Day x Treatment HH 0.201 0.257 0.357 0.228 0.223
(1.308) (1.280) (1.223) (1.199) (1.126)
Household Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Day Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,744 5,403 6,948 8,500 28,536
R-squared 0.746 0.739 0.725 0.717 0.694
Adjusted R-squared 0.736 0.730 0.716 0.708 0.685
Caliper 1 1 1 1 1
Neighbors 1 2 3 4 all
Table 2A. Treatment Effect of Lesson 2
Notes: Dependent variable is mean daily load 12/11/2015-1/19/2016. The treatment group contains N=48 households. 
The control group is constructed by matching on mean daily load for 12/11/15-1/11/2016. Each column uses a 
different number of nearest neighbors, all subject to a caliper of 1 kWh/day. Errors are clustered at the household 
level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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DV = Daily Load [kWh] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lesson Day x Treatment HH 0.681 -0.404 -0.448 -0.438 -1.149
(1.191) (1.062) (1.004) (0.999) (0.908)
1 Next Day x Treatment HH 0.514 0.102 0.254 0.704 0.378
(1.135) (0.927) (0.858) (0.850) (0.724)
2 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.0970 -0.538 -0.350 -0.107 -0.310
(1.308) (1.080) (1.033) (1.019) (0.871)
3 Next Day x Treatment HH 2.882** 2.481** 2.496** 2.535** 2.103**
(1.247) (1.176) (1.118) (1.139) (1.042)
4 Next Day x Treatment HH 3.726** 3.452*** 3.405*** 3.564*** 3.630***
(1.515) (1.272) (1.151) (1.124) (0.924)
5 Next Day x Treatment HH 4.089*** 2.762** 3.060*** 2.402** 2.065**
(1.198) (1.110) (1.039) (1.024) (0.881)
6 Next Day x Treatment HH -0.179 -0.454 -0.188 -0.498 -0.865
(0.841) (0.887) (0.842) (0.832) (0.749)
7 Next Day x Treatment HH 0.863 0.364 0.431 0.553 0.322
(0.968) (0.834) (0.776) (0.758) (0.652)
1 Prior Day x Treatment HH 0.467 -1.456 -0.821 -0.790 -0.909
(1.005) (1.263) (1.090) (1.019) (0.798)
2 Prior Day x Treatment HH 2.431* 1.509 1.290 1.204 1.345
(1.245) (1.138) (1.065) (1.048) (0.920)
3 Prior Day x Treatment HH 0.161 -0.263 -0.134 0.233 1.379
(1.437) (1.234) (1.161) (1.138) (1.035)
Household Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Day Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,609 5,219 6,708 7,907 32,066
R-squared 0.789 0.767 0.760 0.745 0.739
Adjusted R-squared 0.781 0.758 0.752 0.737 0.732
Caliper 1 1 1 1 1
Neighbors 1 2 3 4 all
Table 3A. Treatment Effect of Lesson 3
Notes: Dependent variable is mean daily load 4/9/2016-5/17/2016. The treatment group contains N=48 households. 
The control group is constructed by matching on mean daily load for 4/9/16-5/9/2016. Each column uses a different 
number of nearest neighbors, all subject to a caliper of 1 kWh/day. Errors are clustered at the household level. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 4A. Heterogeneity in Treatment Effect of Lesson 2
DV = Daily Load [kWh] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Characteristic = 
Above 
Median 
Consumption
Above 
Median 
Value
Above 
Median 
Gross Area
Construction 
Newer than 
1955
More than 
3 Bedrooms
Lesson Day x Treatment HH -1.543 -0.470 -6.627*** -2.111 -2.207
(1.496) (2.772) (1.472) (2.532) (2.045)
3.821 -1.073 5.712** 2.555 4.780
(2.563) (3.618) (2.483) (3.258) (3.573)
Household Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Day Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Day x Characteristic FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 5,403 2,030 2,030 2,030 2,030
R-squared 0.746 0.728 0.727 0.724 0.726
Adjusted R-squared 0.735 0.709 0.708 0.706 0.707
Lesson Day x Treatment HH 
x Characteristic
Notes: Dependent variable is mean daily load for thirty days prior to the lesson, the day of the lesson, and seven days 
following the lesson. Each column explores heterogenetiy in the treatment effect by some characteristic, a binary 
variable equal to one if the household is above (treatment group) median for that characteristic. Median consumption = 
24.5 kWh/day averaged over all days prior to the first lesson. Median assessed house value = $186,690. Median gross 
area = 3,274 square feet. Median year of construction = 1955. Median number of bedrooms = 3 bedrooms. The control 
group is constructed by matching on mean daily load for thiry days prior to the lesson using two nearest neighbors 
subject to a caliper of 1 kWh/day. Errors are clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Table 5A. Heterogeneity in Treatment Effect of Lesson 3
DV = Daily Load [kWh] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Characteristic = 
Above 
Median 
Consumption
Above 
Median 
Value
Above 
Median 
Gross Area
Construction 
Newer than 
1955
More than 
3 Bedrooms
Lesson Day x Treatment HH 0.527 -2.033 -2.166 -5.562** -2.280
(0.880) (3.060) (3.046) (2.710) (2.396)
-3.925 -2.181 -1.688 4.320 -2.453
(2.652) (3.533) (3.625) (3.060) (2.950)
Household Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Day Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
Day x Characteristic FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 5,219 1,907 1,907 1,907 1,907
R-squared 0.774 0.711 0.712 0.714 0.711
Adjusted R-squared 0.765 0.690 0.692 0.694 0.690
Lesson Day x Treatment HH 
x Characteristic
Notes: Dependent variable is mean daily load for thirty days prior to the lesson, the day of the lesson, and seven days 
following the lesson. Each column explores heterogenetiy in the treatment effect by some characteristic, a binary 
variable equal to one if the household is above (treatment group) median for that characteristic. Median consumption = 
24.5 kWh/day averaged over all days prior to the first lesson. Median assessed house value = $186,690. Median gross 
area = 3,274 square feet. Median year of construction = 1955. Median number of bedrooms = 3 bedrooms. The control 
group is constructed by matching on mean daily load for thiry days prior to the lesson using two nearest neighbors 
subject to a caliper of 1 kWh/day. Errors are clustered at the household level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels. 
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Abstract 
 
One challenge of promoting energy-efficient behavior change is status quo bias: limiting 
energy use often requires sacrificing convenience and comfort now and in the future. 
Using experimental data with hypothetical scenarios, we explore what temporal frame 
(e.g. daily, monthly, or yearly) minimizes status quo bias and encourages energy-efficient 
intentions. Results suggest individuals are most willing to adopt energy-efficient 
behaviors when the cost savings are framed on a monthly basis, relative to daily and 
yearly frames. We investigate whether cognitive fluency – the perceived ease of 
processing information – could be an underlying mechanism. We find suggestive 
evidence that individuals are indeed most fluent with energy costs framed on a monthly 
basis, possibly because most individuals receive monthly energy bills. When individuals 
are faced with energy costs in relatively disfluent frames (daily and yearly), we find that 
energy efficiency intentions are greatest when given a context for total energy spending 
in a matching frame.  
 
Keywords: Status Quo Bias, Temporal Framing, Energy Conservation, Energy 
Efficiency, Behavior Change 
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1. Introduction 
The US residential sector had a total consumption of 20,558 trillion Btu of energy in 
2015, amounting to billions of dollars spent on household energy bills in addition to 
negative environmental and health externalities from conventional energy generation 
(EIA, 2017). Uptake of energy efficient technologies has been quite slow, in spite of the 
large savings available (the "energy paradox", Jaffe & Stavins, 1994). One low-cost way 
to nudge more energy-efficient decisions is to make the costs and savings of energy 
choices more salient. Indeed, information about costs is becoming more prevalent (e.g. 
cost comparisons of CFL versus incandescent light bulbs on product packaging, and 
savings of energy-efficient alternatives for household decisions on utility electric bills) 
and consumer responses to energy labels have been studied for nearly four decades (e.g. 
McNeill & Wilke, 1979). Yet there is substantial variation in how these costs and savings 
are presented (e.g. per day, per month, per year) and we lack a comprehensive framework 
to understand how individuals respond to this information.  
With large potential for savings on energy bills and information about the costs of 
energy-inefficiency, why aren’t individuals making more energy-efficient choices? For 
individuals who typically engage in energy-inefficient household habits and purchases, 
status quo bias could be a contributing factor towards energy consumption and persistent 
inefficiency (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). For example, individuals were more likely 
to keep a contractor’s arbitrary light bulb choice, despite zero switching cost and the 
potential for future monetary savings (Dinner et al., 2011). In addition, limiting energy 
use often requires sacrificing comfort or convenience, which may make behavior change 
difficult (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). Emphasizing the costs of energy-
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inefficient choices and the benefits of energy efficiency may help overcome reluctance to 
energy-efficient behavior change (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005).  
Our research explores which temporal frame (per day, per month, per year) for 
presenting the costs of energy decisions is optimal for promoting energy-efficient 
choices. We conduct four studies drawing from two online populations. Findings from 
hypothetical scenarios indicate that presenting monthly costs of energy-inefficient 
behaviors decreases the influence of status quo energy behaviors on energy efficiency 
intentions (Study 1). We hypothesize this is because individuals are most easily able to 
think about monthly costs relative to daily and yearly costs (Studies 2 and 3). We find 
that supplementing information about costs of energy inefficiency with explicit 
information about typical energy spending in a matching frame increases intentions to 
engage in energy efficiency relative to providing the same information in mismatching 
frames (Study 4). This research contributes to two bodies of literature. First, we show that 
ease of processing may present a boundary of status quo bias. Second, we contribute to 
the literature on choice architecture, specifically regarding household energy decisions. 
Recent literature has compared the effects of long-term temporal framing on energy 
efficient choices, and has generally found that longer timeframes that are within the 
lifecycle of the product are most effective. However, our findings show that the ease of 
processing information in a given temporal frame also plays a role in consumer choice. 
We start with a literature review in Section 2. We describe choice architecture 
broadly and non-price strategies to encourage energy efficiency and conservation 
specifically. We turn to concepts from behavioral economics and marketing to give 
context to our research question. In light of these underpinnings, we formulate our 
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hypotheses regarding how cost frames can affect status quo bias, cognitive fluency as a 
possible mechanism, and how we can operationalize costs and contexts to encourage 
energy efficiency in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of the four studies in which 
we test our hypotheses. We first provide an overview of all studies and a description of 
the general experimental design. Within this section, we then present each study with 
specific details on methods, data, results, and discussion. We conclude with a general 
discussion of all four studies and implications for energy policy in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature Review  
The motivation for reducing energy use is clear: energy conservation can save 
households money on their electricity bills, reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate 
climate change, and reduce pollution. Given the extent of energy consumption in the 
residential sector, encouraging household energy-efficient behavior change represents a 
significant strategy to conserve energy and mitigate externalities of electricity generation 
(Dietz et al., 2009). Economists, policy makers, and others have developed strategies to 
encourage energy efficiency ranging in degree of autonomy for the decision maker. For 
example, at one end of the spectrum are policies like residential direct load control – 
where utility providers control the level of electricity consumption of household 
appliances, such as by set backs on air conditioning temperatures during hours of peak 
demand – and regulations that mandate certain levels of energy efficiency, such as fuel 
efficiency standards for cars, energy efficiency standards for appliances, or prohibition of 
energy-inefficient products like incandescent light bulbs. While such policies may be 
effective in reducing energy use, they take away autonomy from the individual. At the 
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other end of the spectrum are nudges and non-price strategies that preserve individual 
freedom of choice while still encouraging energy efficient choices.  
 Any decision context is an opportunity to nudge individuals toward choices that 
are socially desirable, such as energy efficiency. Choice architecture is the framework for 
how to display choices to decision makers, including what content to present and how to 
present it (Johnson et al., 2012; Thaler et al., 2014). There is an emerging body of 
literature that provides evidence of the effects of choice architecture on decisions (see 
Johnson et al., 2012 for a review of choice architecture tools). While neoclassical 
microeconomic theory predicts individual choice is independent of how the choice is 
described, there is a vast body of literature documenting violations of descriptive 
invariance. Conditions of these violations inform choice architecture. For example, one 
prevalent tool of choice architecture is defaults. Johnson and Goldstein (2003) showed 
that individuals were more likely to be organ donors when defaulted into the program and 
allowed to opt out rather than having to actively opt into the program. Each individual is 
faced with the same alternatives – to be enrolled as an organ donor or to not be enrolled 
as an organ donor – but the way the decision is set up affects the end choice.  
 Policy makers have turned to concepts from choice architecture as a low-cost and 
politically feasible way to encourage pro-environmental behaviors without restricting the 
consumer’s choice set. Within the larger context of measures to reduce energy 
consumption, choice architecture is a non-price strategy that fits alongside recommended 
behavioral interventions (Allcott & Mullainathan, 2010), including peer comparisons 
(Allcott, 2011; Allcott & Rogers, 2014), commitment devices and goal setting (Becker, 
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1978; Harding & Hsiaw, 2014), feedback (Jessoe & Rapson, 2014; Carrico & Riemer, 
2011), and education (Agarwal et al., 2017; Gill & Lang, 2017), among others.  
Enacted in 1975, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act requires that new 
appliances be labeled with energy consumption information and new vehicles be labeled 
with information about fuel consumption. This information necessarily enters into the 
choice architecture of energy-consuming product purchase decisions and energy-related 
behavior decisions. Therefore, the way information about energy consumption and costs 
is presented affects individual choice.  Over the years, these labels have been subject to 
criticism and redesign to improve ease of use and information communication. For 
example, Larrick and Soll (2008) highlight the difficulty in interpreting the miles per 
gallon figure in terms of fuel-efficient vehicle choices. The recently revised fuel economy 
labels (2013) additionally report gallons per hundred miles, two measures of fuel cost, 
and information about greenhouse gas emissions. These additional measures not only 
make information about comparative fuel use easier to access, but the number of 
measures add weight to the fuel attribute in consumer choice, provide a signpost to 
consider environmental preferences23, and provide a reference point against which to 
weigh attribute levels (Ungemach et al., 2014; Weber et al., 1988; Costa & Kahn, 2013; 
Larrick et al., 2015). These labels provide otherwise missing information about energy 
consumption and cost to consumers, and remove one barrier to consumers considering 
this attribute in their decision-making process (Newell & Siikimaki, 2014). By definition, 
information like energy labels is inherently subject to choice architecture, and decisions 
about what information to present and how to present it affect the consumer’s choices. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Though consumers may react differentially to the connection between pro-environmental 
preferences and fuel economy based on political ideology (Gromet et al., 2013). 
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this paper, we seek to understand the role of temporal framing – over what time period 
energy-related costs and benefits are aggregated – in energy-related household choices. 
Prior research has explored effects of temporal framing of energy costs in product 
evaluation, but there are some gaps in the literature that prevent comprehensive 
understanding of these effects (Kaenzig & Wustenhagen, 2010). Most of this literature 
has focused on long-term temporal frames (per year or longer) and suggest that 
consumers put more weight on attributes whose levels are framed on longer terms 
(Larrick et al., 2015; Burson et al., 2009; Pandelaere et al., 2011; Kaenzig & 
Wustenhagen, 2010). Hutton and Wilkie (1980) found increased purchase intentions for 
energy-efficient refrigerators when lifecycle cost information was provided more so than 
when annual cost information was provided. Similarly, Hardisty et al. (2014) find that 
providing 10-year energy costs generally encourages more energy-efficient choices than 
providing 1-year or 5-year costs. While long-term temporal frames make intuitive sense 
for durable goods, like vehicles and houses, unreasonably long frames may prompt the 
consumer to feel manipulated, be too abstract to fully comprehend, or be unreasonable 
timeframes to consider for behavior change or short-term decisions. For example, it may 
not make sense to the consumer to think of the cost savings of washing a load of laundry 
with cold water rather than hot water on a yearly or ten-yearly basis.  
One notable study looks at shorter-term temporal frames. McNeill and Wilke 
(1979) found no differences in a set of measures regarding refrigerator evaluation when 
typical energy costs were framed in monthly versus yearly terms. In a study on 
preferences for fuel efficiency, Camilieri and Larrick (2014) find that providing 
information about fuel costs per 100 miles encouraged more fuel-efficient vehicle choices 
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than when fuel costs were framed per 15,000 miles, and less efficient choices than a per 
100,000 mile framing. In sum, the literature suggests that presenting energy costs on 
larger scales may be most effective at encouraging energy-efficient choices, but the 
findings are inconclusive for how individuals respond to smaller scales and suggest there 
may exist a nonlinearity in response.  
 
3. Conceptual Underpinnings and Hypotheses  
How we frame costs and savings influences how individuals perceive their 
choices. Since we are considering gains and losses with respect to individuals’ budgets 
and changes in comfort and convenience, it is reasonable to look to prospect theory for 
inference on how to present the costs and savings of behavior change. Central to prospect 
theory is the concept of loss aversion: individuals dislike losses more than they like 
equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Under the framework of prospect theory 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and principles of hedonic editing (Thaler, 1985), 
individuals maximize utility by aggregating costs (pay $y per year) and segregate savings 
(save $x per day). This allows individuals to capitalize on the asymmetric shape of 
prospect theory’s value function. However, other research suggests individuals have 
limited ability to cope with multiple losses at the same time (Linville & Fischer, 1991). 
Individuals prefer to break up negative events to different days, which seemingly points 
toward segregating costs instead.  
Evidence from a third vein of literature suggests individuals tend to neglect small 
recurring costs, the Pennies-a-Day (PAD) effect (Gourville, 1998; 2003). Under PAD, 
individuals may be more likely to spend $x per day to get the comfort and convenience 
 
 
128 
associated with energy-inefficient choices. For example, individuals were more likely to 
donate $1 per day to a charitable organization than $350 per year, despite equal payment 
schemes between the two frames (i.e. automatic deductions from a monthly paycheck), 
and that individuals compared the daily donation to other small, recurring expenses like 
coffee and taxi fares (Gourville, 1998). However, there is no research on whether this 
phenomenon extends to small, recurring monetary gains, such as savings and associated 
benefits from engaging in an energy-efficient household behavior, or whether individuals 
stick with energy-inefficient behaviors when the costs are framed narrowly. If PAD 
extends to small gains, individuals may just round down small recurring savings from 
engaging in energy efficiency. There is evidence, though, that periodic pricing prompts 
individuals to consider repeat experiences of the purchase in question. As applied to 
recurring decisions about energy-related behaviors, narrowly framed savings may make 
the inconveniences or discomforts associated with a switch to energy efficiency more 
salient (Atlas & Bartels, 2017). In other words, messaging about saving $x per day by 
taking energy-efficient colder showers may call to mind the daily discomfort of each 
colder shower and steer individuals away from efficient choices. 
Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) posit several boundaries of loss aversion. They 
find that loss aversion is attached to the benefits of the good rather than the attributes. In 
other words, an individual is willing to give up one good to get another that provides the 
same benefits without loss aversion. They also find that individuals do not exhibit loss 
aversion for goods intended to be exchanged (e.g. cash). Our research investigates 
whether choices about temporal framing can minimize loss aversion for energy 
inefficiency. We operationalize this through a scenario that sets up a status quo level of 
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energy consumption and present individuals with relative costs of energy-inefficient and 
energy-efficient choice alternatives. Theory is conflicted about how consumers may react 
to narrow cost frames when it comes to behavior decisions. Theory generally supports 
broader frames as most encouraging product uptake, but gives little guidance on how 
broader frames affect behavior change decisions. As we describe later, we posit that 
frames that make cost information most easy to process will best encourage energy-
efficient choices. Specifically, we test the hypothesis: 
H1:  Status quo behavior influences intention to engage in energy efficiency 
differentially across cost frames – specifically, status quo bias is minimized when 
consumers are most easily able to process cost information. 
We find that individuals exhibit status quo bias in their choices when costs are 
framed as daily and yearly, but not when costs are framed as monthly. We look to ease of 
cognitive processing and fluency with monthly framing of costs to understand the 
cognitive processes underlying this interesting result. Cognitive fluency – the subjective 
experience of ease of processing information – may further influence how individuals 
perceive information about costs and savings when making energy decisions. Fluency has 
been shown to affect several areas of judgment, with messages that are easier to process 
being linked to judgments of truth, preference, confidence, and familiarity (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009). For example, Song and Schwarz (2008) found that individuals had 
stronger intentions to exercise and cook when the instructions were visually easy to read. 
In relation to fuel-efficient vehicle choices, Camilieri and Larrick (2014) find preliminary 
evidence that scale familiarity may be driving their finding of more fuel-efficient vehicle 
choices when fuel costs were presented per 100 miles rather than per 15,000 miles. 
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Individuals have an intuitive sense for which units and scales are most familiar, and place 
more decision weight on attributes with familiar scales (Lembregts & Pandelaere, 2013). 
Furthermore, individuals find it difficult to translate between units and are prone to 
incorrect comparisons when performing calculations to determine impacts of fuel and 
energy consumption (e.g. Heinzle, 2012; Larrick & Soll, 2008). Moreover, weighing 
tradeoffs between energy alternatives and their attributes can feel difficult, and this 
disfluency may encourage individuals to stick with status quo behaviors (Novemsky et 
al., 2007). This body of literature suggests that we may be able to overcome decision 
avoidance and encourage energy-efficient behavior choices by increasing fluency when 
presenting costs of inefficiency. 
We hypothesize that individuals are most familiar with monthly energy bills, and 
are therefore able to process cost savings information most easily when the framing 
matches their implicit context. By providing an easy-to-process context for the magnitude 
of the costs or savings, individuals may be more easily able to understand the benefits of 
alternatives in the choice set and more likely to overcome status quo bias. We test the 
hypothesis: 
H2:  Individuals are most fluent with monthly framing of energy costs. 
We elicit measures of fluency with the temporal frame and confirm that individuals are 
more fluent with the monthly presentation of costs relative to daily and yearly frames. 
Furthermore, individuals’ stated preferences for monthly cost frames provide additional 
evidence that individuals think of energy expenditures in monthly terms. 
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If fluency between the cost frame and an implicit context for that frame can 
influence individuals’ decisions, then we hypothesize that providing an explicit context 
for energy spending in a matching frame can make relatively disfluent frames easier to 
process. We define context as the typical frame of energy costs (i.e. a monthly energy 
bill). In other words, the monthly energy bill for total household energy use is the context 
for the marginal costs of energy-related behavior choices. In addition to information 
about costs of energy-inefficient behavior alternatives, we explicitly provide a context for 
typical spending on household energy. We manipulate whether these two pieces of 
information match in temporal frame and compare energy-efficient intentions for 
participants who were given context and costs in a matching frame to those given costs 
and context in different frames (i.e. inefficiency costs $x per day and typical energy 
spending $y per year). We specifically test the hypothesis 
H3:  Individuals have a higher intention to engage in energy efficiency when 
costs are framed in the same way as total spending context. 
As predicted, we find that individuals indicated higher intentions for energy-efficiency 
when given cost and context in matching frames, and particularly if these frames were 
broad (i.e. per year).  
	  
4. Studies 
4.1 Overview 
We test our hypotheses through four experimentally designed studies. The 
primary advantage of conducting experiments is that we can isolate the specific effects of 
nuances in how decisions are presented. In such a controlled setting, random assignment 
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of treatment conditions also allows us to interpret differences in response as causal. We 
rely on hypothetical scenarios and self-reported behavior intentions, which could lead to 
biased estimates of treatment effects in a non-experimental setting. However, we expect 
such biases (e.g. inflated intentions of pro-environmental behavior) to occur with equally 
likelihood across all treatment conditions due to random assignment. Therefore, our 
online studies provide a solid foundation for hypothesis testing. Due to the hypothetical 
nature of the scenarios, we interpret treatment effects as changes in intention to make 
energy efficient choices rather than actual changes in energy efficiency. In this section, 
we first outline the general experimental design and elements common across all studies. 
Then, we describe each study along with specific details of the method and design, 
results, and discussion of results as pertains to our hypotheses. 
4.2 General Experimental Design 
We conduct four online surveys from 2015-2016 drawing participants from two 
online populations: Amazon Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics. Each study was completed 
in less than 20 minutes and all respondents were compensated for their time.  
The primary component similar across all studies was a scenario based around a 
household energy decision between energy-inefficient and energy-efficient alternatives. 
The decision varied between some studies, but typically included a behavioral choice 
rather than a purchase. For example, we asked individuals about with what water 
temperature they would wash their laundry. The behavior is to choose a water 
temperature and the alternatives ranged from hot water, which is energy-inefficient 
because hot water requires energy to heat, to cold water, which is energy-efficient 
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because cold water achieves the same outcome while using less energy comparatively.24 
Individuals read the scenario and are given information about the costs of choosing the 
energy-inefficient alternative. The main treatment is random assignment of how the cost 
information is framed – per day, per month, or per year.    
4.3 Study 1: Boundaries of Status Quo Bias 
In our first study, we investigate which temporal framing of costs encourages the 
most energy-efficient choices. We presented individuals with scenarios about household 
energy-related behavior decisions. We asked individuals what they would choose given a 
randomly assigned status quo behavior and information about the energy costs or savings 
of switching behaviors. According to literature on status quo bias, we expect to find that 
individuals’ intentions are a function of their randomly assigned status quo, across all 
cost frame conditions. If individual behavior intention is consistent with the literature on 
cost framing, we would expect costs aggregated over longer temporal frames would 
encourage the most energy-efficient choices, while individuals may neglect costs or 
savings that are framed narrowly. A deviation from expected findings may suggest that 
existing theory about longer-term cost frames does not extend to narrower frames. 
Furthermore, any affect of cost frame on status quo bias would provide evidence for a 
potential boundary of status quo bias, with implications for how to best describe costs of 
household energy behaviors to motivate behavior change. 
Method 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Some may argue that the same outcome is not achieved using hot and cold water because they 
have a prior belief that hot water gets laundry cleaner than cold water. However, many of today’s 
detergents are specifically formulated for use in cold water, rendering the same outcome. 
Furthermore, even if individuals have a strong preference for washing laundry with hot water, 
these preferences would show up as noise due to the experimental design of the study.   
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Participants. We recruited 353 on-line participants to complete a study on 
household decisions through Amazon Mechanical Turk.25 Participants received an 
average of $1.50 for completing the study. Average time to complete was 11.3 minutes 
(sd = 6.8 minutes).  
Procedure. Participants were presented with two scenarios about household 
energy-related decisions in a between-subjects survey design.26 First, they were faced 
with a decision between using hot or cold water to wash laundry. Then, they had to 
choose between using or not using a second household refrigerator. Through random 
assignment, participants were told to consider a status quo of either an energy-efficient 
behavior alternative (e.g. always using cold water to wash laundry; not using a second 
refrigerator) or the energy-inefficient alternative (e.g. using warm or hot water to wash 
laundry; using a second refrigerator). Participants with an energy-efficient (inefficient) 
status quo were presented with the cost (savings) of engaging in the energy-inefficient 
(efficient) behavior alternative behavior. Costs and savings were randomly presented as 
daily, monthly, or yearly for each participant.  
All participants first saw a description of the scenario and then answered a 
question to confirm their scenario status quo. For example, participants assigned the 
inefficient status quo and yearly frame condition saw: “Suppose you often use warm 
water, but you are considering whether to use only cold water for your laundry. If you 
always use cold water, you will save $63.00 per year on energy costs. What do you think 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Two individuals failed a survey-level attention check. Exclusion of these individuals from 
analysis does not substantially alter results. 
26 The study included three additional scenarios, but results from these scenarios were discarded 
due to concerns about overwhelming the participants and quality of data. Only the first two 
scenarios were used in this analysis. Full text of scenarios is included in the Appendix, as are 
similar results for analysis using all scenarios. 
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you would do?” Participants used a 0-10 slider scale (shown in Appendix A) to indicate 
their likelihood of engaging in the energy-inefficient or energy-efficient behavior 
alternative. Our dependent measure is each individual’s response to this question 
averaged over the two scenarios. Individuals also answered a short series of questions 
related to the scenarios, environmental concern, construal level, cognitive reflection, and 
loss aversion.27  
Results 
Figure 1 shows intention to engage in energy efficient behavior, averaged over the 
two scenarios for each status quo and frame condition. In the daily and yearly frames, 
participants were influenced by their status quo, but not in the monthly condition. We 
used analysis of variance to analyze differences in behavior intention between the status 
quo groups, the temporal frame conditions, and the interaction between the two. There 
were main effects of status quo, F(1, 347) = 15.93, p = .0001, temporal frame, F(2, 347) 
= 4.67, p = .0099, and the interaction, F(2, 347) = 4.33, p = 0.0139.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
In the daily condition, participants preferred efficient behaviors more strongly 
when that was their assigned status quo, t(113) = 3.9376, p = .0001, d = 0.735. Likewise, 
participants in the yearly condition also showed statistically significant differences in 
their behavior intentions, in line with their assigned status quos, t(117) = 2.7845, p = 
0.0063, d = 0.511. However, participants assigned to the monthly frame showed no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Measures of construal level, cognitive reflection and numeracy, loss aversion, and 
environmental concern are included in the Appendix, as are additional methodology details about 
scale construction. 
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difference in behavior intention as a function of status quo, t(117) = 0.0781, p = .9378, d 
= 0.014, and they tended toward energy-efficient choices relative to participants assigned 
the inefficient status quo in the daily and yearly conditions. For individuals assigned a 
status quo energy-efficient behavior, there was no effect of temporal frame, F(2, 347) = 
1.46, p = .233, 𝜂  ! = .02. However, there was an effect of temporal frame for individuals 
assigned an energy-inefficient status quo, F(2, 347) = 7.69, p < 0.001. We replicate main 
findings even when controlling for loss aversion, environmental concern, cognitive 
reflection, stated actual frequency of engaging in the energy efficient behavior, and 
typical energy bill spending. 
 We investigated a number of individual differences, including loss aversion, 
environmental concern, construal level, cognitive reflection and numeracy, stated actual 
frequency of engaging in the energy efficient behavior, and typical energy bill spending. 
We find neither a main effect of loss aversion (p = 0.180) nor an interaction between loss 
aversion and status quo (p = 0.404). Environmental concern is significant in predicting 
behavior intention (p < 0.001) but does not interact with the treatment (p = 0.791) or 
affect main findings. Construal level does not produce a main effect (p = 0.661) or an 
interaction (p = 0.863). Cognitive reflection, given by the number of correct responses to 
five tasks (e.g. the bat and ball problem), is not significantly correlated with behavior 
intention (p =0.276) and does not interact with treatment (p = 0.536). Stated actual status 
quo frequency of engaging in energy-efficient behaviors measured on a 5-point Likert 
scale and averaged over the two scenarios has neither a main effect (p = 0.320) nor 
interaction (p = 0.535). Finally, we find neither a main effect of typical energy spending 
(p  = 0.474) nor an interaction with treatment (p = 0.356). 
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We also find that individuals tend to neglect small recurring savings. A main 
effect of temporal frame, F(1, 347) = 1.426, p < 0.001, indicates that individuals in the 
daily condition selected a behavior intention that was less energy efficient than 
individuals who saw monthly or yearly frames, given an energy-inefficient status quo. 
This suggests that the Pennies-a-Day effect (Gourville, 1998) extends to the small 
recurring savings that accrue from adopting energy-efficient household habits and 
switching to more efficient behavior alternatives. In other words, we found that 
individuals given an energy-inefficient status quo were more likely to forgo savings from 
switching to energy-efficient behavior alternatives when the gains from doing so were 
framed as daily, relative to monthly or yearly. 
Discussion 
Data support our hypothesis that individuals are influenced by status quo 
behaviors (H1). Interestingly, we found significant effects of status quo when monetary 
consequences were framed as yearly or daily, but not monthly. We also found evidence 
that the Pennies-a-Day effect – neglect for small recurring costs – extends to neglect for 
small recurring savings. This study showed how costs and savings of energy decisions are 
framed makes a difference in how likely individuals are to engage in energy efficiency.  
One possible explanation for a decreased sensitivity to status quo bias is ease of 
cognitive processing of monthly costs and savings. Many individuals typically receive a 
monthly energy bill, and by framing the costs and savings of energy decisions as 
monthly, individuals may be more readily able to evaluate monetary consequences in 
relation to their typical household energy expenses. This ease of processing may then 
make the value of the costs or savings more salient relative to typical energy expenses, 
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and allow individuals to be more calculating in their energy decisions. We test this 
hypothesis in Studies 2-4. 
4.4 Study 2: Fluency with monthly framing 
In our second study, we test whether individuals are more easily able to process 
monthly costs relative to other temporal frames. We present individuals with one of five 
scenarios, with the same experimental conditions as Study 1. Specifically, we randomly 
assign individuals to either an energy efficient or inefficient status quo and present the 
costs of changing behavior in either a daily, monthly, or yearly frame. We then ask 
individuals five questions to measure fluency with the temporal frames. We find that 
individuals are more fluent with monthly costs and savings than with daily or 
yearly/seasonal costs and savings. 
Method 
Participants. We recruited 1,199 online participants to complete a short survey on 
household decisions through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The average time to complete 
the survey was 2.4 minutes (sd = 3.9 minutes). 
Procedure. Each participant was randomly presented with one of five scenarios 
regarding shower water temperature, bus ridership, light bulb choice, use of a space 
heater, and use of a window air conditioning unit.28 Individuals were randomly assigned 
to a status quo (energy efficient or inefficient) and temporal frame of costs/savings (per 
day, per month, per year for scenarios 1-3 or per season for scenarios 4-5) similar to 
Study 1. Our dependent variable is intention to engage in energy efficiency as measured 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Text of the scenarios and additional measures are provided in the Appendix. 
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by individuals’ responses to the question “What would you do?” Individuals indicated 
their intentions using a 0-10 slider scale between definitely engaging in the energy 
efficient behavior or the inefficient behavior.  
Individuals then indicated their fluency using a seven-point Likert scale on four 
measures: ease of estimating the financial impacts of the decision, ease understanding of 
the decision, clarity of the decision, and clarity of the financial impacts. Text of the 
scenarios and fluency measures are provided in the appendix. We aggregated responses 
to fluency measures using a standardized Cronbach’s alpha (alpha = 0.811). Participants 
also ranked how involved they were in making the decision on a seven-point Likert scale 
(Minvolvement = 5.93, sd = 1.18), and how much they care about saving money and the 
environment on five-point Likert scales (Msaving money = 4.49, sd = 0.77; Menvironment = 4.02, 
sd = 0.95).  
Results and Discussion 
Using the Cronbach’s alpha index of fluency measures across all five scenarios, we find 
significantly higher fluency scores for individuals who are presented with monthly costs 
rather than other temporal frames (Mmonth = 0.079, Mother = -0.039, t(1197) = 2.42, p = 
0.016). Analysis of variance confirms a significant effect of frequency on fluency (F(2, 
1196) = 3.11, p = 0.045). Figure 2 plots mean fluency for each temporal frame condition, 
with higher values indicating higher fluency. Fluency is significantly positively 
correlated with intention to engage in energy efficiency (beta = 0.47, se = 0.119, t(1198) 
= 3.97, p < 0.001), though the variance in our dependent measure explained by this effect 
is small (r-squared = 0.012). 
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[Figure 2 about here] 
We can further investigate how fluency changes for different temporal frames. 
Scenarios 1-3 use the temporal frames per day, per month, and per year, while scenarios 
4-5 regarding use of AC and heat present costs per season instead of per year. First, we 
restrict our sample to only individuals who saw scenarios 1-3 and re-index the fluency 
measures (alpha = 0.811).  We continue to see a marginally significant difference in 
fluency means between individuals who saw monthly costs and those who saw daily or 
yearly costs (Mmonth = 0.066, Mother = -0.033, t(912) = 1.77, p = 0.077). We do the same 
analysis for individuals who saw scenarios 4-5 (alpha = 0.804) and find a marginally 
significantly higher level of fluency for individuals in the monthly condition (Mmonth = 
0.118, Mother = -0.058, t(283) = 1.77, p = 0.079). 
 Study 2 reveals that individuals find it easier to understand decisions about energy 
use when the costs of choice alternatives are framed as monthly, providing support for 
H2. Despite using a range of scenarios, two of which include seasonal instead of yearly 
cost frames, fluency seems to be highest with monthly costs. In Study 3, we further 
explore what temporal frame individuals tend to use when they think about their energy 
expenditures and costs of energy-related behaviors. 
4.5 Study 3: Experience with and preference for monthly framing 
In contrast to Study 2, which elicits fluency with a randomly assigned cost frame, 
Study 3 directly asks individuals for their preferences in frame. Among other components 
(not included in this paper), individuals were given a scenario where they were asked to 
recommend which cost frame should be used to easily convey costs of energy inefficient 
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behaviors to their neighbors. Then they were asked to indicate their preferred way of 
thinking about various expenses, including costs of energy-related behaviors and their 
energy bill. Individuals overwhelmingly prefer monthly cost framing. In combination 
with Study 2, we build evidence in support of monthly framing of costs being the easiest 
to process. 
Method 
Participants. We recruited 315 online participants to complete a short survey on 
household decisions from the Qualtrics panel of respondents. The average time to 
complete the survey was 14.3 minutes (sd = 12.2 minutes). All participants were screened 
to ensure they pay their own energy bills. 
Procedure. Individuals were presented with a scenario regarding how to frame 
costs of energy-related household behaviors.29 In this scenario, individuals are told that 
their neighbors each have energy meters in their homes. Each individual was randomly 
assigned to one of three treatment conditions, and were told that their neighbors saw total 
household energy expenditures either per day, per month, or per year on their energy 
meters. They were then asked to advise a neighbor that wanted to design flyers with a 
cost frame that would be most easy to understand. Individuals ranked each frame on a 7-
point Likert scale from “doesn’t make any sense at all” to “make complete sense.” Then 
individuals chose only one frame to recommend to the neighbor.  
Next, individuals were given a scenario in which they were designing a flyer to 
convey costs of several various activities. Individuals indicated which frame made the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Full text provided in the Appendix. 
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most sense for each activity, choosing from a selection of seven frames (per day, per 
week, per month, per year, trip, per load, per fill-up). Activities included both energy-
related activities and non-energy activities. Finally, individuals responded to a set of 
control questions, not included in this analysis. 
Results and Discussion 
When asked to rate cost frames on a 7-point Likert scale, individuals rated all 
frames as making sense (Mday = 4.94 sd = 0.117, Mmonth = 4.99 sd = 0.115, Myear = 4.84 sd 
= 0.118). However, monthly framing was rated significantly more sensible than the 
yearly frame (t(314) = 1.70, p = 0.091; difference in means not significant between 
month and day frames t(314) = 0.54, p = 0.587). Individuals then chose one of the three 
frames to recommend as the frame that made the most sense to use to communicate costs 
of energy-related household decisions. Figure 3 illustrates the results of this question. A 
majority of individuals recommended describing costs in the monthly frame (N=130, 
41.3%). The remaining individuals were approximately split between daily and yearly 
frames: N=88 (27.9%) recommended daily framing while N=97 (30.8%) recommended 
yearly framing. Interestingly, more individuals recommended monthly framing than daily 
or yearly regardless of the framing used in their neighbors’ energy meters. We argue this 
is further evidence for the ease of processing energy-related costs per month. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
Then, we elicited preferred cost frames for nine activities. Table 1 summarizes 
these results. Individuals preferred monthly framing for all activities except for the 
activities about washing laundry, driving, and grocery shopping. Of particular interest, 
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71.4 percent of individuals consider their energy bills on a monthly basis. This exercise 
provides additional evidence for monthly framing being both easy to process and 
familiar, and supporting H2.  
[Table 1 about here] 
4.6 Study 4: Providing context for unfamiliar frames  
Studies 1-3 showed that individuals respond differently to temporal frames, and 
that framing costs of energy efficiency may reduce status quo bias (Study 1). The 
findings regarding fluency in Study 2 suggest that ease of cognitive processing plays a 
role in the effectiveness of monthly framing in the absence of an explicit context for 
energy spending (or other relevant comparison metric). Study 3 provides additional 
evidence that monthly framing is not only easiest to process but also explicitly preferred. 
The scenarios in Studies 1 and 2 rely on individuals’ implicit contexts for energy 
decisions, and we posit their monthly energy bills serve as this context. This begs the 
question of whether we can enhance the fluency of typically less-fluent temporal frames 
by providing an explicit context (e.g. for energy spending) in the same temporal frame. 
Study 4 has two aims. First, we explicitly test the hypothesis of cognitive fluency for 
matching the frame of behavior-specific costs to the frame of typical household energy 
expenses. In other words, if people are given a daily energy bill, do daily costs work 
better? Second, we test whether broad (i.e., yearly) framing of both costs and typical 
expenses encourages more energy-efficient behavior intentions than narrow (i.e., daily) 
framing. 
Method 
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Participants. We recruited 132 participants for a fifteen-minute online survey 
through Qualtrics. Participants (51% male, 49% female) had an average age of 48 years 
and an average household income of $50,000 – 59,999 with at least some college.  All 
participants were screened to ensure they pay their own energy bills. 
Procedure. Participants were presented with three scenarios: laundry water 
temperature, use of a second fridge, and light bulb choice, as in previous studies. 
Following a description of the scenario, we presented typical household energy spending 
in a randomly assigned frame (daily or yearly), representing an explicit context for easy 
evaluation of costs of choosing an energy-inefficient behavior alternative. Participants 
saw the costs of engaging in the energy-inefficient alternative in a randomly assigned 
frame (daily or yearly), which either matched the typical spending context or did not.30 
Our dependent measure was similarly defined as in Studies 1 and 2, and we average over 
the three scenarios to generate our dependent measure for each individual. Figure 4 
shows an example of how typical energy spending and scenario-specific costs were 
presented. We also solicited fluency using the same four measures as in Study 2. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Results and Discussion 
Figure 5 shows that intention to choose energy efficient behaviors are strongest 
when the cost frame and the typical spending frame are matched. In other words, a daily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Some participants were instead assigned to monthly frames of typical spending context and 
costs of energy-inefficiency. We do not present results from these conditions here due to concerns 
about unintentionally prompting individuals to instead think about their own monthly spending. 
We argue that using daily and yearly conditions, which are relatively less familiar than a monthly 
frame, provides a cleaner experimental context to examine the effects of matching versus non-
matching frames.  
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cost frame works best when matched with a daily spending bill, and a yearly cost frame 
works best when matched with a yearly spending bill. In analysis of variance, we do not 
see a significant main effect of cost frame (F(1, 128) = 0.82, p = 0.366) but there is a 
marginal main effect of spending frame (F(1, 128) = 3.70, p = 0.056) and a statistically 
significant interaction effect (F(1, 128)=5.47, p = 0.021). Pairwise comparisons reveal a 
significant effect of cost frame when daily typical spending is presented (t(63) = 2.178, p 
= 0.033), but an insignificant effect of cost frame when yearly typical spending is 
presented (t(65) = 1.070, p = 0.289). These results provide partial support for H3, though 
we cannot statistically distinguish between behavior intentions with matching or 
mismatching contexts when individuals see an annual total spending context.  
[Figure 5 about here] 
We were unable to test for fluency as a mediator due to suspected ceiling effects. 
Fluency measures were on seven-point Likert scales (Mfluency measures = 6.31, sd = 0.80). 
Thirty-eight percent of individuals chose a seven for all measures, while 92 percent had 
an average raw fluency score greater than five, resulting in very little variation among 
respondents. We think the potential cause for reported high fluency was the clarity of the 
images used to portray costs and typical spending. We also see higher intentions for 
energy efficiency in Study 4 relative to Study 1. Though the scenarios are not directly 
comparable, this suggests that providing an explicit context for energy spending may 
increase fluency, which may in turn elicit more energy-efficient behavior intentions. 
5. General Discussion  
In four studies, we investigate how individuals respond to cost frames within the 
context of energy-related household decisions. Prior literature has mainly focused on 
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longer-term temporal framing of costs, ranging from one year to the life cycle of the 
product in question (Kaenzig & Wustenhagen, 2010; Hutton & Wilkie, 1980; Hardisty et 
al., 2014; Larrick et al., 2015). We extend this work in two ways. First, we focus on 
short-term temporal frames to build a more comprehensive understanding of how 
individuals respond to cost framing in general. Second, our scenarios involve costs 
related to household behaviors rather than product purchases. We find that intentions to 
engage in energy efficient behaviors are subject to status quo bias when the costs or 
savings of behavior change are framed as per day or per year. However, individuals who 
see costs and savings framed on a monthly basis overcome status quo bias in their 
behavior intentions. This provides evidence that is potentially inconsistent with current 
thinking about cost framing, which recommends using longer-term frames to promote 
product purchase. Furthermore, in the same vein as Novemsky et al. (2005) with 
boundaries of loss aversion, we show a possible boundary of status quo bias. 
We postulate that cognitive fluency plays a role in why monthly cost framing 
minimizes status quo bias. Prior literature on cognitive fluency links easy-to-process 
attributes to judgments of truth, preference, and ease (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). 
Therefore, a cost frame that is more cognitively fluent may affect individual choices. In 
two studies, we find evidence that monthly framing is easiest to process and the preferred 
unit to describe costs of several household choices. This finding is consistent across a 
randomized experiment that elicits fluency through a set of measures, and in stated 
preference-style measures. We also see that over seventy percent of individuals think 
about their energy expenses in monthly terms. Prevalence of monthly energy bills may 
provide an implicit context against which to evaluate or understand the costs of energy-
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inefficient behavior alternatives. Findings from these studies point to cognitive fluency as 
a possible boundary of status quo bias, and one that we may be able to leverage to further 
encourage energy efficient choices.  
A fourth study ditches implicit monthly framing to explore the benefits of 
providing an explicit context for relatively disfluent cost frames. If our conceptual 
framework is an accurate description of the decision making process regarding household 
energy choices, then we would expect that manipulations of explicit context framing to 
match cost framing would increase energy-efficient behavior intentions. Consistent with 
this framework, we find that individuals have the greatest intention to engage in energy 
efficiency when they see a context for total household energy expenditures in a frame that 
matches information about the costs of a specific energy-inefficient behavior, relative to 
receiving an explicit context in a mismatched frame.  
Our findings suggest two additional tools that choice architects can consider. 
First, we show that cognitively fluent framing can reduce status quo bias. If a policy 
maker’s goal were to encourage some behavior that is hindered by attachment to the 
status quo, then framing the costs of inaction in a frame that is easier to process could 
lead to more decisions to act. To illustrate with an example outside of energy contexts, 
consider the choice of whether to purchase relatively healthy fresh produce or 
comparatively unhealthy prepared foods at the grocery store. Individuals tend to think 
about their budgets for groceries in weekly terms.  Advocates for healthy eating that want 
to encourage purchases of fresh produce instead of prepared foods could consider 
framing the additional costs of unhealthy foods relative to fresh produce in terms of costs 
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per week. Future research should expand on how fluent framing and descriptions might 
be able to counteract other biases, like default bias and loss aversion.  
The second tool available to choice architects is providing a context against which 
to evaluate disfluent cost frames. We find that providing an explicit context for frames 
that are relatively difficult to think about increases behavior intention. The PAD literature 
recommends using narrow framing because doing so elicits comparisons to trivial 
recurring purchases. However, we find that framing costs as daily is less easy to process 
than equivalent monthly costs. Future research should investigate how providing explicit 
contexts could enhance the PAD effect. To illustrate with an example from one of 
Gourville’s (1998) motivating studies, individuals were asked about intentions to donate 
to a charity and provided the donation amount in a narrow frame ($0.85 per day) or a 
broad frame ($300 per year). While individual donation intentions were highest with the 
narrow cost frame, it is possible that disfluency with daily framing within the context of 
donations attenuated this effect, and that providing an explicit context for this amount 
(e.g. average daily spending on other products somehow related to charitable giving, or 
even perhaps setting up a contrast with daily spending on selfish purchases) could further 
increase donation intentions.  
It is also worth further investigating how fluency with the magnitude of the cost 
impacts choice. PAD finds that narrowly framed costs call to mind other familiar small 
costs, like a cup of coffee. But some very small costs (e.g. $0.11 per day relative cost of 
incandescent light bulbs) may not have a clear comparison, and this disfluency with 
magnitude may also play a role in how individuals respond to PAD framing. To this 
point, providing an explicit context against which to compare very small, narrowly 
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framed costs could increase fluency by increasing ease of recall of comparable trivial 
recurring purchases. 
 We face several limitations in our studies. Ideally, we would have liked to run a 
formal statistical test of cognitive fluency as a mediator. However, we were limited by 
the high fluency ratings of aspects of the energy decisions. One possible cause of high 
fluency ratings is the explicit (versus implicit) context given. Future research should 
investigate changes in behavior intention when there is an implicit versus explicit context 
for total energy expenditures. We suspect that individuals evaluated costs against an 
implicit context of monthly spending on energy bills in the absence of an explicit context. 
Study 4 attempted to manipulate fluency by providing an explicit context of total 
household energy spending in a relatively unfamiliar frame (per day or per year).  
However, providing an explicit context regardless of frame may render all aspects of the 
decision easy to process, and hence contributed to the ceiling effects we found with our 
fluency measure. Instead, future research could compare across product or behavior 
categories where individuals use contexts in different frames. For example, researchers 
could present costs in various frames and compare intentions for energy efficiency (with 
the context for total spending being on a monthly basis) to intentions to, say, substitute 
less expensive produce for more expensive prepared foods (with the context for total 
grocery budgets being on a weekly basis). To be consistent with findings from this 
research, we would expect to see status quo bias when energy costs are framed other than 
monthly and food costs are framed other than weekly.  
Additionally, future research should compare monthly cost framing to annual and 
longer-term framing, to provide a more comparable result to literature on longer-term 
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frames. Future research could also investigate alternative mechanisms that decrease status 
quo bias, for example evaluability of the costs or the changes in underlying judgments 
due to increased fluency. Song and Schwarz (2008) found that individuals were 
significantly more likely to engage in certain behaviors when the instructions for doing so 
were cognitively fluent. In terms of energy-related household decisions, cognitively 
fluent cost framing could cause individuals to think of the behavior changes as easy to do, 
increase preference for the energy efficient alternative, or allay underlying doubt about 
actual savings by increasing judgments of ease, preference, or truth. Lastly, future 
research should include an incentive compatible experiment. Our studies relied on 
hypothetical scenarios, in which hypothetical bias may affect individuals’ responses and 
inflate intentions for energy efficiency. A field experiment in particular would be 
beneficial to understand the external validity of our findings, both within an energy 
conservation context as well as in other decisions. 
Our findings have important implications for how to convey information about 
energy choices, both in framing and in content. Specifically, policy makers and energy 
conservation advocates should consider framing costs of energy-inefficient choices in the 
frame that is most fluent for the target audience. While prior literature recommends 
describing costs over longer time horizons, our research prompts another call to think of 
costs in terms of shorter horizons if those frames are easiest to process. We suspect these 
guidelines are particularly appropriate for costs of energy-related behaviors rather than 
energy-consuming products. In the case of using a frame that could be less fluent, a 
context against which to weigh those costs should also be provided. 
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Tables and Figures 
	  
Figure 1. Energy efficient behavior intentions by status quo condition and cost frame 
	  
 
Notes. Figure illustrates intention to engage in energy efficient behavior as a function of status 
quo and assigned frame of costs or savings, averaged across scenarios in Study 1. 
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Figure 2. Fluency by cost frame 
 
 
Notes: Figure illustrates Cronbach’s alpha of fluency measures by cost frame in Study 2.  
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Figure 3. Stated preference for cost frame 
 
Notes: Figure shows number of individuals who recommended each cost frame. N=315 
 
  
88
130
97
0
50
10
0
15
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Per Day Per YearPer Month
Recommended Cost Frame
 
 
158 
Figure 4. Energy meter context and cost sticker 
 
 
Notes: Participants saw the above images depicting typical energy spending (left) and costs of 
energy-inefficient choice alternatives (right). Energy meters showed daily and yearly frames 
($3.75 per day, $1,370 per year). Cost labels showed daily and yearly frames ($0.11 per day, $40 
per year). 
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Figure 5. Energy efficient behavior intention cost frame and total expenditure context 
 
 
Notes: Figure shows intention to engage in the energy-efficient alternative by cost and context 
condition in Study 4. Measures of energy efficiency intentions were highest when an explicit 
context for typical energy spending was provided in a frame that matched the frame of cost of 
energy-inefficient choices. 
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Cost per day per week per month per year per trip per load per fill up
Washing laundry with hot water 
instead of cold 4.8 10.2 30.2 10.8 1.9 41.3 1.0
Using two refrigerators instead of 
one 13.3 4.1 49.8 30.5 1.6 0.3 0.3
Driving a gas-powered vehicle 
instead of an electric vehicle 3.5 11.1 25.7 14.6 10.2 0.6 34.3
Using a space heater or window air 
conditioner 19.4 6.0 56.2 16.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Using incandescent instead of CFL 
or LED light bulbs 20.6 2.9 45.1 29.2 1.6 0.3 0.3
Going to the grocery store 3.5 31.8 26.0 4.4 33.0 0.3 1.0
My energy bill 9.2 2.5 71.4 15.2 0.6 0.6 0.3
My movie budget 3.2 7.3 44.8 23.5 20.0 0.6 0.6
Taking public transportation to work 
instead of a personal vehicle 11.8 14.3 27.3 11.1 31.8 1.6 2.2
Table 1. Stated preferences for cost frames
Notes: Cells indicate percentage of N=315 individuals who prefer each frame for the costs in each row. Percentages sum to 100% in each row. 
Darker shading indicates higher percentage.
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Sample slider measuring energy-efficient behavior intention 
 
 
 
Note: Slider was anchored at 5. Responses were reverse coded (definitely energy efficient choice 
= 10, definitely energy inefficient choice = 0). 
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Appendix B: Full text of scenarios used in main analysis of Study 1 
Scenario: Laundry 
Scenario description 
When doing the laundry, you can choose what water temperature your washing machine 
uses. Some people choose to use warm or hot water because they think warmer water is 
most effective for cleaning laundry. However, warm and hot water use more energy than 
cold water.  
 
Status quo manipulation 
For this scenario, suppose you often use [warm/cold] water.  
 
Status quo condition check 
This scenario asks you to assume that you currently use a certain type of water. What 
temperature is the water in this scenario?  
o warm 
o cold 
 
Suppose you often use [warm/cold] water, but you are considering whether to use 
[cold/warm] water for your laundry. 
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Cost frame manipulation 
If you always use cold water, you will save 17 cents per day on energy costs. 
If you always use cold water, you will save $5.25 per month on energy costs. 
If you always use cold water, you will save $63.00 per year on energy costs. 
If you often use warm water, you will pay 17 cents more per day for energy costs. 
If you often use warm water, you will pay $5.25 more per month for energy costs. 
If you often use warm water, you will pay $63.00 more per year for energy costs. 
 
What do you think you would do? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 
that you definitely would use only cold water and 10 means that you definitely would use 
warm water. 
 
Scenario: Second refrigerator 
Scenario description 
Many homes have a second fridge or freezer. They are typically used for additional food 
storage or convenience, and are typically located in a garage, basement or another room 
in the house. Suppose you own a second fridge, and are deciding what to do with it. If it's 
plugged in, you can use it to keep things cold, but you must pay for its energy costs. If it's 
not plugged in, it you can store it in the house, give it away or sell it. 
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Status quo manipulation 
For this scenario, suppose you own a second fridge and your second fridge is [plugged 
in/not plugged in]. 
 
Status quo condition check 
This scenario asks you to assume something about your fridge. In the scenario, is it 
currently plugged in? 
o Yes, it is plugged in 
o No, it is not plugged in 
 
Suppose you are considering whether to disconnect [connect] a second fridge in your 
home.  
 
Cost frame manipulation 
If you disconnect the second fridge, you will save 33 cents per day on energy costs. 
If you disconnect the second fridge, you will save $10.00 per month on energy costs. 
If you disconnect the second fridge, you will save $120.00 per year on energy costs. 
If you connect the second fridge, you will pay 33 cents more per day on energy costs. 
If you connect the second fridge, you will pay $10.00 more per month on energy costs. 
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If you connect the second fridge, you will pay $120.00 more per year on energy costs. 
 
What do you think you would do? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 
that you definitely would disconnect the fridge and 10 means that you definitely would 
connect the fridge. 
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Appendix C: Main analysis of Study 1 using all five scenarios 
Figure 1A shows mean behavior intention averaged across all five scenarios. In an 
ANOVA, there were main effects of status quo (F(1, 347) = 6.67, p = .0102), temporal 
frame (F(2, 347) = 8.38, p = .0003), and the interaction (F(2, 347) = 18.34, p = 0.0607). 
In the daily condition, participants preferred efficient behaviors more strongly when that 
was already their status quo, t(113) = 2.465, p = 0.015, d = 0.460. Likewise, participants 
in the yearly condition also showed statistically significant differences in their behavior 
intentions, in line with their assigned status quos, t(117) = 2.337, p = 0.0211, d = 0.429. 
However, participants assigned to the monthly frame showed no difference in behavior 
intention as a function of status quo, t(117) = 0.449, p = 0.0.654, d = .0824.  
The results from this analysis are consistent with those presented in the main 
paper. Additional scenarios include decisions about whether to shower with warmer or 
cooler water, ride the bus to work or commute using a personal vehicle, and whether to 
use a space heater or window air conditioning unit (based on each individual’s response 
to a question about which is more applicable to them). 
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Figure 1A. Energy efficient behavior intention averaged across five scenarios by status 
quo condition and cost frame 
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Appendix D: Independent measures and scale construction used in Study 1 
Cognitive reflection and numerical ability items were taken from Atlas and 
Bartels (2017), based originally on Frederick (2005) and Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer 
(2001). Scale was constructed as the proportion of correct responses (mean = 0.40, sd = 
0.28, min = 0, max = 1). Similarly, we measured construal level using the four items in 
Atlas and Bartels (2017) originally from Vallacher and Wegner’s (1989) 24-item 
Behavioral Identification Form. Scale was constructed as the proportion of abstract 
descriptions (mean = 0.60, sd = 0.22, min = 0, max = 1). We constructed a scale about 
environmental concern using four measures. Together, these measures had a Cronbach’s 𝛼 of 0.866 and ranged from -2.4 to 1.6 (mean = 0, sd = 0.84).  
 
Typical Energy Spending 
Approximately how much did you spend on your energy bill last month? 
o $0 
o $1-50 
o $51-100 
o $101-200 
o $201-300 
o $301-400 
o $401-500 
o $501+ 
o I don’t remember 
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Actual status quo 
Please identify how often you do the following behaviors: 
[measured on a 5-point Likert scale from Always – Never] 
o Wash my clothes using only cold water 
o Use a second refrigerator in my home 
o Shower using cooler water 
o Take a bus to work 
o Use a personal vehicle to commute to work 
o Use a window AC unit in my home 
o Use a space heater in my home 
 
Perceived discomfort or inconvenience 
How much discomfort, inconvenience, or effort would you experience following each of 
the following behaviors? 
[measured on a 4-point Likert scale from Severe – Little to none] 
o Always washing clothes in cold water (instead of using warm or hot water) 
o Removing a second refrigerator from the home 
o Always shower using cool or cold water (instead of warm or hot water) 
o Using public transportation instead of a personal vehicle 
o Removing a window AC unit from one room in my home 
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o Removing a space heater from your home 
 
Environmental concern 
Please select the option that best describes your opinion: 
[measured on a 5-point Likert scale from Strongly agree – Strongly disagree] 
o I care about the environmental impact of my energy choices 
o I frequently think about the environmental impact of my energy choices 
o I am an environmentally conscious person 
o I value how environmentally conscious I appear to others 
 
Cognitive reflection and numerical ability 
Next we will ask you a few brain teasers. Please answer the following as best you can. 
[Correct answers in parentheses.) 
o A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? (5 or 0.05) 
o In a lake, there is a patch of lilypads. Everyday, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the lake, how long would it take for the patch 
to cover half the lake? (47) 
o A 21 page album contains 480 photos. Each page displays either 18 large photos 
or 24 small photos. How many pages display small photos? (17) 
o In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 
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in 1,000. What percent of tickets of ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win 
a car? (0.1) 
o Suppose you have a close friend who has a lump in her breast and must have a 
mammogram. Of 100 women like her, 10 of them actually have a malignant 
tumor and 90 of them do not. Of the 10 women who actually have a tumor, the 
mammogram indicates correctly that 9 of them have a tumor and indicates 
incorrectly that 1 of them does not have a tumor. Of the 90 women who do not 
have a tumor, the mammogram indicates correctly that 81 of them do not have a 
tumor and indicates incorrectly that 9 of them do have a tumor. The table below 
[omitted here] summarizes all of this information. Imagine that your friend tests 
positive (as if she had a tumor), what is the likelihood that she actually has a 
tumor? (Please enter a percent.) (50) 
 
Construal level 
[Concrete (versus abstract) items are denoted with a *.] 
Any behavior can be described in many ways. For example, one person might describe a 
behavior as “writing a paper,” while another person might describe the same behavior as 
“pushing keys on the keyboard.” Yet another person might describe it as “expressing 
thoughts.” This form focuses on your personal preferences for how a number of different 
behaviors should be described. Below you will find several behaviors listed. After each 
behavior will be two different ways in which the behavior might be identified. For 
example: 
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 1. Attending class 
  a. sitting in a chair 
  b. looking at a teacher 
Your task is to choose the option, a or b, that best describes the behavior for you. Simply 
select the option you prefer. Be sure to respond to every item. Please mark only one 
alternative for each pair. Remember, mark the description that you personally believe is 
more appropriate for each pair. 
1. Making a list 
o a. Getting organized 
o b. Writing things down* 
2. Voting 
o a. Influencing the election 
o b. Marking a ballot* 
3. Taking a test 
o a. Answering questions* 
o b. Showing one’s knowledge 
4. Eating 
o a. Getting nutrition 
o b. Chewing and swallowing* 
 
Loss aversion 
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Consider a bet based on the toss of a (fair) coin. If the coin turns up heads then you win 
$20, and if the coin turns up tails you lose $2. Would you make this bet? For each of the 
following bets, please indicate if you would make the bet: 
[individuals selected “yes” or “no”] 
o HEADS: win $20 – TAILS: lose $2 
o HEADS: win $20 – TAILS: lose $5 
o HEADS: win $20 – TAILS: lose $10 
o HEADS: win $20 – TAILS: lose $15 
o HEADS: win $20 – TAILS: lose $20 
o HEADS: win $20 – TAILS: lose $25 
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Appendix E: Full text of scenarios used in main analysis of Study 2 
 
Individuals saw one of the following scenario descriptions 
- Most people shower in temperatures ranging from 115 degrees (very hot) to 
around 65 degrees (cold). While many people find warmer showers to be more 
pleasant than cooler showers, warmer showers cost more than cooler showers. 
- Suppose you live near a bus route that is convenient for your work commute and 
you also own a car. You must decide whether to drive or take the bus to work 
every day. If you take the bud your commute will take 20-30 minutes longer. 
Driving a personal vehicle to and from work is more convenient than the bus, but 
you must pay for the additional fuel cost. 
- Most lamps and lighting fixtures are compatible with incandescent light bulbs, 
LEDs and CFL (compact fluorescent) light bulbs. Some people choose to use 
incandescent light bulbs because they prefer the color and tone of their light. 
However, incandescent light bulbs use more energy than LED and CFL light 
bulbs. 
- Many homes have an air conditioner (AC) installed in a window to keep a room 
cool during the hot months. Suppose you own a window AC unit, and are 
deciding what to do with it. If you don’t use it you can store it in the house, give it 
away, or sell it. If you use it, the air conditioner will help you keep the room cool 
during the summer, but you must pay the energy costs. 
- Many homes have a portable space heater to keep a room warm during the colder 
months. Suppose you own a portable space heater, and are deciding what to do 
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with it. If you don’t use it you can leave it unused in the house, give it away, or 
sell it. You can use it to keep the room warm during the winter, but you must pay 
the energy costs. 
 
Status quo manipulation and check 
For this scenario, suppose you currently [do the energy efficient/inefficient alternative]. 
This scenario asks you to assume that you currently [do a certain type of behavior]. What 
is [the behavior]? 
- example: For this scenario, suppose you currently use cooler water to shower. 
This scenario asks you to assume that you currently use a certain type of water. 
What temperature is the water in this scenario? 
o warmer 
o cooler 
 
Cost manipulation 
Suppose you currently [do the energy efficient/inefficient alternative]. You are 
considering switching to [do the other alternative]. If you [do the alternative] you will 
[pay/save] $x per [day/month/year] on energy costs. 
- example: Suppose you currently shower using warmer water. You are considering 
switching to take showers using 15 degrees cooler water. This would be a 
noticeable, but not painful, difference in water temperature. If you use cooler 
water, you will save 12 cents per day on energy costs. 
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Dependent measure 
What do you think you would do? Please answer on the following scale, where 0 means 
that you definitely would take cooler showers and 10 means that you definitely would 
take warmer showers. (note: reverse code) 
 
Fluency measures [7-point Likert scale from Very Difficult – Very Easy] 
- Estimating how the energy decision would financially impact me was… 
- Understanding what the energy decision meant was… 
- The description of the financial impact seemed… 
- The description of the energy decision seemed… 
 
Involvement [7-point Likert scale from Not at all involved – Very involved] 
- How involved were you in the energy decision?  
 
Concern about money [5-point Likert scale from Not at all – A lot] 
- How much do you care about saving money?  
 
Concern about environment [5-point Likert scale from Not at all – A lot] 
- How much do you care about saving the environment?  
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Appendix F: Text used in main analysis of Study 3 
 
Recommended cost frame  
Now, suppose that in your neighborhood, most of your neighbors have energy meters in 
their houses. The meters have different settings for how to display energy costs. You 
know that all of your neighbors have left the meter on its default setting, which displays 
household energy expenses in the same way as the meter below. 
[energy meter] Energy spending is [$3.75 per day/$114 per month/$1,370 per year] 
 
Write a sentence or two describing the energy meter that your neighbors see, including 
how much they typically spend on their home energy. 
[open-ended response] 
 
Suppose a neighbor is designing a flyer to tell other households in your neighborhood 
about the costs of various energy-related choices at home, similar to the yellow label you 
saw in the previous scenario. 
 
Your neighbor wants to ensure that the costs are easy to understand, and asks for your 
suggestions on the following ways to describe the costs. Please rate each description 
below. 
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[7-point Likert scale: Doesn’t make any sense at all – Makes complete sense] 
- “… costs $0.10 per day” 
- “… costs $3.10 per month” 
- “… costs $36.50 per year” 
 
Which description would you recommend that your neighbor use? [multiple choice 
selection] 
- “… costs $0.10 per day” 
- “… costs $3.10 per month” 
- “… costs $36.50 per year” 
 
Preferred frame  
Suppose you were designing a label like the yellow label you saw before. You want to 
convey the costs of various household activities and alternatives so that your neighbors 
understand the costs easily. To do this, you want to describe costs in a way that seems the 
most natural. 
 
For example, you might say that eating at a restaurant instead of buying groceries costs 
$50 more per week or $200 more per month. Or you might say that leaving the lights on 
at home all day instead of turning them off costs $1 more per day or $0.20 more per 
lamp. 
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Please select the description that you think makes the most sense for each activity below. 
There is no right or wrong answer – just select the choice that makes the most sense to 
you. 
[multiple choice; frames include cost per day, cost per week, cost per month, cost per 
year, cost per trip, cost per load, cost per fill-up] 
- My movie budget 
- Using a space heater or window air conditioner 
- Driving a gas-powered vehicle instead of an electric vehicle 
- Using incandescent light bulbs instead of LED or CFL bulbs 
- Going to the grocery store 
- Taking public transportation to work instead of driving my own car 
- My energy bill 
- Washing laundry with hot water instead of cold water 
- Using two refrigerators instead of one 
	  
 
